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Privacy and Civilization, an Essay by Anthony Lewis
Jan Prochazka was a leading dissident during the totalitarian Commu-
nist regime in Czechoslovakia. He liked to meet and talk with another
dissident friend. The police secretly recorded their conversations. One day,
amazingly, the police began broadcasting the tapes on the radio. It was a
move to discredit Prochazka. According to the great Czech writer, Milan
Kundera, the tactic nearly succeeded. People were shocked because "in
private a person says all sorts of things, uses coarse language, acts silly, tells
dirty jokes ... floats heretical ideas he'd never admit in public and so
forth."' But gradually, people realized
[t]hat the real scandal was not Prochazka's daring talk but the rape
of his life; they realized, as if by electric shock, that private and
public are two essentially different worlds and that respect for that
difference is the indispensable condition, the sine qua non, for a
* Anthony Lewis was a columnist for The New York Times from 1969 to 2001. He
twice won the Pulitzer Prize. He was born in New York City and attended the Horace Mann
School in New York and Harvard College, receiving a Bachelor of Arts in 1948. From 1948 to
1952, he was a deskman in the Sunday Department of The Times. In 1952 he became a
reporter for The Washington Daily News. In 1955 he won a Pulitzer Prize for national
reporting for a series of articles in The News on the dismissal of a Navy employee as a security
risk-dismissal without telling the employee the sources or nature of the charges against him.
The articles led to the employee's reinstatement.
In 1955 Lewis joined the Washington Bureau of The New York Times. In 1956-57
he was a Nieman Fellow; he spent the academic year studying at Harvard Law School. On his
return to Washington he covered the Supreme Court, the Justice Department, and other legal
matters, including the government's handling of the civil rights movement. He won a Pulitizer
Prize for his coverage of the Supreme Court in 1963.
He is author of three books: Gideon's Trumpet, about a landmark Supreme Court
case; Portrait of a Decade, about the great changes in American race relations, and Make No
Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment.
Lewis was for fifteen years a Lecturer on Law at the Harvard Law School,
teaching a course on The Constitution and the Press. He has taught at a number of other
universities as a visitor, among them the Universities of California, Illinois, Oregon, and
Arizona. Since 1983, he has held the James Madison Visiting Professorship at Columbia
University.
1. MILAN KUNDERA, TESTAMENTS BETRAYED: AN ESSAY IN NINE PARTS (Linda
Asher, trans., Harper Collins, 1995).
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man to live free; that the curtain separating these two worlds is not
to be tampered with, and that curtain-rippers are criminals.
2
In time, Kundera managed to leave Czechoslovakia for France. There
Kundera saw a magazine cover of Jacques Brel, the singer, hiding his face
from photographers who had ambushed him in front of a hospital where he
was being treated for advanced cancer. 3 "And suddenly," Kundera wrote, "I
felt I was encountering the very same evil that had made me flee my country;
broadcasting Prochazka's conversations and photographing a dying singer
seemed to me to belong to the same world."4
The reason I have begun by describing these two experiences of Milan
Kundera's is that they provide the setting, and the insight he drew, for one of
the most compelling modern statements in support of privacy as a humane
value. Kundera said in 1985,
For me, indiscretion is a capital sin. Anyone who reveals someone
else's intimate life deserves to be whipped. We live in an age
when private life is being destroyed. The police destroy it in
Communist countries, journalists threaten it in democratic coun-
tries, and little by little the people themselves lose their taste for
private life and their sense of it. Life when one can't hide from the
eyes of others-that is hell. Those who have lived in totalitarian
countries know it, but that system only brings out, like a magnify-
ing glass, the tendencies of all modem society .... Without se-
crecy, nothing is possible-not love, not friendship.
Kundera saw journalists as the destroyers of privacy in democratic
countries, the equivalent of the secret police. And he has a point. He gave a
French example. Britain, home of the world's sleaziest tabloids, is even
worse. American supermarket tabloids are ruthless in their exposure of the
famous, and latterly their tittle-tattle has often been copied by mainstream
newspapers and broadcasters. But the most striking development of recent
years in America has been the use of the legal process to expose the inner
life of individuals. Kenneth Starr, the independent counsel who tried to
drive President Clinton from office, used his menacing power to obtain from
Monica Lewinsky's personal computer her unsent love letters and personal
jottings; he printed them out and included them in the report he sent to the
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. A Talk With Milan Kundera, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1985 (Magazine), at 85.
[Vol. 27:225
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House of Representatives. He also included, despite her anguished plea,
computer messages from a friend of Ms. Lewinsky's in Japan telling about
conflict with her husband.
Ms. Lewinsky especially resented a Starr subpoena demanding that a
Washington bookstore produce a record of all the books she had bought
6
there. "I felt like I wasn't a citizen of this country any more," she said. But
Starr said courts had upheld a subpoena for records of books read by
Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, so they should do the same
for him. That a prosecutor would advance so absurd an analogy shows how
the interest of privacy has been devalued in the legal mind.
Jeffrey Rosen's recent book, The Unwanted Gaze,7 compellingly de-
scribes what Rosen subtitles the book, The Destruction of Privacy in
America. He cites the lawsuit by Paula Jones as an example of how sexual
harassment law has been perverted into a destroyer of privacy.8 By accusing
President Clinton of an offensive sexual advance years before, Jones was
able to compel him, and others, to describe their consensual, private sexual
activities in testimony that inevitably became public.9 Monica Lewinsky was
asked by Jones's lawyers to hand over her diaries, address books, letters,
notes and so on.' 0 Rosen asks, "[H]ow could the law permit such unreason-
able searches, in which the investigation of the offense seemed more
invasive than the offense itself?""
We have come a long way in this country, a prurient way, from the
modest indignity that helped to provoke Louis D. Brandeis' great defense of
privacy: the use of pictures of his law partner's wife, without her consent, in
newspapers. Brandeis and his law partner, Samuel D. Warren, invented a
legal theory for the protection of privacy in their 1890 article in the Harvard
Law Review, The Right to Privacy.'2 They used a phrase that rings for us
still, "the right to be let alone.,
1 3
Brandeis was a man of strong and lasting convictions. Thirty-eight
years later he used that phrase again, dissenting from the decision of a
majority of his Supreme Court colleagues that wiretapping was not a search
6. ANDREW MORTON, MONICA'S STORY 215 (1999).
7. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA (2000).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
13. Id.
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subject to the restraints of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 14 He
wrote:
The makers of our Constitution... recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to
be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men.15
The wiretapping decision from which Brandeis dissented has been
overruled by the Supreme Court.16 Tapping of telephones by government
agents is now subject to the Fourth Amendment's bar on "unreasonable
searches," though that gives the government a good deal of room to define
what is reasonable. But otherwise, the interest of privacy has not fared well
in the United States. What Kundera described as the curtain between every
individual's public and private life is well and truly ripped.
The odd thing is that privacy has suffered despite the adoption of law
designed to protect it. For the Brandeis-Warren article has had more effect
on law, in all likelihood, than anything else ever written for a law review.
Legislatures and courts in most states have made invasion of privacy a tort,
just as Brandeis and Warren proposed. Treatises have identified four
varieties of the tort: 1) appropriation of a person's name or likeness, like
Mrs. Warren's; 2) invasion of one's personal space, as by a concealed
microphone in a medical rescue helicopter; 3) a depiction that puts a person
in a false light; and 4) disclosure of truthful but embarassing private facts
about a person.17
But despite all those legal trappings, those grounds for recovery of
damages, lawsuits for violation of the right to privacy have not often proved
fruitful. In significant cases, judges have found the interest in privacy
outweighed by other interests. One of the earliest of those cases, and to me
one of the most tormenting, is Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.,' 8 decided in
1940.
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
15. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
17. W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
18. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
[Vol. 27:225
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William James Sidis, born in 1898, was a boy genius. 19 His father,
Boris, a psychologist, set out almost from birth to develop the boy's
faculties. William was said to be reading The New York Times by the age
of 18 months.2" By the time he started school, he knew not only English but
22was studying Latin and French. Boris trained him relentlessly, issuing
bulletins on William's progress to the press.23
At the age of eleven, William entered Harvard, and The New York
Times described him as the "wonderfully successful result of a scientific
forcing experiment., 24 But, as anyone might have predicted, William did not
enjoy the life forced upon him. After college and incomplete attempts at
graduate school, he sought obscurity.5 Working variously as a clerk and a
translator, Sidis dropped out of the public eye until 1937, when The New
26Yorker published an article about him by Jared L. Manley. The headline
was "Where Are They Now?" Under that was the line "April Fool," a play
on the fact that Sidis was born on April 1.27 The article described him as
living a lonely life in "a hall bedroom in Boston's shabby south end." 28 It
spoke of his "curious... laugh," his collection of streetcar transfers and his
29interest in the lore of the Okamakamesset Indians. It was, as a judge said, a
It 30
"merciless" exposure of a man who desperately desired to be let alone.
Sidis sued under state law for violation of his right to privacy.31
Because he and the company that published The New Yorker were from
32different states, the case was brought in federal court. It was decided in
1940 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an
opinion by a particularly thoughtful judge, Charles Clark, a former dean of
the Yale Law School.33 Judge Clark expressed sympathy for the plaintiff.
34
19. Jared L. Manley, Where Are They Now, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 14, 1937, at 22,
as discussed in Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.
20. Sidis Could Read at Two Years Old, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1909, at 7.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
26. Manley, supra note 19, at 22.
27. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 807 (2d Cir. 1940).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 807, 809.
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Sidis claimed that The New Yorker article had held him up to "public scorn,
ridicule and contempt," causing him "grievous mental anguish [and]
humiliation. ' 5 There was no reason to doubt the truth of those assertions.36
But Judge Clark found for the defendants, the publishers. 37 He did not find
them protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, he did not mention the
First Amendment, for the Supreme Court had not yet brought libel and
privacy within its ambit. He simply balanced the interests-Sidis's in
privacy, the society's in freedom of comment-and said the court was not
disposed "to afford to all the intimate details of private life an absolute
immunity from the prying of the press. 38  Brandeis to the contrary
notwithstanding, Judge Clark said, he would allow "limited scrutiny of the
'private' life of any person who has achieved, or has had thrust upon him,
the questionable and indefinable status of a 'public figure."'
39
"Thrust upon him," that phrase of Judge Clark's, is what lost the case
for Sidis. To many it may seem unfair-it does to me-that Sidis was more
vulnerable to public mocking for the rest of his life because of the fame his
father forced upon him. But I suppose it would be strange, in a country as
devoted to freedom of expression as this one, to bar the press and the public
from taking a continuing interest in someone who had been a publicized boy
genius. More recent interpretation of the First Amendment has made that
side of the balance even weightier.
Whatever the legal balance should have been when Sidis sued, there are
questions of journalistic decision-making. Was the Jared Manley article
good journalism? Should The New Yorker have printed it? Was it ethical to
do so? When I teach the Sidis case, I ask my students what other works by
Jared Manley they have read. It is a trick question, because Manley did not
exist. The name was a pseudonym used by the real author of the Sidis
article, who was James Thurber. Another thing: Thurber evidently did not
meet Sidis. The article said a woman, unnamed, had "recently succeeded in
interviewing him.",40 Did she disclose her purpose? Or did she pose as a
new friend of the lonely man so that she was invited to visit his hall bedroom
and inspect his collection of streetcar transfers? There is a smell of tabloid
journalism here that one does not usually associate with The New Yorker.
Publishing a story that pries brutally into someone's private life may not give
35. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 251 (1984).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 811.
38. Id. at 809.
39. Id.
40. Manley, supra note 19.
[Vol. 27:225
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the victim a right to damages, but it may nonetheless violate the standards of
decent journalism. William James Sidis lived just four years after the
Second Circuit decision. Unemployed and destitute, he died of a cerebral
hemorrhage.4'
The interest of privacy was first authoritatively weighed against the
First Amendment's protection of freedom to publish in a Supreme Court
42
case called Time, Inc. v. Hill. James Hill, his wife, and five children lived
in a suburb of Philadelphia.43 In 1952, three escaped convicts took over their
home.44 The Hills were held hostage for nineteen hours, but were treated
respectfully by the convicts, who left and ten days later were caught.45 The
press covered the story intensely, to the distress of the family and especially
of Mrs. Hill, who was a very private person.46 To escape from the glare of
publicity, the Hills moved to Connecticut and sought obscurity.
Two years later a play called The Desperate Hours opened on
Broadway. It depicted a two-day reign of terror by escaped convicts who
held a family hostage: brutality, sexual threats, and general menace. The
play was set in Indianapolis. But Life magazine, doing a feature on the
opening, photograped the actors in the former home of the Hills near
Philadelphia and described the play, with all its terror, as a reenactment of7
what had happened to the Hills. The Life story was devastating to the Hill
family.48 Mrs. Hill suffered a psychiatric breakdown.49 Mr. Hill said he
could not understand how Life could publish such a story without at least
telephoning him to check the facts.50 "It was just like we didn't exist," he
said, "like we were dirt."'"
41. See generally Jim Morton, Peridromophilia Unbound: William James Sidis, at
http://members.aol.com/popvoid/sidis.htm; John H. Lienhard, Engines of Our Ingenuity No.
969: William James Sidis, at http://www.uh.edu/engines/ epi969.htm.
42. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
43. Id. at 378.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1967).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court 242, 249-50
(Oxford Univ. Press 1985). See also Leonard Garment, Annals of Law: The Hill Case, THE
NEW YORKER, Apr. 17, 1989, at 90, 109.
51. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, at 249.
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Mr. Hill sued Time, Inc., the publishers of Life, for violation of the New
York privacy statute.52 By associating his family with horrors that it had not
in fact experienced, he said, the article put the family in a false light.53 In the
New York courts, he won damages of $30,000.54 But Time, Inc. took the
case on to the United States Supreme Court, where Mr. Hill was represented
by Richard M. Nixon.55 After hearing argument on April 27, 1966, the
56justices voted 6-3 to affirm the Hills' modest judgment.
The opinion was assigned to Justice Abe Fortas. 7 He began with a
stinging attack on Life's handling of the story. 58  "Needless, heedless,
wanton and deliberate injury of the sort inflicted by Life's picture story," he
wrote, "is not an essential instrument of responsible journalism. Magazine
writers and editors are not, by reason of their high office, relieved of the
common obligation to avoid inflicting wanton and unnecessary injury. The
prerogatives of the press--essential to our liberty-do not preclude
reasonable care and avoidance of casual infliction of injury .... They do
not confer a license for pointless assault."
59
Justice Fortas went on to speak, eloquently, of the meaning of privacy
and its place in a civilized society.
[I]t is of constitutional stature.... [I]t is not only the right to be
secure in one's person, house, papers and effects, except as permit-
ted by law; it embraces the right to be free from coercion, however
subtle, to incriminate onesself; it is different from, but akin to the
right to select and freely to practice one's religion and the right to
freedom of speech; it is more than the specific right to be secure
against the Peeping Tom or the intrusion of electronic espionage
devices and wiretapping. All of these are aspects of the right to
privacy; but the right of privacy reaches beyond any of its specif-
ics. It is, simply stated, the right to be let alone; to live one's life as
one chooses, free from assault, intrusion or invasion except as they
can be justified by the clear needs of community living under a
government of law.
60
52. Time, 385 U.S. at 374.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 379.
55. Id. at 375.
56. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50 at 242.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 243.
60. Id.
[Vol. 27:225
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Powerful words, but you will not find them in the reports of Supreme Court
decisions. At the passionate urging of Justice Hugo L. Black, the Supreme
Court set the case down for reargument the following fall.6' And then, by a
62
vote of 5-4, it reversed the judgment for Mr. Hill. What had happened?
Justice Black was the most committed advocate of free expression on the
Supreme Court at that time, and very likely at any time in the Court's
history. Just before the Hill case was reargued, in October, he circulated
among his colleagues a biting memorandum on the case.63 "After mature
reflection," he wrote, "I am unable to recall any prior case in this Court that
offers a greater threat to freedom of speech and press than this one does."
64
His point was that the press, imperfect as it inevitably is, would be
devastated if it were subject to damages for non-defamatory mistakes.
Two members of the Court changed their votes, and in January 1967, a
655-4 majority set aside Mr. Hill's judgment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
66
wrote the opinion of the Court. He had written the landmark libel opinion
67three years earlier in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. That decision held
that, because "the central meaning of the First Amendment" was the right to
criticize government and its officials, someone who published such criticism
could not be made to pay damages for mistakes unless such mistakes were
knowing or reckless falsifications. 68 Now, Justice Brennan applied the same
formula to the Hill case.69 Life's falsifying of the Hill family's story had not
been proved to be knowing or reckless, so it was entitled to a new trial at
which that question could be decided by a jury. 7° "The guarantees for
speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment
upon public affairs,' Justice Brennan wrote, "essential as those are to
healthy government. One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to
comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes persons to
public view, both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self
to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized commu-
61. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, at 301.
62. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397-401 (1966).
63. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, at 299.
64. Id. at 301.
65. Time, 385 U.S. at 397-401.
66. Id. at 376.
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
68. Id. at 273.
69. See generally Time, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 388.
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nity. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society
,,72
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and press.
Milan Kundera, with his powerful feelings about the need for privacy,
would surely shudder at Justice Brennan's statement that "[e]xposure of the
self to others ... is a concomitant of life in a civilized community., 73 The
Kundera and Brennan views define the ultimate issue on this subject, the
conflicting claims of privacy and free expression. Each effectively dismisses
the prime value of the other.
Justice Fortas, joined by two other members of the Court, dissented.74
His opinion lacked most of the bitter rhetoric that was in his earlier draft of a
majority opinion. But he did say that a state should have "the right to
provide a remedy for reckless falsity in writing and publishing an article
which irresponsibly and injuriously invades the privacy of a quiet family for
" • • •,,75
no purpose except dramatic interest and commercial appeal. Reading the
record differently from the majority, he said the jury had found Life
reckless.76
The fourth dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan, took a position that
I find convincing. 77 Because this case did not involve an official or famous
person, he said, the "marketplace" of free speech in which contesting ideas
are supposed to wrestle in First Amendment theory would not work. Mr.
Hill could not command an audience to answer Life's distortions. So, there
was a danger, Justice Harlan said, of "unchallengeable untruth. 8 °
Accordingly, he would have required Mr. Hill to prove only that Life's
editors had been negligent in making their mistakes, rather than what is
harder to prove, that they were deliberate or reckless in their falsification. 8 1
One thing more must be said about the troubling case of Time, Inc.
When details of the shifting votes inside the Court were made public in
Bernard Schwartz's The Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court,83 in
1986, former President Nixon, who had argued the case twice for Mr. Hill,
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 411 (Fortas, CI., & Clark, J., dissenting).
75. Time, 385 U.S. at 415 (Fortas, CI., & Clark, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Fortas, C.J., & Clark, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 402 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80. Time, 385 U.S. at 408 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
82. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
83. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 50.
[Vol. 27:225
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asked his former counsel and law partner, Leo Garment, to look into it.84
Mr. Garment wrote an article for The New Yorker.85 He noted a statement by
Justice Harlan that publicity carried a "severe risk of irremediable
harm... [to] individuals involuntarily exposed to it and powerless to protect
themselves against it."'86 Mr. Garment said there had been testimony at the
trial that the Life article had caused "lasting emotional injury" to Mrs. Hill.
Then he wrote:
Two eminent psychiatrists had explained the causal dynamics of
the trauma inflicted on her. Both said she had come through the
original hostage incident well but had fallen apart when the Life ar-
ticle brought back her memories transformed into her worst night-
mares and presented them to the world as reality. Both said she
was and would for an indefinite time remain a psychological tin-
derbox. In August, 1971, Mrs. Hill took her life."
Justice Brennan was a great figure on the Supreme Court: Sullivan88 in
particular was a transforming victory for freedom of expression. But I think
the principle was pressed too far in Time, Inc. v. Hill.89 James Hill was not a
public person of the kind for whom the Sullivan 9° rule was imposed,
someone who should have stayed out of the kitchen if he could not stand the
heat. Nor was Mrs. Hill. I do not think the Hills of this world should have
to jump such high hurdles in order to make a modest legal point about their
privacy.
Then think of the Hill9' case in terms not of law, but of journalistic
ethics. Justice Fortas's original criticism of Life-"needless, heedless, wan-
ton" 92 -was hyperbolic. But did he not have a point in suggesting that
responsible journalists have a duty of reasonable care, especially toward
powerless private individuals like the Hill family? Neither William Sidis nor
James Hill had sought public position or prominence; fame was thrust upon
them. But what of those who put themselves in the public eye, the politicians
84. Garment, supra note 50, at 90.
85. Garment, supra note 50.
86. Id. at 109.
87. Id.
88. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
89. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
90. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
91. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
92. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, at 251.
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and celebrities who dominate today's publications and broadcasts? Do they
have any right to privacy at all?
Press attitudes on that question have changed drastically. When
Franklin D. Roosevelt was president, reporters and photographers effectively
hid from the public the fact that he spent most of his time in a wheelchair.
93
When a photographer new to the White House took a picture of the president
in his wheelchair, colleagues removed the film from his camera. Judge
Charles Clark, in the opinion rejecting Sidis's lawsuit, said that he could
imagine situations in which "public characters," as he called them, could
protect their privacy by law. 94 "Revelations," he said, "may be so intimate
and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the
community's notions of decency." 95
Nowadays it is hard to imagine any revelation so intimate that it would
offend the public's sense of decency, or that the press would consider too
invasive to publish. Anything that shows a politician in a bad light,
especially a president, is fair game. And, of course, sex is best of all. We
can date the end of press inhibitions to the moment a reporter asked Senator
Gary Hart at a press conference, "Senator, have you ever committed
adultery?,
96
We are obsessed with the sex lives of politicians. When editors are
criticized for focusing on that subject, they often justify their choice by
arguing that sexual behavior bears on a politician's fitness for office. Yet, I
have never seen any evidence that sexual purity assures wise leadership.
When a Linda Tripp comes along with her tales and her tapes, I think .a
mainstream newspaper editor or broadcaster should tell her to peddle them to
a supermarket tabloid. That is what a French editor would surely do, but the
French equivalent of a supermarket tabloid would not be interested either.
Sex? What else is new? Only in the United States and Britain does the press
go mad over straying politicians. Why? Is it something about the Anglo-
Saxons, as the French call us? Or, is it a result of increasing competition for
readers and viewers? If we do not publish it, that is, some bottom-dwelling
slug will put it on his website. So in this view the news business is
experiencing something like Gresham's law, with the vulgar and sleazy
tending to drive out serious news. After September 11, 2001, newspapers
and broadcasters did turn more serious. But after a time, analysts have
93. FDR and Polio-A 'Splendid Deception', at http://www.feri.org/archives/polio/
deception.cfm.
94. See generally Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
95. Id. at 809.
96. See N.Y. TIMES, May 7,1987, at A1.
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found, many reverted to a search for the tawdry. Celebrity gossip is the
staple of much of the magazine and tabloid newspaper world. The vicious
gossip-monger who was the fictional antihero of Sweet Smell of Success97 is
not fictional any longer. But you do not have to be a celebrity to be a victim
of today's intrusive journalism.
Ruth Shulman was driving on a California highway when her car was
hit by another and rolled down an embankment. She was gravely hurt,99
ending up as a paraplegic. A rescue helicopter came to the scene of the
accident and flew Ms. Shulman to a hospital.t°° What she did not know was
that the nurse in the helicopter had a wireless microphone, and someone else101
had a video camera, filming her in agony. It all became part of a program
that was really not news but a debased form of entertainment. °2 Ms.
Shulman sued for invasion of her privacy.10 3  The Supreme Court of
California ruled that she could have no legal objection to filming at the scene
of the accident, but she was entitled to an expectation of privacy in the
helicopter and could recover damages for the intrusion by the broadcast
company into that privacy. °4
Or, think about Charles and Geraldine Wilson of Rockville, Maryland.
Early one morning, while they were still in bed, their nine-year-old
granddaughter was up and waiting for a school bus. They heard her open the
door to someone.'10 Mr. Wilson, wearing only briefs, went out to see who it
was. 10 6 Three policemen with guns drawn ordered him to the floor.10 7 A
photographer who was also there took a picture of him with an officer's knee
on his back and a gun at his head. °8 The photographer worked for The
Washington Post, as did the reporter who was there with him.1°9 They were
on what is called a "ride-along," accompanying the police in "Operation
Gunsmoke," a search for wanted felons." ° The Wilsons' adult son was
97. Ernest Lehman & Clifford Odets, Sweet Smell of Success (1957 screenplay).
98. Shulman v. Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 475 (Cal. 1998).
99. Id. at 476.
100. Id. at 475.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 476.
104. Id. at 477.
105. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 607 (1999).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. 526 U.S. at 607.
110. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606-07.
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wanted on charges of violating probation and was a target of Operation
Gunsmoke."' He was not there, and in due course the police left.' 12 The
Wilsons sued the officers for violation of their Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and the case went to the United
States Supreme Court."
13
Some leading press organizations, including The New York Times, filed
a brief defending such press ride-alongs as legitimate under the Fourth
Amendment. 14 "The news media afford the public," the brief said, "a
unique window through which to observe the conduct of those offi-
cials ... and the social conditions they confront."' 1 5 Does that persuade
you? Not me. I do not think we need to find out about social conditions by
having reporters and photographers burst into private homes with armed
policemen. And it did not persuade the Supreme Court. It held that bringing
116
the press into the Wilsons' home violated the Fourth Amendment.
I spent fifty years as a newspaper reporter and columnist, and I believe
with all my heart in the First Amendment. If the press is to do its job, it must
look into some closed areas of government and society. It could hardly be
effective in holding power accountable if it had to ask the permission of
those who have power before looking into their activities. But, it is not
inconsistent with the great function of the press in keeping power account-
able to have some concern for the feelings of those who have not sought
power, for William Sidis or Ruth Shulman, for example. Or, for Oliver W.
Sipple, who had fame thrust upon him in an extraordinary way. On
September 22, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford was visiting San Francisco." 7
As he walked out of the St. Francis Hotel, a woman in the crowd, Sara Jane
Moore, raised a gun and aimed it at the President. 18 As she fired, Oliver
Sipple, a former Marine, struck her arm." 9 The shot missed Ford; Sipple
may have saved his life.
120
Two days later Herb Caen, a columnist in The San Francisco
Chronicle, carried an item suggesting that Sipple was gay and was a hero
111. Id. at 606.
112. Id. at 607.
113. Id.at608.
114. Brief of Amici Curiae of ABC, Inc. et al. at *1, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603
(1999) (Nos. 97-1927, 98-83).
115. Brief of Amici Curiae of ABC, Inc. et al. at *2, Wilson (Nos. 97-1927, 98-83).
116. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614.
117. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (Ct. App. 1984).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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especially in the gay community of San Francisco. 121 Other newspapers
copied the story, and across the country Sipple was identified as gay. He
sued for invasion of privacy, arguing that he was indeed homosexual but that
he was entitled to damages for publication of private facts that would
embarrass him. 123 The California courts ruled against him, finding that his
sexual orientation was known to many before the Caen column so it was not
legally "private." 1
24
Decades ago the California courts held that publication of embarrassing
facts that had been known to the public years before could be penalized by
damages.125 The case involved a former prostitute who had been accused of
126murder but acquitted. In the following years, she had reformed, married
and become a respected member of the town where she lived. 127 Then a
movie was made about her life, The Red Kimono. 12 This had an adverse
effect on her social position, and she sued for violation of her privacy. An
appellate court said she was entitled to sue, but recent privacy decisions by
the Supreme Court of California indicated that that precedent might no
longer be followed. 129 Thus, the outcome of Oliver Sipple's lawsuit seemed
inevitable. The American legal culture, as it is today, would not accept a
prohibition on publication of facts already widely known.
Other societies take a different view. Britain, which has never had a
privacy tort, is developing one now after incorporation into domestic law of
the European Covenant on Human Rights, which protects the right to respect
for private and family life. 13  Early cases suggest that British courts may
embrace the French concept of the "right to rehabilitation"-the right for
past sins to be forgotten and an acknowledgment that information may be
legally "private" even though it is known to friends of the offended
plaintiff.' 1
The first important British decision expounding what we would call the
law of privacy was handed down in March 2002 by the Court of Appeal.
121. Id.
122. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
123. Id. at 667.
124. Id. at 668.
125. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
126. Id. at 91.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See e.g., Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
130. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Part III, Art.
17, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
131. See A v. B Plc, 2 All E.R. 545 (C.A. 2002) available at 2002 WL 230787.
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The case was A v. B Plc.'32  Lord Chief Justice Woolf delivered the
judgment for a three-judge panel. 33 "A" was a leading British foot-
ball/soccer player who had had extramarital sexual relations with two
women, "C" and "D."' 3 "C" told her story to a tabloid Sunday newspaper,
"B."' 135 "A" obtained an injunction from a high court judge forbidding the
newspaper and the women to publish his, or anyone's, name. 136 Lord Woolf
set aside that restraint, giving what was an extraordinary victory to the
interest of freedom of expression-extraordinary because British judges in
the past have issued injunctions freely in disregard of that interest. 37 Judge
Woolf wrote:
Even trivial facts relating to a public figure can be of great interest
to readers .... Conduct which in the case of a private individual
would not be the appropriate subject of comment can be the proper
subject of comment in the case of a public figure .... The public
have an understandable and so a legitimate interest in being told
the information .... The courts must not ignore the fact that if
newspapers do not publish information which the public are inter-
ested in, there will be fewer newspapers published, which will not
be in the public interest.'
38
Lord Woolf made two other points that advanced the interest of free
expression in privacy matters. First, he said, "[r]elationships of the sort
which A had with C and D are not the categories of relationships which the
court should be astute to protect when other parties to the relationships do
not want them to remain confidential."'' 39 In other words, a public figure-
even one as fleeting as a football player-must bear the risk that the other
party to a sexual relationship may kiss and tell.14  Second, Woolf said that
courts "should not act as censors or arbiters of taste."' 4' It must leave that to
the ethics of journalism, policed in Britain to a certain extent by a body
called the "Press Complaints Commission." '42 "[T]he fact that a more lurid
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. A v. B Plc, 2 All E.R. 545, available at 2002 WL 237087.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. A v. B Plc, 2 All E.R. 545 (C.A. 2002) available at 2002 WL 237087.
142. Id.
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approach will be adopted by the publication than the court would regard as
acceptable is not relevant."
143
British tabloids are notoriously tasteless. But judges must not be
swayed by that, Lord Woolf was saying.' 44 Unless a judge weighing the
interest in privacy finds it distinctly more compelling than that of publica-
tion, the nature of the publication does not matter. With that, the British
press took a significant step toward the freedom its American colleagues
have enjoyed.
The American press has largely been triumphant in its resistance to the
law of privacy. It challenges the very constitutional premise of the true
Brandeisian legal action for deprivation of privacy: the idea that publication
of private facts, however embarrassing or even antisocial the publication
may be, can be penalized. The press argues that, under the First Amend-
ment, truth can never be penalized. The United States Supreme Court has
carefully avoided deciding that question, avoiding it, for example, when a
television station used the name of a victim of rape and murder when a state
law prohibited disclosure. 145 The Court held that the station could not be
penalized because a court official had inadvertently given it the victim's
146
name.
But the press should not be too comfortable-too arrogant, I might
better say-in its court victories against privacy claims. The public, coarse
as its tastes have become, may react against disclosure for disclosure's sake
if pressed too far against the powerless. There may still be, that is, what
Judge Clark in the Sidis case called "the community's notions of de-
cency."' 147 And, too, the public may react against developments in techno-
logy that strip us, unaware, of privacy, like a Microsoft Media Player that
keeps a log stored on the user's own computer of all the movies he plays.
Government in this country has accumulated powers more intrusive
than Justice Brandeis could have imagined. We need a press to watch it:
"[a] cantankerous press, an obstinate press, a ubiquitous press," as Judge
Murray Gurfein put it in the Pentagon Papers case. But "the right to
know," that phrase chanted by some editors as if it were a magic incantation,
is not the only value in a democratic society, not even one as committed to
the freedom of expression as ours. Privacy is also a crucial value, for
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
146. Id. at 496-97.
147. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
148. United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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reasons powerfully expressed a few years ago by Professor Thomas Nagel of
New York University:
The distinction between what an individual exposes to public'view
and what he conceals or exposes only to intimates is essential to
permit creatures as complex as ourselves to interact without con-
stant social breakdown. Each of our inner lives is such a jungle of
thoughts, feelings, fantasies and impulses that civilization would be
impossible if we expressed them all .... Sex is an important part
of what must be managed in this way, if a civilized human being is
to be constructed on the ever-present animal foundation, but ag-
gression, fear, envy, self-absorption and vanity all form part of the
task.... Just as social life would be impossible if we expressed
all our lustful, aggressive, greedy, anxious or self-obsessed feelings
in ordinary public encounters, so would inner life be impossible if
we tried to become wholly persons whose thoughts, feelings, and
private behavior could be safely exposed to public view.1
49
We are in the age of exposure now-self-exposure on Oprah Winfrey and
the like, exposure of others by the press. Secrecy is a red flag to journalists,
rightly so. Governments use it to hide corruption and incompetence, and to
increase their unaccountable power. But in another sense-the sense
articulated by Thomas Nagel and Milan Kundera-secrecy is an essential
component of a civilized life.
149. Thomas Nagel, The Shredding of Public Privacy: Reflections on Recents Events
in Washington, Times Literary Supp., Aug. 14, 1998, available at
http://www.geocities.com/Capitol Hill/Senate/9634/tlsnagel.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
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Irving v. Penguin UK and Deborah Lipstadt: Building a
Defense Strategy, an Essay by Deborah Lipstadt
In September 1996, I received a letter from the British publisher of my
book, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory,'
informing me that David Irving had filed a Statement of Case with the Royal
High Court in London indicating his intention to sue me for libel for calling
2him a Holocaust denier in my book. When I first learned of his plans to do
this, I was surprised. Irving had called the Holocaust a "legend." In 1988,
the Canadian government had charged a German emigre, Ernst Ztndel, with
promoting Holocaust denial. Irving, who had testified on behalf of the
defense at this trial, told the court that there was no "overall Reich policy to
kill the Jews," that "no documents whatsoever show that a Holocaust had
* Dr. Deborah E. Lipstadt is Dorot Professor of Modem Jewish and Holocaust
Studies at Emory University in Atlanta where she directs the Institute for Jewish Studies. Her
book DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND MEMORY (1993) and
is the first full length study of those who attempt to deny the Holocaust.
She recently decisively won a libel trial in London against David Irving, who sued
her for calling him a Holocaust denier and right wing extremist in her book. The trial was
described by the Daily Telegraph (London) as having "done for the new century what the
Nuremberg tribunals or the Eichmann trial did for earlier generations." The Times (London)
described it as "history has had its day in court and scored a crushing victory." The judge
found David Irving to be a Holocaust denier, a falsifier of history, a racist, an antisemite, and a
liar. Her legal battle with Irving lasted approximately five years. According to the New York
Times, the trial "put an end to the pretense that Mr. Irving is anything but a self-promoting
apologist for Hitler." In July 2001, the Court of Appeal resoundingly rejected Irving's attempt
to appeal the judgement against him.
Dr. Lipstadt has also written BEYOND BELIEF: THE AMERICAN PRESS AND THE
COMING OF THE HOLOCAUST (Free Press/Macmillan, 1986, 1993). The book, an examination of
how the American press covered the news of the persecution of European Jewry between the
years 1933 and 1945, addresses the question "what did the American public know and when
did they know it?"
1. DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON
TRUST AND MEMORY (1993).
2. For additional information regarding this trial, see Holocaust Denial on Trial, at
http://www.holocaustdenialontrial.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2003). The information contained
in this essay is based on the personal experiences of the author. As a result, the reader should
contact the author for further information regarding the contents of this essay.
3. R v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731. He was charged under a law that was
subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Canadian Supreme Court. Id.
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ever happened," and gas chambers were an impossibility. Since then, he
repeatedly denied the Holocaust. When asked by the press why all mention
of the Holocaust had completely disappeared from a new edition of one of
his books, he responded: "If something didn't happen, then you don't even
dignify it with a footnote." 5
I was sure that his threats to sue me were much "sound and fury"
signifying very little at all. In fact, they would turn out to be anything but
innocuous. They evolved into a six-year battle that would tremendously
impact my life. In my book, which was a scholarly study of the phenome-
non of Holocaust denial, I had devoted no more than a few pages to Irving.6 I
had described him as a Hitler partisan, someone who knew the truth but who
bent it until it fit his political ideology, and "the most dangerous Holocaust
denier." The reason, I argued, that he posed a danger was because he had
written numerous books about World War 11 and the Third Reich, many of
which were well-known and well regarded. Other deniers are publicly
known only for being deniers. Irving, on the other hand, had a reputation as
a writer of historical works that long predated, and was independent of, his
activities as a denier. Consequently, his pronouncements about Holocaust
denial garnered far more attention than they would coming from other
deniers. More importantly, he could and did insinuate different elements of
the panoply of Holocaust denial arguments in his books on other topics, for
example, his biography of Goebbels. Even those readers who completely
dismissed his beliefs about the Holocaust found it hard to avoid them.
Though my words about Irving and his modus operandi were harsh, I did not
worry about being sued because it seemed to me that what I had written was
no worse than what others had written about him in the past. Moreover,
everything I learned about Irving since the book was published in 1993
convinced me that my assessment of him was correct. It seemed utterly
incomprehensible that David Irving would deign to challenge the charge that
he was a Holocaust denier. My nonchalance about Irving's charges of libel
was reinforced by the fact that what I had written about him came from
published sources. I assumed that this problem would be easily resolved.
My nonchalance when I first received Penguin's letter was not the first
time I had treated the topic of Holocaust denial with undue jocularity. I had
done the same thing close to twenty years earlier when I first heard about
Holocaust deniers. A professor from Israel was visiting Seattle where I then
4. David Irving's 1988 Testimony, R v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.
5. Tr. of Day 1 at 97, Irving v. Penguin Books, Ltd. (Queen's Bench Div. 2000) at
http://www.holocaustdenialontrial.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
6. See generally LIPSTADT, supra note 1.
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taught. He told me about this loosely organized group which was actively
sending out letters to university professors promoting a journal which denied
the Holocaust. I had then wondered who would take them seriously. And
now I wondered who could take David Irving's claims that he was not a
denier seriously. Certainly this was a ploy just to scare me. As it turned out,
I was wrong on all accounts. Irving would energetically fight. The fact that
my sources were all documented did not protect me in the United Kingdom,
as it would have in the United States. The British courts took this matter
most seriously. In fact, since British libel law favored the plaintiff, it put the
onus on me, the defendant, to prove the truth of what I had written, rather
than on Irving to prove the falsehood, as would have been the case in the
United States. Defamatory words are presumed under English law to be
untrue. In short, I had to prove I told the truth. Had I not fought, he would
have won by default. I would have been found guilty of libel and, ipso facto,
Irving's definition of the Holocaust-no gas chambers in which Jews were
systematically killed, no officially sanctioned Third Reich plan to kill the
Jews, no systematic killings, no Hitlerian involvement in, or endorsement of,
the persecution of the Jews-would have been determined to be a legitimate
one.
This legal action was the first trial involving the Holocaust in which a
denier was the plaintiff and a scholar the defendant. It was about me and
what I had written, and it was about far more than me and my book.
Ostensibly, it was about the past, but it was also how the past would be
remembered in the future. The trial captivated the interest of both those who
study the history of the Third Reich and the Holocaust, as well as those who
study and combat neo-Nazi's attempts to resurrect that past. Two courts
ultimately rendered a decision, the Royal High Court of Justice and the court
of public opinion.
Although Penguin and I were both being sued by David Irving, we had
different commitments and priorities. Penguin was a subsidiary of the
multinational corporation, Pearson, Ltd., I feared that its fidelity would be to
its parent company, its shareholders, and the financial "bottom line." Even if
it wanted to fight, Penguin was not a completely free agent. An insurance
company paid its legal expenses, and the insurance company would have a
determining role in how the case would be handled. I feared that, as legal
costs escalated, Penguin might abandon the case or be forced to do so by
their insurers. Such a decision could come at any point, including after a
trial had already begun. I could easily be left in the lurch midway through
the proceedings. Penguin did have a commercial incentive to stay in the
battle. Settling with Irving, though possibly financially attractive to a public
2002]
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company, would give the publisher a black eye among authors. It might well
make those who wrote controversial books leery about doing business with
Penguin. Nonetheless, I could not be sure of what it would ultimately do. I
was well aware that in recent years publishers had not made a practice of
standing by their authors, even when they thought they were in the right.
Given all this, I instinctively felt that I needed someone to formulate a legal
strategy based on my best interests and no one else's.
At a loss as to how to proceed, I called a friend in London who had
already heard about the case and had a suggestion for me: Anthony Julius. I
knew Julius's name because he had just written T.S. Eliot, Anti-Semitism and
Literary Form.7 Many reviewers had given critical acclaim to the book.
Reviews had made a point of mentioning that Julius had written this
intellectually thick book as his Ph.D. dissertation while working full time as
a lawyer. I recalled a profile of Julius in The New Yorker in which he had
observed, in response to a reporter's comment about a lawyer getting his
Ph.D. in literary theory, that many lawyers have hobbies. This book was his
"golf equivalent."
Julius had been intrigued by the way a great poet, such as Eliot,
appropriated the degraded discourse of anti-Semitism to animate his own
work. Eliot had taken that which the enlightened world had supposedly
discarded, anti-Semitic speech, and turned it into art. But it was not just
Eliot's anti-Semitism that intrigued Julius. It was the way legions of critics
and readers had ignored, minimized, or tried to explain away this element of
Eliot's work. Anti-Semitism was not, Julius argued, peripheral to Eliot's
poetry, but central to those texts in which it appears.
Julius's book had generated serious discussion and debate regarding the
literary establishment's treatment of Eliot's anti-Semitism. Eliot scholars
had positioned themselves on different sides of the controversy that swirled
around the book. Many scholars and critics had long dismissed Eliot's anti-
Semitism as ironic, peripheral, or merely the "price to pay for admission into
the club of Modernism." Some, perhaps feeling a bit defensive, rejected
Julius's attempt to affix the label of anti-Semite on the work of a poet whom
they so treasured. Others were tremendously impressed by Julius's erudite,
even forensic, analysis of this aspect of Eliot's poetry and his argument that
Eliot meant what he said about Jews. Julius's book was so tightly argued
that one reporter described it as "the eviction of Eliot from the house of lame
excuses." Attesting to the importance of this work, Oxford University's
Professor of Poetry, James Fenton, had made it the subject of one of the
7. ANTHONY JULIUS, T.S. ELIOT, ANTI-SEMITISM AND LITERARY FORM (1996).
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three annual lectures he delivers each year at the university. In the lecture,
which was entitled "Eliot v. Julius," Fenton posited that "whatever
assessment is made of Eliot in the future, the Julius book will have to come
into it." Zeroing in on what may have well made some Eliot defenders so
uncomfortable, Fenton noted, "Julius says an anti-Semite is a scoundrel.
What is it that holds us back from saying that Eliot was a scoundrel?" 8
Julius was also Princess Diana's divorce lawyer and his name had
regularly appeared in the British press during the Princess's divorce
settlement negotiations. He had become part of that story. Though I was
happy to learn about Julius's willingness to help me, I wondered if a divorce
lawyer was the right person for a case such as this. A bit of Internet surfing
revealed that his specialty was not divorce, but press and libel cases. Born in
1956, Julius studied English literature at Jesus College, Cambridge. He had
joined a law firm in 1981, and became a partner by 1984. By 1986, he was a
member of the firm's management committee, and a year later, the head of
its litigation department. He taught law part-time at University College in
London where he created a new course, Law and Literature. Not surpris-
ingly, a number of the reviewers linked his critique of Eliot to his work for
Princess Diana. One described him as the ultimate iconoclast, willingly
challenging two British idols, T. S. Eliot and the House of Windsor.
While Irving was hardly anyone's idol, I figured that this was precisely
the kind of lawyer I needed, one who was unafraid of taking on formidable
cases. I reached for the phone to dial his office, fully expecting to have to
negotiate my way through a phalanx of receptionists and secretaries. A
friendly voice answered on the first ring, "Anthony Julius." "Is this Anthony
Julius's office?" I asked. "This is Anthony Julius," was the response.
Surprised to be connected so rapidly, I launched into an explanation of the
case. After a few moments he politely interrupted to assure me that he knew
many of the details already. There was nothing left but the pivotal question.
"Would you be willing to represent me?" Without any hesitation, Julius
said, "Of course. I would be delighted to do so." With someone of Julius's
caliber on board, I assumed that this matter would be dispatched in a
relatively straightforward fashion.
I did not have long to bask in these feelings of reassurance. A few days
later, a colleague dropped a recent issue of The New York Review of Books
on my desk. "Hear you are having trouble with this guy, David Irving.
There's an article here which might interest you." The journal contained a
review of Irving's recent biography of Josef Goebbels by the highly
8. The Talk of the Town, THE NEW YORKER, May 20, 1996, at 29.
2002]
25
: Nova Law Review 27, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
venerated Gordon Craig, Professor Emeritus at Stanford University, and
author of the Germany, 1866-1945,9 among many other important books. I
respected Craig's work and was anxious to see his assessment of Irving. I
was surprised, if not shocked, by what I read. While Craig disparaged
Irving's claim that Auschwitz was "a labor camp with an unfortunately high
death rate" as "obtuse and quickly discredited," he praised Irving's
iconoclastic views of history. 10 "Such people as David Irving have an
indispensable part in the historical enterprise and we dare not disregard their
views."l I wondered how Craig, an impeccable scholar with a distinguished
reputation, could believe that someone with such a distorted notion of
Auschwitz should have an "indispensable part" in the historical conversa-
tion. I found it perplexing that Craig could so readily bifurcate the different
aspects of Irving's work. If Irving so grossly distorted one major element of
the history of the period, how could his treatment of other elements be
trusted? Second, I was deeply distressed by Craig's failure to grasp that, by
including Irving in the conversation, he was according these "obtuse and
quickly discredited" views a new found prominence and credibility. I
worried, however, that if someone such as this highly respected scholar, who
knew so much about the period, could be beguiled by Irving, how much
easier it would be to beguile a jury of ten British citizens or even a British
judge.
Though he hoped Irving would drop the threat of a lawsuit, Julius
counseled that we must proceed as if we would end up in court. When I
asked Julius how we were going to fight this, he explained that there were a
number of different options open to libel defendants. They could argue that
the plaintiff was misinterpreting the words in question. This option was not
available to me because Irving was not misinterpreting what I had said about
him. When I had called him a Hitler partisan, right wing ideologue, and
Holocaust denier, I meant exactly that. The second option was to argue that
the words were not defamatory. That, too, was not an avenue I could
choose. The words were meant to be critical of him. I hoped that, when
others read them, they would grasp that this man was a denier who had made
overtly anti-Semitic statements. Finally, defendants could claim "justifica-
tion," that the words, about which the complaint was lodged, though
defamatory, were true and the author was, therefore, justified in writing
9. GORDON A. CRAIG, GERMANY, 1866-1945 (1978) (OXFORD HISTORY OF MODERN
EUROPE).
10. Gordon A. Craig, The Devil in the Details, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Sept. 19, 1996
(reviewing DAVID IRVING, GOEBBELS: MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH (1997)).
11. Id.
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them. That, Julius explained, was the path we would pursue. While we did
not have to prove that every detail of what I wrote was correct, we did have
to prove the essence of my words, or, as the courts defined it, their
"substantial truth." In British law this is generally known as proving the
truth of the "sting" of the libel.12 We would not only demonstrate for the
court the falsehood of Irving's contentions regarding the Holocaust, but
would also endeavor to show that, when discussing the Holocaust, Irving
consistently distorted, misquoted, and ignored those documents which
disproved his theories. Julius was unequivocal: "We will argue, exactly as
you did in your book, that Irving does not follow established historical
procedures and subordinates the truth for ideological purposes. His writings
and comments about the Holocaust are, we will contend, designed to spread
anti-Semitism and engender sympathy for the Third Reich."
As Julius laid out our battle plan, I felt reassured. Julius, who told me
he would be working together on this matter with his colleague, James
Libson, explained that, at this point, he was not sure Irving would really
pursue this case. Our objective, in fact, was to get him to drop the case. We
would do so by vigorously responding to his charges, using every legal
avenue open to us. We hoped that, faced by a formidable opposition, he
would drop the matter. Listening to Julius talk about Irving, I understood
that his Eliot book was far more than a "golf equivalent." It was an
expression of his deepest intellectual and moral commitments. He could not
abide anti-Semitism irrespective of whether it came from a T.S. Eliot or a
David Irving. He had even less tolerance for those who were willing to
ignore, justify, or rationalize away hatred and prejudice for any reason, be
they critics, reviewers, or scholars.
Over the next few months, Julius and James laid out for me in e-mails
and phone conversations the various steps involved in this kind of libel case.
James, whose job it seemed to be to walk me through the intricacies of
British law, explained that first we would have to prepare the "pleadings,"
our presentation to the court of what we perceive to be the central issues in
the case. At the same time, we would begin the discovery process, the
process by which each party turns over to the other side all materials it has in
its possession relevant to the issues, including correspondence, documents,
papers, books, and tapes. All the research material I used in preparing the
book was going to have to be disclosed. So, too, I would have to disclose
any correspondence or notes that concerned Irving.
12. Judgment at 4.7, Irving v. Penguin Books, Ltd. (Queen's Bench Div. 2000), at
http://www.holocaustdenialontrial.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
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The next step was the preparation of witness statements. My statement
would be my means of introducing myself to the court. In it, I would have to
provide background information on my professional and personal life,
insofar as it pertained to the case. We would then select expert witnesses,
and ask them to analyze Irving's work in order to assess my claim that he
was a denier and falsifier of history. Their reports would be submitted to the
court and to Irving well in advance of the trial, if there was to be one.
English court proceedings stipulate that the parties to such suits prepare their
evidence in writing and exchange it in the form of witness statements some
time before the trial. The purpose is to avoid "trial by ambush" and also to
shorten any legal proceedings. It was a crucial stage since one commits,
fairly early on, to the evidence which will be introduced at the trial. Finally,
based on the expert reports, we would present Irving with a list of interroga-
tories, questions which he would have to answer prior to the trial itself.
Julius and James were fairly certain that Irving, faced for one of the first
times in his career with a vigorous defense against his legal threats, would
eventually abandon this case. Underlying this strategy was a fundamental
proposition, which James articulated for me one day in a phone conversation
when I expressed amazement at the level and amount of work being done:
No detail will be left unturned. We will never allow ourselves to
assume, even for a moment, that simply by putting before the jury
an array of Irving's statements we will succeed in convincing it of
the truth of your words. We will fight this case as if it were the
biggest commercial case to ever cross our desks. Though we may
believe that Irving denied the Holocaust, we will not lull ourselves
into thinking this will be self-evident to either a judge or a jury.
As our strategy evolved, we not only decided what we would do, we
also decided what we would not do. Many people, lawyers in particular,
urged us to consider a countersuit against Irving. Julius, James, and I agreed
that, even if Irving decided to drop the case, we would not pursue that
avenue. We knew that a countersuit would create a real burden for Irving.
However, since he had few accessible financial assets, there seemed to be
nothing to be gained from a countersuit. It would afford him the media
attention he so craved, as well as the opportunity to play the victim. We also
determined that if we did go to court, we would not call survivors. Our
decision was based on both forensic and moral calculations. We were
adamant that this trial was not about proving the Holocaust happened. It was
about proving that as related to the history of the Holocaust, David Irving
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was a liar. To have called survivors would have been to suggest that we
needed the "eyewitnesses" or "witnesses of fact" to prove that there indeed
was a Holocaust. There was another reason why we were reluctant to put
survivors in the witness box. Irving was planning to act as his own lawyer.
We did not believe it ethical to place elderly survivors in a position to be
harassed and challenged by a Holocaust denier. Though we did not doubt
that they could withstand his challenges to their testimony, we did not feel it
right to impose this burden on them.
Over the course of the Fall of 1997, Julius, James, and I were in
frequent conversation about what we would want our team of experts to do.
Knowing Irving's work as I did, I fully expected the experts would find a
willful pattern of historical distortions when they scrutinized his writings on
the Holocaust. The experts' reports on Irving served another purpose as
well. They would put Irving on the defensive and alter the equilibrium of the
legal battle. He began this process as the plaintiff. As a result of our
exposure to his historical calumnies he would end up, we hoped, as the
"defendant." By January 1998, an impressive team had been drafted. We
asked Professor Richard Evans from Cambridge, a specialist on German
history, to serve as our lead historical witness and conduct a historiographic
investigation. He would analyze Irving as a historian, asking whether, when
writing about the Holocaust, Irving adhered to generally acceptable
standards of historical scholarship, or whether he deliberately distorted and
falsified history. In essence, we asked him to follow Irving's footnotes. I
was familiar with Evans' work on Germany, particularly his book In Defense
of History,13 which challenged post-modernist critiques contending that
history was often used as an ideological prop for bourgeois institutions.
Evans' book argued that the past "really happened, and we really can, if we
are very scrupulous and careful and self-critical.., reach some tenable
conclusions about what it all meant."'14 It was this that had prompted Julius
to suggest Evans serve as our lead historical witness. Professor Robert Jan
van Pelt, an architectural expert who had coauthored a meticulous, in-depth
study of the history of Auschwitz, joined Evans. Few people in the world
were more familiar with Auschwitz, its history, and its archives than van
Pelt. We asked him to focus on Irving's claims that the gas chambers at
Auschwitz were fakes. How did Irving justify these claims? What
"evidence" did he use to buttress his conclusions? Did Irving take into
consideration existing testimony and documentary evidence regarding the
13. RICHARD J. EVANS, IN DEFENSE OF HISTORY (1999).
14. See generally id.
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gas chambers? Professor Christopher Browning of the University of North
Carolina, author of Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 & the
Final Solution in Poland,15 and an expert on the origins of the Final
Solution, agreed to evaluate Irving's assertions that those Jews who were
killed were victims of rogue actions and not of a centralized plan, a Final
Solution with its roots in the highest echelons of the Third Reich. In his
report, Browning would marshal the documentary evidence of the Final
Solution, evidence Irving had to ignore in order to make his claims. Chris
Browning was then in the process of serving as a witness for Scotland Yard
at the war crime trial of Anthony Sawoniuk. 16 Sawoniuk, who had been
charged with murdering Jews, had arrived in England after the war and
worked as a British Rail ticket collector. The prosecution charged that he
had personally been responsible for murdering Jews in his hometown of
Domachevo, Belarus. Browning testified as an expert witness at the Zundel
trial when Irving had proclaimed Holocaust a legend and the gas chambers
fakes. Peter Longerich, a German born specialist on Hitler and a Professor
at the University of London, would analyze Hitler's role in the Final
Solution. Longerich would focus on Irving's claim that Hitler had no direct
role in the persecution of the Jews. Hajo Funke, a Professor of Political
Science at the Free University in Berlin and one of Germany's leading
specialists on right wing extremism, agreed to examine Irving's involvement
with the German radical right and neo-Nazi fringe. We wanted to demon-
strate to the judge and jury that David Irving's Holocaust denial had a
motive and that there was a relationship between his pattern of historical
falsification and political ideology. In other words, his Holocaust denial was
not just loopy history but was a means of furthering his political ideology.
As the months passed, I became consumed by the preparation of my
discovery list. I began to have almost daily phone calls with James and his
colleagues, reviewing what would be on my list. They kept stressing that I
had to scour my files and pull everything that might, even in the most
oblique way, relate to what I had written about David Irving. I also had to
strip my shelves bare of any books I had cited in Denying the Holocaust.
17
All those books had to be sent to London. Together with my research
assistant, we began to review the thousands of pieces of paper I had
accumulated while writing the book. Files that I had assumed I would never
seriously look at again were piled high on my desk. Books, some with the
15. CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 &
THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND (1992).
16. R. v. Sawoniuk, 2 Crim. App. R. 220 (C.A. 2000).
17. LIPSTADT, supra note 1.
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yellow post-it notes I had used while writing the book still on them, were
packed up to be sent off to England. It was a tedious job and I deeply
resented having to do it. As I reached the end of the process, Julius and
James, anxious that there be no question about my having fully complied
with the rules of the discovery process, arranged for an American lawyer
who specialized in libel, to come to my home to review the process by which
I had prepared the discovery list. I expected his visit to be a perfunctory one.
When he left five hours later, I was completely exhausted. He had opened
files at will to see if there was anything there that could even remotely be
connected with the case that I had not sent to London.
One afternoon during a visit to London, Evans and I met in my hotel
and walked over to the University of London in order to hear the historian
John Lukacs speak about his new book, The Hitler of History.'8 I looked
forward to the lecture for two reasons. I wanted to get to know Evans a bit
and thought this might allow me that opportunity. I was also anxious to hear
Lukacs because his book severely castigated Irving for the way he mangled
history, particularly in relation to Hitler. After the Gordon Craig review, it
was refreshing to read Lukacs' unequivocal description of Irving as an
"unrepentant admirer of Hitler,"' 9 who engaged in frequent "twisting" 20 of
documentary sources. Irving was an "apologist ' '2 and "rehabilitator ' '22 of
Hitler whose opinions had an "unsavory character., 23 Lukacs castigated
those historians, critics, and reviewers who relied on Irving's researches and
gave him "qualified praise. 24  Had they bothered to examine Irving's
sources, they would have found that his work was filled with "unverifiable
. ,,25
and unconvincing assertions. The book, already out in the United States,
had not yet appeared in a British edition. At the lecture, Lukacs told me that
the British edition might be delayed. Irving was threatening to sue. Lukacs
made it clear that his publisher, Macmillan, was watching my case closely.
As we left the lecture, I told Evans that Irving's threats against Lukacs
exemplified why it was so important to fight this battle: "Unless someone
stands up to Irving and refuses to be cowed by his threats, he will keep doing
18. JOHN LUKACS, THE HITLER OF HISTORY 26, 132, 178, 229-30 (1997).
19. See generally id.
20. See generally id.
21. See generally id.
22. See generally id.
23. See generally LUKACS, supra note 18.
24. See generally id.
25. See generally id.
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this to every author who exposes him for what he is. He'll shut down any
book which is critical of him."
During another visit, Julius, Evans, Browning, and I had dinner
together. Browning was then testifying in the war crimes trial of Anthony
Sawoniuk. Browning, who had seen how Holocaust deniers operate in the
courtroom during the Zundel trial, believed that Irving saw the trial as a
"platform" to gain publicity and support from his followers. Browning
understood our reluctance to call survivors as witnesses. "The Zindel trial
was horrible for them. The survivors who testified were not the only ones
who suffered. Even spectators sitting in the gallery found it painful to watch
what was done to them on the stand." Evans shared his observations based
on his months of looking at Irving's work. "Every time I look at Irving's
historical work I find a complete falsification. All veneer of respectability
slips away as soon as you begin to do the research." Looking at me, Evans
said, "Based on our research thus far, I think that Deborah was much too
kind to him. He seems to do everything she says he does."
As we talked about the historical evidence, I reflected on the clash of
cultures that faced us. An argument that would be readily embraced in a
scholarly setting might have to be set aside in the forensic setting. I spent
most of my life in the academic world, knew that culture well, and was
comfortable in it. I worried about the forensic world, but I knew our case
would be strong. There were, however, so many variables and unknowns.
One prejudiced or even iconoclastic judge or juror could bring us down.
Arguments, which would have trumped all others in the scholarly world, had
to be set aside because of the vagaries of a jury.
Throughout the summer, Mischon de Reya and Davenport Lyons,
Penguin's solicitors, poured over Irving's discovery list, the list of those
documents which, because they had some relationship to the case, he was
required to share with us prior to the trial. It consisted of close to 1500
items. When I first saw it, I was overwhelmed both by its size and by the
fact that, at first glance, it seemed to be filled with items that bore no
connection with my case. Could this, I wondered, be a boilerplate list, one
that he used for other legal actions? He was preparing to sue the journalist
Gitta Sereny, who in 1996 had written a critical review of his book
Goebbels26 in The Observer.2' The list contained items that related to her
case and not to mine. James worked together with the other lawyers in a
careful perusal of what was on his list. I was amazed at the work that went
26. DAVID IRVING, GOEBBELS: MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH (1997).
27. See generally Gitta Sereny, Spin Time for Hitler, THE OBSERVER, Apr. 21, 1996
(reviewing DAVID IRVING, GOEBBELS: MASTERMIND OF THE THIRD REICH (1997)).
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into the preparation of this application for the additional materials. The
lawyers had made note of the many items that had nothing to do with our
case. James explained why this was important. "In England, the loser pays
the costs. When we win and it comes time to assess our costs we will bill
him for the time spent separating the wheat from the chaff, that which
pertains to our case and that which had no connection to our case."
James and the others did something else that was far more important.
First, they looked for what was missing on the list. Even though we had, at
first, been taken aback by the size of his list, we soon recognized that it was
very incomplete. Responses to letters were there without the original letter.
References were made to enclosures that had been sent to Irving, but the
enclosures were missing. Then, in what was the most crucial step, they
composed a twenty-page "wish list," consisting of items they believed were
in Irving's files but were not included on his discovery list. This included
his correspondence with leading Holocaust deniers, anti-Semites, and neo-
Nazis. In addition to the items missing from his discovery list, we asked for
access to his complete collection of video and audiotapes. We were anxious
to show a jury that what he said in "public" in his books when he was
playing the part of historian was dramatically different from what he said in
"private" when he was talking to his most ardent followers, many of whom
seemed to share his political ideology. We also asked for access to his
personal daily diary. We argued that the diaries would help us prove that he
indeed did keep company with neo-Nazis and radical right-wingers. Such
evidence would buttress our argument that there was a relationship between
his historical falsifications and his political ideology; there was a motive.
We wanted these materials for building my defense, but asking for them
might have an unintended consequence. We assumed that this would be the
material Irving would be most ardent to keep out of the eyes of the public. If
this material contained information on Irving's connections with extremists
and neo-Nazis, he would want, we speculated, to keep it out of the public
domain. He would then, we presumed, calculate that it was better to drop
the case than to allow this material to see the light of day.
In September 1998, Julius, James, and the Davenport Lyons lawyers
went into court to challenge his list as it now stood, and to present the
application for the additional materials. I asked Julius if he wanted me to be
present. Much to my surprise he told me no. "We want him to drop the
case. Your presence at a hearing will appeal to his sense of theatricality. It
might give him an inflated sense of importance and make him less inclined
to drop the matter." Pre-trial hearings are presided over by a Master. James
described him as "a sort of junior judge." Our Master was, much to my
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amusement, named Master Trench. Given the nature of the battle that
occurred at this hearing, it was probably an appropriate name. Irving
assiduously fought to keep all these materials out of our hands. He was, he
complained to the court, being forced to disclose his "stock and trade." We
were, he charged, on a "fishing expedition." At first, Master Trench seemed
sympathetic to Irving's contentions and he questioned the broad sweep of
our application. Julius explained that the all-inclusive character of our list
was a response to the manner in which Irving had structured his charges.
Irving's accusations were exceptionally broad and we were, therefore,
obligated to respond in kind. Irving made the sweeping argument that I had
damaged, if not destroyed, his career and his reputation as an historian. We,
thus, were obligated to prove the precise nature of that career. In order to do
so, we had to examine far more than the historical materials he used in the
preparation of his books.
Throughout this hearing, which stretched from one day into the next,
whenever Master Trench agreed to one of our requests and Irving saw that
he had lost, he would complain that this action was part of the global
conspiracy against him. He accused "the enemies of truth," Irving's
euphemism for the Jews, of being out to destroy him. James, who called me
to give me a detailed description of the proceedings, described it as his "last
line of defense." It reminded James as sounding "like the desperate act of a
desperate man." James continued:
The problem for Irving is that he can make the conspiracy claim
now. He won't be able to make it when the expert reports come in.
Historians such as Richard Evans, Chris Browning, Robert Jan van
Pelt and the others can hardly be accused of being part of the con-
spiracy. He's going to have to find a better challenge for them.
At the end of the hearing, Master Trench agreed to virtually all our requests
including the right to inspect the diaries. It was such a sweeping victory that
even Julius, who generally adopted a low-key attitude and took our successes
in almost studied stride, allowed just a trace of excitement to creep into his
voice when he called me. He described Master Trench's order as an
"outstanding" development. James, who called a few moments after Julius,
made no effort to contain his excitement. "We had a fantastic day in court.
Master Trench's order is so wide we will not only get the items we ask for,
we will probably obtain materials we did not think we would get. Irving is
going to have to strip his files bare. A great burden has been placed on him."
Master Trench also took the unusual action of requiring Irving to sign an
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affidavit that his discovery was complete and compelled him to pay for the
costs of the work entailed in the discovery application. Thrilled by James's
report, I asked, "So will this get him to drop the case?" My excitement
about our success was tempered a bit by James's response. "When we began
this challenge to his discovery list, I thought it would. Now I don't think so.
A rational man might drop matters now. If he doesn't do so, then we will
have to depend on the expert witness reports and the interrogatories to get
him to drop out." We were about to end the conversation when James
added:
Oh yes, I was so excited by our successes that I forgot to tell you.
At the hearing, Anthony, who makes a point of avoiding getting
into any conversation with Irving, suggested to him that since this
case was so 'complex and intricate' it would be better if it was
heard by just a judge and not a jury. Irving agreed and Master
Trench will issue the order: No jury, just a judge.
I was pleased that the variable of an unknown group of people who would be
obligated to read reams of material had been removed from this case.
The other reason I was pleased at this development was that a jury
would only render a verdict. A judge would give a written judgment, laying
out the reasons for his or her decision. It would provide a perfect opportu-
nity for a ringing indictment of Irving and his historical lies. When I
expressed my satisfaction about this to another British jurist I knew, he had a
warning ready for me. "Deborah, don't be disappointed if the judgment is
not the sweeping condemnation of Irving you want." He proceeded to
explain that British judges are masters at practicing judicial restraint. "They
might say," he explained, "'I did not find this witness helpful.' Everyone
associated with the legal process will recognize that as a euphemism for
'This witness lied to me.' Those outside the legal process will not read it as
that."
Master Trench had given us the right to the diaries but placed strict
limits on our use of them. Because they contained highly personal
information, only the lawyers and those experts who were working on the
topic of Irving's connection with neo-Nazis could see them. If they found
something that pertained to the work of another expert, they could pass that
section on. No one else, myself included, could inspect the diaries. While
this stipulation protected Irving from having people troll through his
personal diaries, it did not offer him complete sanctuary. Any portion of the
diary that we introduced into court became part of the public record. As the
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experts began to review the material from Irving's personal files and diaries,
I was surprised to learn of his interaction with key American personalities.
During his visits to the United States, he had established contact with the
former Ku Klux Klan leader, David Duke. Duke and Irving not only played
tennis together but exchanged lists of their major donors, apparently
assuming that donors who supported one of them would be inclined to
28
support the other. Irving edited Duke's book, My Awakening. The book
was replete with so many racist and antisemitic diatribes that I found it
difficult to read. I was sitting with Julius and James, reviewing the material
from the diaries and the list of documents we had from Irving's files, when I
came across the information about Irving's speaking engagements before the
American extremist group, the National Alliance. The National Alliance
advocated that the United States be divided into racial regions; whites would
live in the choicest ones and people of color (that included Jews) in the
others. Its founder was William Pierce, who was the author of The Turner
29Diaries, which had become the "Bible" of far right wing extremists. He
advocated that extremists fight the government of the United States by
engaging in "leaderless revolution," i.e. that they operate as small cells that
30
could not be traced back to any large overarching organization. Irving's
diaries and correspondence revealed that he was in regular contact with
German neo-Nazis and extremists. During the two-year period immediately
following the unification of Germany, he regularly traveled to the former
East Germany where he had participated in a series of neo-Nazi rallies and
given talks to groups the German government labeled as extremist.
Irving then went to court and demanded that I, too, have to sign an
affidavit attesting to the honesty of my discovery procedure. Master Trench
agreed. James believed that the only reason Master Trench did so was
because Irving was representing himself. "He wants to give him as much
leeway as possible. If Irving had counsel, you may not have had to complete
such a form." James explained that, "it really was not a big deal." All I had
to do was go to a British embassy or consulate and swear before an embassy
official that I had turned over all pertinent documents to my adversary. I
complied, but as I did so I thought of how my life had been disrupted by this
case.
28. DAVID DUKE, MY AWAKENING: A PATH TO RACIAL UNDERSTANDING (1998).
29. ANDREW MACDONALD, THE TURNER DIARIES (1996). Andrew MacDonald is a
pseudonym used by William Pierce. See Q & A on The Turner Diaries, at
http://www.adl.org/presrele/Militi_71/2737_71.asp (last viewed Jan. 25, 2003).
30. Id.
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Though I could not talk to the press about the discovery materials from
Irving's files, there were still other things I could discuss with reporters, who
were beginning to call for interviews. I was anxious to explain to them that
Irving was not to be trusted as a historian and that this trial was not about
competing versions of history. In early 1999, over lunch in a small
Bloomsbury bistro near the Mishcon offices, I asked Anthony what topics I
should avoid when talking to the press. He looked at me and, in his blunt
fashion, said, "All of them. Just don't talk to the press. Period." When I
asked why, Julius argued that David Irving craved publicity. If I refused to
cooperate, most reporters would drop the story, thereby denying Irving the
attention he so wanted. Furthermore, Julius continued, "British judges hate
it when a case on which they are scheduled to sit is litigated in the press
prior to coming to trial." I began to mull over his view. After lunch, as I
made a quick detour to the British Museum, I realized that when a lawyer
tells a client something it is not an "opinion" or a "suggestion." It is far more
than that. I knew that I was used to talking to the press. I did it well. It
seemed silly not to allow me to use my talents in this regard. I knew,
however, that I also had to follow my lawyer's instructions in this regard.
As an academic, I was not used to taking orders about what I could and
could not say, particularly when it related to my professional work.
Academia was, in fact, all about the freedom to think and write as one
wished, within the confines of one's discipline. Thinking about this, I
realized that one of the hardest aspects of this whole saga would be ceding
control to someone else. This could well become the professional fight of
my life, and because it was in an unfamiliar arena, I could not lead the
charge.
20021
37
: Nova Law Review 27, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Dick Schaap: Covering a Contest Called Life, an Essay by
Jeremy Schaap
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTROD UCTION ............................................................................. 261
II. THAT W AS THEN .......................................................................... 263
II. FINDING THE ATHLETE'S VOICE ................................................... 266
IV. BIG MONEY CHANGES EVERYTHING ............................................ 272
V. THE ATHLETE-REPORTER GAP ..................................................... 274
V I. C ONCLU SION ................................................................................. 275
I. INTRODUCTION
In an interview conducted in the Summer of 2002, Sports Illustrated's
Rick Reilly challenged Chicago Cubs' slugger Sammy Sosa to take a drug
test for steroids.1 Sosa, who had invited the challenge by saying he would be
the first in line to be tested if the players' association agreed to testing, was
furious-and profane.2 He lashed out at Reilly, said he was tricked, and that
Reilly had betrayed him. Did Reilly break a promise to Sosa? No one other
than Sosa or Reilly knows. However, their confrontation was far from
unusual in the increasingly hostile climate that defines athlete-media
relations.
At the World Series in 1999, Pete Rose was honored as one of the
"players of the century." NBC's Jim Gray used the occasion to question
* Jeremy Schaap is a 1991 graduate of Cornell University and has been an ESPN
New York-based bureau reporter since September 1998. Before joining ESPN, Schaap was a
writer for NBC's Atlanta Summer Olympics daytime show (hosted by Greg Gumbel), and a
writer and producer for NBC's Wimbledon coverage. In 1994, Schaap was a writer for CBS's
Lillehammer Winter Olympics primetime show. Schaap's television career includes covering
sports and general news for New York 1 News (1992-94), and serving as an associate editor
of special projects for the Winter and Summer Olympics for Sports Illustrated (1991-92). His
writing has been published in the international edition of Time magazine and in the official
program of the Twenty-Fifth Olympiad. Schaap has won four Emmy awards-three for his
work aired on ESPN's Outside the Lines and one as a feature producer for SportsCenter. He
is the son of award-winning journalist Dick Schaap.
1. Rick Reilly, Excuse Me for Asking, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 8, 2002, at 94.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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Rose about gambling on baseball.4 Gray wanted to know if Rose was ready
to admit that he bet on the game that had been his life. Rose, who was
banned from baseball for life in 1989 for gambling, tried to deflect the
questions, but Gray was persistent. Rose told Gray, "I'm surprised you're
bombarding me like this... on a great night, great occasion, great ovation."
5
The public reaction to Gray's line of questioning was overwhelmingly
negative.6 To quell the controversy, he was forced to make an on-air
apology later in the World Series .
In 1993, as the New York Mets, who were expected to challenge for the
pennant, were suffering through a season in which they would eventually
lose 103 of their 162 games-the worst record in the major leagues that
year-outfielder Bobby Bonilla threatened reporter Bob Klapisch in the
Mets' clubhouse.8 Bonilla told Klapisch, who had frequently criticized
Bonilla in his stories, that he would, "show him the Bronx," then knocked
away a microphone that had been recording the confrontation. 9
Bonilla's colorful outburst illustrated the lack of respect between the
media and the Mets. So did an incident of July 4, 1993, again in the Mets'
clubhouse, when former Cy Young Award-winning pitcher Bret Saberhagen
squirted bleach on several reporters and cameramen.' 0 It was not a playful
prank.
Detroit Tigers' pitcher Jack Morris once famously dumped a bucket of
cold water on the head of Detroit Free Press columnist Mitch Albom.
Outfielder Deion Sanders once did the same to baseball announcer Tim
McCarver, a former major league catcher. Outfielder Dave Kingman once
4. Richard Sandomir, Gray Interrogates Rose at an Inappropriate Time, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at D8.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Richard Sandomir, Interviewer of Rose is Snubbed by Curtis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 1999, at D3 (stating the apology was made on October 26, 1999 during NBC's pre-game
show).
8. George Vecsey, Can Bonilla Get Along in New York? N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993,
at B9 (noting Bob Klapisch, of The New York Daily News, was the co-author of a book titled
The Worst Team Money Could Buy, which chronicled the struggling New York Mets
franchise).
9. Id.
10. Malcolm Moran, On Rainy Day, Saberhagen Pitches a Fit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
1993, at B31 (noting Saberhagen originally denied participating in the incident, but a team
investigation proved otherwise and led to disciplinary action against the pitcher).
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boxed up a dead rat and sent it to a reporter in the Oakland Coliseum press
box. "
These examples are culled from only baseball. However, in football,
basketball, and to a lesser extent in hockey, there have been hundreds of
similar confrontations. Essentially, today's athletes do not get along very
well with the men and women who cover them. The relationship is, above
all else, adversarial. This is not to say that every clubhouse and locker room
is a minefield for reporters. Incidents like those mentioned above are still
relatively rare. Most athletes tolerate the media. Most reporters are fair.
However, the climate has undoubtedly changed.
II. THAT WAS THEN...
It was a very different world in 1956, when my father, the sports
journalist Dick Schaap, graduated from Columbia University's School of
Journalism. The Golden Age of Sports, the Roaring Twenties, were long
over, but the romance had not died. The Brooklyn Dodgers were the world
champions. The Dodgers' Duke Snider patrolled center field at Ebbets
Field, while Mickey Mantle and Willie Mays were playing the same position
for the Yankees and Giants, respectively, in the same city.
Rocky Marciano was the heavyweight champion of the world, Archie
Moore was the light heavyweight champion, and Ray Robinson was the
middleweight champion. Everyone knew who they were and what titles they
held. The National Football League, at thirty, was still in its media infancy;
two years later, the Giants-Colts overtime championship game at Yankee
Stadium would lift the sport into maturity. Bill Russell was preparing to
play for the United States Olympic team in Melbourne, and Wilt Chamber-
lain was still a student at the University of Kansas. In hockey, Maurice
Richard of the Montreal Canadiens and Gordie Howe of the Detroit Red
Wings were the dominant figures in their six-team league. Vince Lombardi
was still an assistant coach on the staff of the New York Giants. Ben Hogan
and Byron Nelson were fading, and Arnold Palmer was just beginning to
assert himself on the PGA Tour. Sports were far from pure, but they were
still covered as a diversion, not as big business.
It was this world that my father entered in 1956, straight out of
journalism school, as a reporter at Newsweek. His colleagues included
11. See, e.g., High 5: What are the Top 5 Baseball Announcer Controversies of All
Time? N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 22, 2002, at 3 (determining the McCarver and Sanders fights
were number one on the list).
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Roger Kahn, who would eventually write The Boys of Summer,'2 the
definitive book on the Brooklyn Dodgers of the 1950s; and John Lardner, the
gifted son of the gifted sports and short story writer, Ring Lardner.
Before my father had even joined Newsweek, Kahn took him to dinner
with his hero, the Dodgers' Jackie Robinson. That was the culture then.
Reporters, even the greenest among them, broke bread with the biggest stars
in sports. There was, for the most part, mutual respect and an understanding
on the part of the athletes that the writers had a job to do. In the 1920s,
every writer who traveled with the New York Yankees knew that Babe Ruth
was a gluttonous womanizer and whoremonger.13 No one wrote a word to
that effect. Now, every indiscretion is considered fair game, and athletes do
not like it at all.
My father's relationships with the athletes he covered were rarely
acrimonious. Unlike so many of his colleagues, he fundamentally liked
athletes, and, in turn, they liked him. In terms of developing trusting
relationships, my father also had a distinct advantage over most of his
colleagues. He never regularly covered sports for a newspaper. He never
had a beat. If he had, he would have been compelled to be critical, and at
times to be confrontational. That is the nature of beat writing and column
writing. When a relief pitcher blows a lead, or a manager loses control of
his team, it is the newspaper reporter's obligation to poke, prod and probe-
to dissect failure.
My father was never obligated to deal with athletes when they were
down. As a national reporter for magazines and television, he could focus
on the subjects and the people he liked, and whose company he enjoyed.
There were rare instances when he would have to deal with a difficult
person, but for the most part, he could choose his topics and deal with those
athletes who were his friends, or at least friendly.
As a general city-side columnist at the New York Herald Tribune and its
successor, the World Journal Tribune, my father could not be so discerning.
He dealt with all the criminals, scoundrels, and politicians who helped run
New York in the mid-1960s, and he did not deal with them kindly.
In The Paper,14 the award-winning history of the Herald Tribune,
Richard Kluger wrote:
12. ROGER KAHN, THE BOYS OF SUMMER (Perennial Classics 2000) (1971).
13. See, e.g., ROBERT W. CREAMER, BABE, THE LEGEND COMES TO LIFE 21 (Penguin
Books 1983) (1974).
14. RICHARD KLUGER, THE PAPER (Vintage 1986).
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In 1965, (Herald Tribune publisher Jock] Whitney ordered the edi-
tors to kill a column by Dick Schaap, who by then had forsaken the
city-editorship to write heavily ironic commentary for the split
page on the connivances and blunderings of the power elite.
Schaap's offending column, noting how Governor [Nelson] Rocke-
feller's former allies had abandoned him wholesale in the wake of
his matrimonial misadventures, was intended as a comment on the
fickleness of politics, but Whitney, missing the point or not want-
ing to make it at the expense of his friend Nelson, said, "Why beat
a dead horse?" But when Schaap later deftly needled Mayor John
V. Lindsay, the great white hope of New York Republicans, whom
the Tribune had given strong editorial backing-and Whitney and
[Herald Tribune president Walter] Thayer had supported finan-
cially as well-in the mayoral campaign, he was never censored.'
5
One of my father's favorite subjects was Robert Moses, the czar of New
York's parks and roadways. In The Power Broker,16 Robert Caro's Pulitzer
Prize-winning biography of Moses, Caro wrote:
Dick Schaap wrote a whole-hilarious--column on the impossibil-
ity of reaching [Moses] on the phone, and when he visited [Gener-
alissimo Francisco] Franco wrote: "Moses' mission to Madrid is
another indication of his keen public relations sense. Franco is
practically an American folk hero. His firm democratic stance
cannot be questioned. No one could be more deserving of the
World's Fair's Gold Medal, unless, of course, it is Robert Moses
himself."' 7
My father's relative gentleness as a sports writer can be attributed in
large part to his experiences in hard news. It was difficult for him to muster
real indignation about sports after having covered the Watts riots and the
civil rights movement-which is not to say that he wrote about sports as if
they were somehow pure. However, for the most part, when he covered
sports, he tended to make friends, not enemies.
15. Id. at 694.
16. ROBERT CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW
YORK (1974).
17. Id. at 1108-09.
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The best friend he made through sports was Jerry Kramer, with whom
he would co-write four books and nearly a quarter-million words.18 In 1967,
my father decided to collaborate on an insider's look at the National Football
League with Kramer, the Packers' all-pro right guard. The book would be a
diary of Kramer's 1967 season, as he and his teammates defended the NFL
championship they won in Super Bowl I, which was their fourth title in six
years.19
Their timing was perfect. In the conference championship game, the
immortal Ice Bowl, the Packers defeated the Dallas Cowboys and Kramer
made the crucial play, the block that allowed Bart Starr to score a touchdown
on a quarterback sneak with thirteen seconds remaining. In his autobiogra-
20phy, Flashing Before My Eyes, my father recalled the aftermath of the
block:
In the locker room after the game, Kramer, enjoying his unfamiliar
role as hero, stood before the television cameras while CBS ran
and reran and reran the slow-motion pictures of Starr's touchdown,
and Kramer's block. Millions of Americans came to know Jerry
Kramer's name for the first time from one crisp, timely block.
"Thank God for instant replay," Kramer said, and we had our title:
Instant Replay: The Green Bay Diary of Jerry Kramer.21
My father met Kramer in the early 1960s, when he was writing his
second book on Paul Hornung the Packers' star halfback. He thought
Kramer was bright and literate, the perfect collaborator. The Packers not
only won the 1967 NFL championship, they also won Super Bowl II, 33-14,
against the Oakland Raiders, the champions of the American Football
League. That is where the book ends.
I. FINDING THE ATHLETE'S VOICE
Soon after its publication in the Fall of 1968, Instant Replay22 became
the best-selling sports book ever. Better than any previous sports book, or
18. See, e.g., JERRY KRAMER & DICK SCHAAP, INSTANT REPLAY (1968) [hereinafter
INSTANT REPLAY]; JERRY KRAMER & DICK SCHAAP, DISTANT REPLAY (1985) [hereinafter
DISTANT REPLAY].
19. INSTANT REPLAY, supra note 18.
20. DICK SCHAAP, FLASHING BEFORE MY EYES: 50 YEARS OF HEADLINES, DEADLINES
AND PUNCHLINES (2001).
21. Id. at 147-48.
22. INSTANT REPLAY, supra note 18.
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any since, it captured the peculiar milieu of the locker room, the combination
of machismo and male bonding rituals that rule the locker room.
I sat in front of my locker, and I talked and talked and talked. I
talked about the mistakes we made during the first half. I talked
about the spirit of our team. I talked about Lombardi.... I told
anecdotes and I told my opinion of just about everything, and after
a while I noticed that most of my teammates were dressed and were
starting to leave the locker room. I was still in my uniform, still
perched in front of my locker, I really didn't want to get up. I
wanted to keep my uniform on as long as I possibly could.
23
Instant Replay was an unvarnished look inside the world of the NFL, to
a point. It was not an expose, or salacious, nor even mildly off-color.
Unlike Ball Four,24 the groundbreaking baseball diary Leonard Schechter
and Jim Bouton published in 1969, Instant Replay did not tell tales out of
school. Ball Four debunked. Instant Replay glorified. Each was honest in
its own way.
The success of Instant Replay made my father the collaborator of
choice for America's best athletes. His subsequent collaborators included
New York Jets' quarterback Joe Namath; 25 New York Mets' pitcher Tom
Seaver;26 New York Knicks' forward Dave DeBuscchere; 27 pro golfer Frank
Beard; 28 all-time home run king Hank Aaron; 29 pro football Hall of Famer
Joe Montana;30 two-sport sensation Bo Jackson; 3' New York Giants'
quarterback Phil Simms; 32 and tennis coach Nick Bollettieri.
33
In the early seventies, when my father wrote books with Namath,
Seaver, Kramer, DeBuscchere, and Beard, the money generated by a literary
success was still enticing for athletes. Even the most highly compensated
23. Id. at 281 (Jerry Kramer speaking of his experience after a big game).
24. JIM BOUTON, BALL FOUR (1970).
25. JOE NAMATH & DICK SCHAAP, I CAN'T WAIT UNTIL TOMORROW. .. 'CAUSE I GET
BE7rER-LOOKING EVERY DAY (1969).
26. TOM SEAVER & DICK SCHAAP, THE PERFECT GAME: TOM SEAVER & THE METS
(1970).
27. DAVE DEBUSCCHERE, THE OPEN MAN: A CHAMPIONSHIP DIARY (1970).
28. FRANK BEARD, PRO: FRANK BEARD ON THE GOLF TOUR (1970).
29. HANK AARON & DICK SCHAAP, HOME RUN: MY LIFE IN PICTURES (1999).
30. JOE MONTANA & DICK SCHAAP, MONTANA (1999).
31. Bo JACKSON & DICK SCHAAP, Bo KNOWS BO (1990).
32. PHIL SIMMS & DICK SCHAAP, SIMMS TO MCCONKEY: BLOOD, SWEAT, AND
GATORADE (1988).
33. NICK BOLLETTIERI & DICK SCHAAP, MY ACES, MY FAULTS (1997).
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athletes could still really use the money from a successful literary venture.
Kramer, for instance, made far more money from Instant Replay than he did
playing for the Packers. Therefore, my father could pick and choose those
athletes with whom he wished to work.
My father's first post-Instant Replay collaboration was with Namath,
who allowed my father to have a lot of vicarious fun. Namath was the
biggest star in sports in 1969, when together they wrote, I Can't Wait Until
Tomorrow... 'Cause I Get Better Looking Every Day.34  The book
chronicled the Jets' 1968 season, which they capped by winning Super Bowl
ImI against the heavily favored Baltimore Colts. It also documented, gently,
Namath's swinging lifestyle, with off-hand references to booze and broads,
in the vernacular of the book.
The book perfectly captured Namath's swagger, as evidenced in these
few paragraphs about Super Bowl 11.
The only thing that really upset me all day was that, after the game
was over and we'd won, 16-7, we didn't have any champagne in
our locker room. That was just plain ridiculous. [Jets coach]
Weeb [Ewbank] and Milt Woodard, the president of the American
Football League, said that it wouldn't look right on television for
us to be drinking, that it'd be bad for our image, bad for the sport, a
bad influence on children. They were acting childish themselves.
It was pure hypocrisy, and hypocrisy hurts our image a lot more
than a couple of glasses of champagne. We were the champions,
man, the best in the world, and we had Cokes and Gatorade to
drink. The whole thing left a bad taste in my mouth. I washed it
out later with Johnnie Walker.
I had some night. I stayed up till the sun rose the next day. Hell,
I'd been getting too much sleep all week, anyway. We were on top
of the world. Number one. We were number one. Sometimes for
no reason at all, I just broke out laughing. I felt so good. On tele-
vision that night, I watched the replay of the game. Some people
were already saying that if we played the Colts again on. another
day, the result would be different. I watched the game on TV and
saw how conservatively I'd played, how I went for field goals in-
stead of touchdowns, and I guess I had to agree with those people.
On another day, we would have beat Baltimore worse.
35
34. See NAMATH & SCHAAP, supra note 25.
35. NAMATH & SCHAAP, supra note 25, at 69.
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They were very different: Namath, the glamorous quarterback and
ultimate bachelor, and Kramer, the anonymous, gritty lineman and family
man. But my father captured each of their voices perfectly. Reading Instant
Replay and I Can't Wait Until Tomorrow, you can hear Kramer and Namath,
not my father, which is the ultimate tribute to him as a collaborator.
My father not only captured the voices of his co-authors, but their
personalities as well-their strengths, weaknesses and fears. With Dave
DeBuscchere, my father wrote The Open Man,36 the story of the New York
Knicks' first championship in 1970. The Knicks' coach, Red Holzman,
liked to say "[1]ook for the open man," and the title of the book was a play
on those words. More than most sports biographies, it revealed its subject
honestly and poignantly. Again, my father and his subject are describing
what it feels like to have just won a championship:
I ran down the corridor toward our locker room, past the tangle of
cables and lights and television cameras, cradling the basketball. I
didn't know what I was going to do with it. All I knew was that the
ball represented everything we'd worked for since September, eve-
rything I'd worked for, really, since I first started playing basket-
ball.37
Debuscchere then described how he felt a few hours later: "I [laid]
down and tried to sleep, but I couldn't. My heart started pounding, louder
than I'd ever heard it before. For more than an hour, I lay and listened to my
heart, thumping so hard, my T-shirt was palpitating. ' 38
In his foreword to Sport, a collection of my father's writings, Breslin
wrote, "[s]o typical of Schaap, he ends a story of victory with DeBuscchere
lying in bed, chest pounding, frightened that he [was] having a heart
attack., 39  Even as my father was pumping out book after book, his
friendships with the athletes he profiled flourished. Somehow, he gave both
the athletes and the readers who bought his books what they wanted. It has
to do with fairness as well as skill. He showed the readers a world they had
never seen before, but he did not sensationalize. He rarely, if ever, took
cheap shots, and he rarely, if ever, told a juicy story at the expense of
someone else. There was, however, an edge to his prose, and an honesty that
endeared his writing to his subjects, the critics and the public.
36. DEBUSCCHERE, supra note 27.
37. Id. at 263.
38. ld. at 265.
39. DICK SCHAAP, SPORT X (1975).
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As a ghostwriter for thirty years, my father worked with many of the
biggest names in sports. He was disappointed that Muhammad Ali chose
someone else to co-author his autobiography, but he understood. Ali was, in
effect, required to collaborate with a member of the Nation of Islam. There
were only a few other subjects who declined my father's advances, Frank
Sinatra and Joe DiMaggio, and they declined everyone's request.
My father knew Sinatra fairly well. Sinatra was, my father told me, the
only person he let call him "Dickie." My father wrote a column for the
Herald Tribune about a literary party Sinatra attended. He loved the last
line: "The frugging at the Gate wasn't the same after Sinatra left. It must
have been like that at the Mermaid after Shakespeare left., 40 DiMaggio my
father knew better. My father reflected on their relationship in his
autobiography:
In later years, as I got to know him better, I tried to persuade
DiMaggio to allow me to collaborate with him, as I had with other
athletes, on an autobiography. He declined, of course, fiercely
guarding his privacy, but once, when we both happened to be eat-
ing breakfast in a Marriott hotel near Fisherman's Wharf in his
hometown of San Francisco, he teased me, saying, "I'm almost
ready." And then he smiled, and I smiled, both of us knowing he
would never be ready to share the intimate details of his baseball
career or his equally sensational marriage-to Marilyn Monroe.
From then on, whenever I saw him, once or twice a year, I'd ask,
"Are you ready now?" and we'd both smile.
4 1
Everyone with whom my father wrote a book was a superstar, except
Tom Waddell. My father got to know Waddell as he was dying of AIDS in
1987, profiling the one-time Olympic decathlete for 20/20 and Sports
Illustrated. Though they knew each other only briefly, my father and
Waddell became very close. My father saw in Waddell-a college football
and gymnastics star, an Olympic decathlete, an Army paratrooper, a
successful physician, and the founder of the Gay Games-the versatility and
courage that he had always admired.
My father, like most men of his generation, or of any generation, was at
least somewhat homophobic, which he admitted in several stories he wrote
about his relationship with Waddell. He often said that by getting to know
Waddell, who was about as macho as a gay man could be, he overcame his
40. Id. at 274.
41. SCHAAP, supra note 20, at 14-15.
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homophobia. As Waddell lay dying, he and my father decided that my father
would tell his story, in autobiographical form, posthumously. It would turn
out to be a Herculean task, of Odyssean length. He spent nine years, on and
off, writing it.
When it was finally published, he told the San Francisco Examiner he
never had a book "mean so much to me. This was the first person I'd
collaborated with that I couldn't call up and ask what happened next. We
only worked in the last year of his life and Tom's memory was beginning to
go in the end. 42
Describing his inability to finish the project, my father told the
Examiner:
I wanted this book to be so good. I wanted it to live up to him.
With all the famous people I've written with-Joe Namath, Joe
Montana, Bo Jackson, Billy Crystal-there was never any pressure
from any of them to get it done. But with Tom, who was dead, I
felt somehow he was looking over my shoulder and if I didn't do it
perfectly, somehow if he wasn't going to punish me, I was going to
punish myself.
43
Gay Olympian,44 as the book was called, was a critical, but not
commercial, success. My father, however, never regretted the effort he put
into writing it. Waddell was my father's first gay co-author and he wanted
to further expand his horizons. It bothered my father, who had championed
civil rights and black athletes throughout his career, that he had never co-
authored a book with a black athlete. He was close to Jim Brown,
Muhammad Ali, Willis Reed, and Wilt Chamberlain-to name but a few of
the prominent black athletes who were his friends-but he had never
partnered with any of them.
In the late 1980s, he finally found a black athlete with whom he would
co-author an autobiography.
[My] relationship with Bo Jackson is special. Bo is special. In the
SportsCentury poll for the athlete of the twentieth century, I voted
Bo number one, just ahead of Jim Brown and Wilt Chamberlain,
well ahead of Michael Jordan and Babe Ruth, an opinion shared by
42. Cynthia Robins, Gay Games Champion Tom Waddell's Courageous Story Took
Perseverance to Tell, S.F. EXAMINER, July 30, 1996, at C1.
43. Id.
44. TOM WADDELL & DICK SCHAAP, GAY OLYMPIAN: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF DR.
TOM WADDELL (1996).
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none of the other forty-seven voters. But for pure athleticism,
which was supposed to be the SportsCentury gauge, for sheer
speed, strength, and agility, Bo was the best I ever saw.
My father would go on to write another autobiography-this one
relatively brief, to accompany some beautiful photographs-with another
black athlete from Alabama, Hank Aaron. It begins:
I am in awe of the great home-run hitters, the ones who are no
longer with us. The Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, for one.
Jackie Robinson, for another. Forget about Babe Ruth and Roger
Maris. Forget about Mark McGwire, Sammy Sosa and Ken Grif-
fey Jr. Forget about Hank Aaron. King and Robinson. They're
the real home-run hitters.46
Just as my father captured the voice of Jerry Kramer-the WASP from
Idaho-and Joe Namath-the Catholic from western Pennsylvania-and
Tom Waddell-the gay San Franciscan-he found Bo Jackson and Hank
Aaron's voices, too.
IV. BIG MONEY CHANGES EVERYTHING
There are several primary reasons the climate has changed. First and
foremost: money. Big money has changed everything. Before the advent of
free agency in the mid-1970s, sports were covered primarily as recreation
and athletes' salaries were, for the most part, deemed immaterial. With rare
exception, sports stars were tremendously underpaid because there was no
free market bidding for their services. Reporters knew just how poorly
management treated players and were generally sympathetic. It was difficult
to criticize a struggling athlete when you knew he was not being justly
compensated in the first place. Now, when the average salary for a major
league player is more than $2,000,000 per year, fans and reporters expect
more. Athletes are expected to play to the level of their paychecks.
Money is also a factor in the sense that athletes and the people who
cover them are no longer in the same class of wealth. Reporters and athletes
once spent much of their time together. Hall of Fame first baseman Lou
Gehrig's best friend was not a fellow player, but a reporter; the same for
pitcher Don Larsen and countless others. Until the 1970s, it was quite
45. SCHAAP, supra note 20, at 280.
46. AARON & SCHAAP, supra note 29, at 4.
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common for some reporters, especially columnists, to be more highly
compensated than the athletes they covered. Now, the twelfth man who sits
at the end of the bench for a National Basketball Association team makes
more money in a single season than most reporters will make in twenty years
on the beat. Reporters and athletes rarely see each other after the game
because the reporters, literally, cannot afford to frequent the same establish-
ments. Also, it is not easy for the wealthy athlete to relate to the middle-
class journalist. Their lives are completely different.
With the infusion of big money into our games, sports are covered as a
business. Labor strife is, in baseball at least, a constant. Newspapers report
every player's salary. The negotiations between leagues and networks to
determine rights fees are avidly covered. The sports business beat is among
the most coveted in major newspaper sports sections. The games are so
often secondary to the economics.
Money has also isolated the athlete-millionaires from average fans. The
fans, who pay the enormous salaries by purchasing $50 baseball seats and
$200 hockey seats and $8 beers, are now less reverent and more demanding.
Their point of view is reflected in the media.
My father wrote an essay in 1992 for the seventy-fifth anniversary
edition of Forbes.47 Reflecting on the changing nature of big-time sports in
America, he wrote:
The stakes are so high now. The average major league baseball
player earns more than a million dollars a year. Losing pitchers
and feeble hitters, men with stunningly modest statistics, demand
much more. Steve Greenberg, the deputy commissioner of base-
ball, used to be an agent, negotiating players' contracts. He once
told his father, Hank Greenberg, the Hall of Famer, who was the
first ballplayer to earn $100,000 in a season, that he was represent-
ing a certain player. "What should I ask for?" Steve said. "He hit
.238."
"Ask for a uniform," Hank said.
Steve shook his head. "Dad," he said, "you just don't understand
baseball any more."
Nobody understands baseball any more. No one relates to the
salaries, not even the players themselves. They earn so much more
than they ever dreamed of.
48
47. Dick Schaap, So Much of the Joy Is Gone, FORBES, Sept. 14, 1992, at 86.
48. Id.
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V. THE ATHLETE-REPORTER GAP
The sports media and athletes have grown apart for other reasons, too.
Sports journalism was, until fairly recently, more trade than profession. Its
ranks were filled primarily by men who were once copyboys and educated
primarily on the job. They were hard men, who spent their lives on the road.
Alcohol was a constant. Certainly, there were exceptions. Grantland Rice, a
Vanderbilt graduate, and Red Smith, a Notre Dame graduate, were probably
the most widely read and respected sports columnists ever. However,
today's sports writers are much more likely to be sons and daughters of
college graduates than the contemporaries of Rice and Smith. They are
much more likely to have attended Ivy League schools. Virtually all of them
have degrees in communications or journalism. They have so little in
common with athletes who are largely unscarred by higher education and
were raised poor, in single-parent households.
Race and ethnicity are also factors contributing to the widening divide
between athletes and reporters. The vast majority of professional football
and basketball players are black.49 The vast majority of the men and women
who cover them are white. In baseball, forty percent of the players speak
English as a second language, if at all. None of this has brought players and
reporters closer.
Then there is the Watergate/Vietnam phenomenon. All journalism
changed with Watergate and the war in Vietnam. Virtually all reporters, and
most Americans, became more cynical and more suspicious of public
figures. If the President was a crook, then no one was trustworthy. It was
not good enough any more to take people at their word. The presumption
now is that we are being spun-by politicians, by movie stars, by athletes-
and the reporter's job is to expose the lies and distortions. We no longer
expect the media to treat star athletes gently; we expect the truth, which
athletes quite frequently prefer not to have revealed. In fact, when Jim
Bouton wrote Ball Four, his warts and all groundbreaking account of life
49. For example, of the fifteen players on the 2002-2003 Miami Heat roster, thirteen
were black. The other two players were from New Zealand (Sean Marks) and the Republic of
Georgia (Vladimir Stepania). On the three-time defending world champion Los Angeles
Lakers, eleven of the thirteen players were black. Again, one of the non-black players was
foreign-born, Stanislav Medvedenko, from the Ukraine. In the NFL, the 2002 Super Bowl
Champion New England Patriots fielded thirty-nine black players and twenty white players in
the 2002-2003 season. On the extended roster for the Miami Dolphins, forty-four players
were black while twenty-two players were white.
50. BOUTON, supra note 24.
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as a major league pitcher in the 1960s, he was shunned. In many baseball
circles, he still is shunned.
Today's fans find it difficult to warm to players who are transient-
Braves and Rams who next year are just as likely to be Rangers and Colts.
Today's reporters cannot, for the same reason, build long-term relationships
with those they cover.
Remember this, too: Until the advent of cable television, very few
games-other than NFL games-were on national television. Athletes who
craved celebrity needed writers to publicize them. Now, with virtually every
game they play televised and with all their outstanding plays featured in
highlights on national shows such as ESPN's SportsCenter, the athletes do
not need the reporters. In fact, they have little to gain and much to lose by
accommodating the media.
VI. CONCLUSION
My father captured the voices and spirits of many. He found their
voices because he cared about them. Jimmy Breslin put it best in his
foreword to Sport: "The sport Dick Schaap always has covered is the
contest called living." 5'
51. SCHAAP, supra note 39, at ix.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The revelation in the final months of Ronald Reagan's presidency that
First Lady Nancy Reagan relied on the prognostications of an astrologer to
help determine her husband's schedule-including the timing of his
signature on a major arms control treaty with the Soviet Union-was itself
hardly the fruit of journalistic enterprise. That essential detail, which
titillated the nation in May of 1988, was handed to the press on a platter, as
it were. Actually, it was not on a platter, but rather in a plain brown
cardboard box containing the manuscript of Donald T. Regan's White House
memoir entitled, For The Record.' I can attest to that, as I was the recipient
of that box-delivered to me by the book's publisher, Harcourt Brace
Jovanovitch. I was to read it, and recommend to my editors at Time
Magazine whether Time should purchase the rights to run excerpts in the
magazine, prior to the book's publication later that year.
Don Regan, who had been President Reagan's Treasury Secretary, then
his Chief of Staff, was ousted from this last job in February 1987, in a
"palace coup" that was widely believed to have been engineered by Nancy
Reagan herself. Less than a year and a half later, Don Regan's revenge was
* Barrett Seaman, a visiting Goodwin Professor in February, 2002, retired in 2001
after a thirty-year career as a correspondent and editor of Time Magazine. In addition to
assignments in New York, Chicago, Bonn, Germany, and Detroit, he served as Time's Senior
White House Correspondent from 1984-88, covering the second term of Ronald Reagan's
presidency. He also served as Time's Special Projects Editor from 1994 to 2001, and was
responsible for many of Time's special editions and reports. He is the coauthor, along with
Michael Moritz, of Going For Broke: The Chrysler Story, (Doubleday, 1981) about the near-
death experience of the nation's third largest auto company. He is currently working on
another book.
1. DONALD T. REGAN, For the Record, TIME, May 16, 1988, at 26.
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ripe and ready for picking. Because Time was the first periodical ap-
proached by the publisher, and because I, as the magazine's Senior White
House Correspondent, covered the Reagan/Regan White House during his
tenure, I was handed an instant "scoop" that seemed certain to make a big
splash.
Don Regan certainly knew the news value of what he had. The opening
anecdote on the very first page of his three hundred ninety-seven page book
described how Mrs. Reagan allegedly tried to influence the timing of her
husband's surgery for colon cancer based on advice from her astrologer-"a
woman in San Francisco," as Don Regan reported.3 In fact, that is all Don
Regan knew about the woman, otherwise known as the First Lady's
"Friend." 4  His story was about the consequences of what he saw as
meddling with the affairs of state which he, as Chief of Staff, saw as his, and
her husband's, purview.5 His goal in exposing this bit of sensation was to
explain why working in the White House during Reagan's second term, a
critical period which encompassed the high drama of the Reagan/Gorbachev
summit meetings leading to the end of the Cold War as well as the
sometimes farcical shenanigans of the Iran-Contra affair, had been so
difficult for him.
My recommendation to Time's editors was, as they say, "a no-brainer:"
they should buy the rights to excerpt the book. It was not merely a matter of
titillation. Don Regan's book contained valuable insights into the Reagan
presidency. Additionally, the allegation that an astrologer played a role in
the timing, if not the substance, of policy was, in and of itself, indisputably
newsworthy. The job then fell to Executive Editor Ronald Kriss and myself
to target the most relevant and interesting sections, and meld them together
into a package that would run over thirteen pages in Time.0
The other job, one that fell largely to me, was to both confirm and
elaborate on Don Regan's account-to bring some added journalistic value
to the story. Journalistic value that would include some commentary, which
would put Don Regan's obviously personal-and therefore biased-
recollections into perspective. However, I felt it should also include
whatever additional information Time could provide about the influence of
Mrs. Reagan's astrologer friend, and the opinions of other administration
2. This was partly attributable to Regan's thought that Time's coverage of him had
been more balanced than that of its arch rival Newsweek.
3. REGAN, supra note. 1, at 26.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Barrett Seaman, Good Heavens!, TIME, May 16, 1988, at 25.
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officials as to its impact on policy and history-which, after all, is what
journalism should be about. Among my key questions: Who was this
"Friend" whose parsings of the heavens had, by Don Regan's account,
wreaked such havoc on the President's schedule and, in the case of the
White House's response to the Iran-Contra scandal, arguably affected
Reagan's political standing?
11. FINDING JOAN QUIGLEY
Privacy is an issue that seldom enters the calculus of journalists
covering the White House. The law firmly establishes that virtually
anyone-including the First Lady-associated with the place is a "public
figure" whose actions and speech is deemed to be relevant to the affairs of
state, and thus inherently "newsworthy."7  Nancy Reagan's belief in
astrological powers-long-held, but deeply reinforced after Ronald
Hinckley's assassination attempt on her husband in March, 1981-was fair
game for media scrutiny, as were all the actions and reactions by her
husband's staff.
However, if I were to discover the identity of the "Friend," which I fully
intended to do; would Time's subsequent delvings into her personal life, her
relationship with the Reagans, her character, constitute an invasion of her
privacy? By exposing the "Friend" as the person who abetted what Time
eventually characterized as Mrs. Reagan's "more than a charming eccentric-
ity,' 8 would the magazine be liable for subjecting this otherwise private
citizen to public ridicule?
To be candid, I did not think much about these questions as I began my
efforts to "flesh out" the details of Don Regan's allegations. I was much
more concerned with protecting Time's exclusive story. I found myself
approaching White House sources in an almost conspiratorial fashion. I
informed them, in private interviews, that I was aware of Nancy's astrologer
friend. I encouraged them to confirm what Don Regan had written, to reveal
any new details they had about her influence, and to join with me, in
essentially, a pact of silence that would keep a lid on the story until Time
went to press. Under our agreement with Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch,
publication would not happen until late June, so that it would precede the
early summer publication of For The Record.9 In news-driven Washington,
7. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
8. Seaman, supra note 6, at 25.
9. Regan, supra note 1, at 26.
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and around a White House that was covered by more than two hundred
reporters on a regular basis, three months was a long time to sit on a scoop.
Many of the President's aides, who had been living with the explosive
knowledge of Nancy's astrologer for years, were at first shocked to learn
from me that Don Regan was to reveal the existence of the "Friend" in his
book. All were loyal to the President and wanted to mitigate whatever
damage the news might bring down on him. However, as human beings, the
President's aides were also anxious to absolve themselves of any connection
to the astrologer-and to use this opportunity to explain' ° why their own
jobs had been complicated by her influence. As such, they proved quite
helpful in confirming-and even expanding on-what Don Regan had in his
book.
Where the President's aides were unhelpful was on the issue that eluded
Don Regan as well: who was this woman? This detail was a closely-
guarded secret in the East Wing.'" Only a handful of people knew.
Moreover, no one who knew the identity of the "Friend" was willing to
divulge it to me.
There was, however, one source, who I did not, and still will not,
identify, who agreed to confirm the name if I were to come up with it
independently. Thus, my search became somewhat like that of the miller's
daughter-turned-queen in the fairy tale of Rumplestiltskin.'Z In order to keep
from being beheaded by the king, her husband, she needed to discover the
name of the little man who could spin straw into gold.' 3 For me, the
consequences of failure were not nearly so dire as they were for the miller's
daughter; however, as a journalist, I was still determined to find her out.
The information available to Don Regan was certainly enough to get us
started. Myself and a number of Time colleagues, who would become
involved in this search, knew the astrologer was a female. We knew she was
from San Francisco, and we could infer from Mrs. Reagan's references to
her as "my friend" that she was very likely a woman of about the same age
and social status. We were able to rule out the obvious, like the renowned
10. Either on "background" or "off the record," in the parlance of Washington
journalism.
11. The East Wing is a term used to describe the residential side of the White House
and the First Lady's staff-as distinct from the West Wing, where the President's top
assistants worked.
12. See, e.g., NEIL PHILIP, FAIRY TALES OF THE BROTHERS GRIMM 68-73 (1997).
13. Id.
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Jeanne Dixon, who had once advised both Reagans on their charts,14 and
Joyce Jillson, a seer whose clients tended to be Hollywood types. 15
I did have one additional clue that Don Regan did not: a source told me
this "Friend" had attended a state dinner at the White House sometime
during Reagan's second term, which began in January of 1985. There had
been only about half a dozen formal occasions held to honor heads of state in
Washington on officials visit, leaving somewhere in the range of 120 to 130
guests at each function. Thus, it was not an onerous task to comb through
the records to see if an otherwise unidentified woman from San Francisco
was on one of the lists.
The next step was to make use of Time's extensive network of bureaus,
one of which was in San Francisco. Briefed on what little information I had,
bureau chief Paul Witteman assigned one of his best "stringers"' 6 to the
story. Reporter Dennis Wyss began searching the city's newspaper society
columns and periodicals that might include coverage of astrology, as well as
interviewing astrology buffs and local friends of the Reagans.
With just two weeks remaining before the issue of Time in which the
Regan book excerpts and related news stories were scheduled to run, other
news organizations began to speculate about what the book might reveal.
While several papers hinted that astrology might be involved, by late April,
no one yet had the story. I, however, grew increasingly concerned that other
media organizations were getting hot. I advised Ron Kriss and other New
York editors that, in my view, it would be prudent to push our story up a
week so that it came out on Monday, May 9, instead of on May 16. Though
the arduous task of excerpting and fitting Regan's own words was not yet
completed, they agreed it was worth a sprint to the finish to preserve our
exclusive story.
Meanwhile, Dennis Wyss was honing in on a couple of likely prospects
for Mrs. Reagan's "Friend." On Friday, May 6, the San Francisco Chronicle
ran a short item speculating that Nob Hill socialite Joan Quigley, who
coincidentally was a friend of the Reagans, had written several books on
astrology and might have been advising the White House. 7 Paul Witteman
called me in Washington to see if her name checked out on any of the White
House guest lists. It did. Joan Quigley, according to White House records,
14. Laurence Zuckerman, The First Lady's Astrologer, TIME, May 16, 1988, at 41.
15. Id.
16. Stringers are professional journalists not directly employed by the magazine but
used on an as-needed basis to supplement the work of Time's correspondents.
17. Ruthe Stein, The Star Gazers Among Us: They Pick Wedding Dates, Make
Career Moves by Horoscope, S.F. CHRON, May 6, 1988 at B3.
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was in attendance at the April 1985 state dinner honoring the visiting
President of Algeria.
18
We had two more reporting days left before the close of the May16
issue.19 That was not much time in which to check out this vital piece of
information, or to find out whatever else we could about Joan Quigley, and,
if possible, to talk to her. My first step was to try to reach the source who
had promised to confirm her name if we came up with it independently.
That proved moderately difficult, as the source was traveling and not easily
reachable. Shortly after two o'clock Friday afternoon, my office phone rang
and a familiar voice asked what I had. "Joan Quigley," I said. "How did
you find her?" was the reply. Given my past, mutually-trusting relationship
with this source, that was confirmation enough for me.
Finding Joan Quigley in person proved to be more challenging. It was
critical for us to have not only corroborating information that she was the
soon to be the notorious "Friend" of the First Lady, but also for us to hear
from Ms. Quigley herself. However, she was out of the country-in
London, it seemed-and not due back in San Francisco until late Saturday,
when the magazine would be all but put to bed.
Dennis Wyss set about interviewing Quigley's Nob Hill friends and
neighbors. Researchers in our New York headquarters dug up everything
they could on Ms. Quigley-her graduation from Vassar in 1947, 0 her initial
involvement in astrology,1 her several books on the subject,2 and evidence
of her connection with the Reagans. Meanwhile, New York stringer Wayne
Swoboda tracked down what flight Quigley and her traveling companion
were on from London to New York. He then managed to book himself onto
the New York-to-San Francisco leg of the trip and interview the astrologer.
When the plane landed in San Francisco, Bureau Chief Paul Witteman and
stringer Dennis Wyss were there to greet them.
18. The White House maintains public records of the guest lists of all official
functions, including state dinners. In 1988, all a reporter had to do was check the White
House Press Office's files for the guest lists of state dinners. Nowadays, these lists are
available on the White House web site.
19. Issues are always dated one week after the Monday on which they actually hit
newsstands.
20. Seaman, supra note 6, at 25.
21. Id.
22. See generally JOAN QUIGLEY, WHAT DOES JOAN SAY?: MY SEVEN YEARS AS
WHITE HOUSE ASTROLOGER TO NANCY AND RONALD REAGAN (1990).
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ImI. THE STORY
The result for Time was a fifteen-page package, introduced by a story I
wrote attempting to put these revelations in perspective. 23  Then came
Regan's excerpts, followed by a one page story identifying Quigley. 24 It
recounted her first fascination with astrology, her role as a columnist for
Seventeen Magazine, as well as her books and other public pronouncements
on the subject.25 It was rich with biographical detail and included the
following paragraphs. Joan Quigley was described as:
Thin and well-coiffed, Quigley, sixtyish, is not unlike many of the
First Lady's California friends. The daughters of John B. Quigley,
a San Francisco hotelier and prominent Republican, Joan and her
sister Ruth grew up in a penthouse suite overlooking Union Square.
Although both were noted for their beauty, neither married. Today
the sisters reside in a luxurious cream-color apartment building
atop exclusive Nob Hill. Both are fixtures at local theater openings
and society fund raisers. "Joan is elegant, witty, articulate and
strikingly pretty," says her friend Beatrice Bowles. But another
acquaintance of 20 years who requested anonymity describes Quig-
ley as "conservative, very private and a little wacky."
26
The story went on to quote Quigley herself extensively on her
astrological philosophy. However, it also noted that
[s]everal fellow astrologers are decidedly cool toward Quigley.
Marion D. March, who prepares charts for many Hollywood stars,
dismisses her as a "media astrologer" because of her many TV ap-
pearances. Others in the astrological community grouse that Quig-
ley is too aloof. But Jayj (sic) Jacobs, another San Francisco prac-
titioner, asks, "If she's doing astrology for the Reagans, what does
she need with the rest of the community?",
27
While Time's tone was respectful, there was no missing an overall
assumption of skepticism in both my piece and the Quigley piece, which was
written by New York staff writer Laurence Zuckerman, based on reporting
23. Seaman, supra note 6, at 25.
24. Regan, supra note 1, at 26.
25. Zuckerman, supra note 14, at 41.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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by stringers Wyss and Swoboda. The kicker of the story noted that
"[a]ccording to a friend, Quigley had been predicting for months that a major
earthquake would rock San Francisco on May 5... [b]ut, May 5 came and
went with nary a tremble-except perhaps on Quigley's personal Richter
scale. That was the last day of blissful anonymity for the First Lady's
astrologer.
'2 8
When the May 16 issue of Time hit the streets on Monday, May 9, there
was plenty of reaction. The President himself directed his ire not at Time but
at Don Regan. "From what I hear, he's chosen to attack my wife, and I don't
look kindly on that at all," he said.29 From San Francisco, where hordes of
reporters descended upon Joan Quigley's Nob Hill apartment, there was not
so much as a peep of protest from the astrologer herself.
lV. QUIGLEY'S RIGHT To PRIVACY
However, what if an enterprising personal injury lawyer had gotten to
Joan Quigley and convinced her that she had a case against Time? After all,
she resided in California, where, lawyers tell me, the courts have been
comparatively liberal in their willingness to entertain cases that test all fourS • 30
of Prosser's categories for privacy invasion. One currently before the
courts31 involves a little league baseball team whose coach had been accused
of sexually molesting as many as half a dozen of his current players.
32
Sports Illustrated, a sister publication of Time, ran a photograph of the entire
team.33 That prompted three separate groups to sue: 1) several players
pictured, who had not been molested, on grounds that the photo linked them
to teammates, who had been molested, thereby casting them in a false light;
2) two assistant coaches on similar grounds of false light; and 3) some of the
actual victims, for invasion of privacy.
34
Some legal observers are surprised the California courts even allowed
the case to go forward, especially since the coach himself is already serving
an eighty-four year sentence, having admitted to molesting over two hundred
28. Id.
29. Seaman, supra note 6, at 25.
30. See generally, PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS (5th. Ed. West 1984). The
four categories are 1) appropriation; 2) public disclosure of private facts; 3) false light; and 4)
intrusion. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
31. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (Ct. App. 2001).
32. Id. at 506.
33. William Nack & Don Yaeger, Every Parent's Nightmare, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Sept. 13, 1999, at 40.
34. M.G., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507.
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boys during a thirty-year coaching career.35 If that case can be heard in
California, might not Joan Quigley have had a chance to give Time a hard
time? If so, then what could she possibly claim? She could not claim that 1)
Time had falsely identified her as Nancy Reagan's astrologer; Ms. Quigley
herself confirmed that essential truth;36 2) any embarrassing facts about her
private life had been exposed; 3) any commercial rights had been misappro-
priated; or 4) Time's public exposure of private facts caused any discernible
37harm to Ms. Quigley, or her career.
Matters might have been different, however, if Time's reporting had
turned up and published, more personal details about Quigley's life. 3  For
example, what if, the magazine had, in its search for a fuller picture of Ms.
Quigley's San Francisco lifestyle, learned that the Nob Hill society matron
was more than a spinster-that she was gay?
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that reporter Wyss was told
that very thing by several sources-or maybe even by the quoted blind-
source; and that he filed it to Time's New York writers and editors. Let us
also assume 39 that Time's editors deemed her sexual orientation to be a
newsworthy detail, and had included it in the story. Would that not
constitute the kind of public disclosure of a private fact that would warrant a
lawsuit?40
The California Court of Appeal heard a similar case brought by Oliver
"Bill" Sipple against the San Francisco Chronicle,4' its renowned columnist
35. While working on this article, the author contacted three prominent first
amendment lawyers who, speaking off the record, remarked on the peculiar situation this case
presented.
36. Zuckerman, supra note 14, at 41. Ms. Quingley confirmed this allegation.
37. Probably the best evidence of this is in Quigley's book, by looking merely at the
title and how she recounts how Time's reporter approached her on the plane from New York to
San Francisco and asked for an interview. See Quigley, supra note 22, at 21-22. Quigley
says she granted it, in spite of Nancy Reagan's adamant admonition that she should not reveal
her identity. The publication of the book is, to me, anyway, prima facie evidence that Quigley
did not suffer from Time's exposure, and in fact materially benefited from it. Id.
38. The notion of stipulating a potentially more complicated-hence interesting-
legal scenario was suggested to me by Bruce Sanford, a First Amendment attorney with Baker
& Hostetler, based in Washington, DC.
39. I make this a hypothetical assumption since it would have been unusual for a
conservative Republican White House to be relying on the stargazing prognostications of a
lesbian.
40. The elements needed to establish a case for invasion of privacy depends on state
law, but it is generally a cause, for publishing facts that are offensive and not newsworthy.
Cape Publ'ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1377 (Fla. 1989).
41. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1984).
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Herb Caen, and a number of other newspapers that picked up on the story in
1975.42 Sipple was the man who reached through a crowd and grabbed the
arm of Sara Jane Moore, foiling her attempt to assassinate President Gerald
R. Ford.43 Suddenly and involuntarily thrust into the public limelight, Sipple
drew national coverage as an ordinary man who became an uncommon
hero.44  However, Caen's column went further than just extolling his
heroism; it reported that the ex-marine was a familiar figure in San
45Francisco's gay bar scene.
Sipple's subsequent suit alleged that the paper published this intimate
detail of his personal life without his consent; and that it caused him
personal anguish because, among other outcomes, his parent, brothers, and
46
sister learned of his homosexuality for the first time in the public domain.
His lawyers argued that Caen's story met the criteria for a tortious act.47 It
constituted public exposure.48 His sexual preference constituted a private
fact.49 The consequences of its revelation were offensive and objectionable
to a reasonable person.5° Moreover, this particular detail of his private life
was of no legitimate public concern.51 The trial court initially agreed to hear
the case, rejecting the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 52
Eventually it reversed that position, based on facts revealed during the
discovery process, and Sipple appealed.
53
Ultimately, the California appeals court agreed with the lower court
ruling, and dismissed the action.54  In its opinion, the court ruled that
Sipple's sexual preference was not a private fact, since his homosexuality
was widely known in San Francisco's gay community.55 It further rejected
the plaintiffs contention that this detail had no news value, arguing that its
42. Id. at 666.
43. Id. 201 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 671.
55. Id. at 670.
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revelation helped to dispel the stereotype that all homosexuals are timid,
weak, or unheroic.56
Because the courts' standards of newsworthiness are so broad, it seems
likely to me that Joan Quigley, faced with a similar revelation by Time,
would have faired no better in court than Mr. Sipple. If we assume, again
hypothetically, that she was more discreet than Sipple and did not hang
around gay bars, her claim of the disclosure of a private fact might be
strengthened. Further, if publication of her sexual proclivity had caused Nob
Hill to shun her, or prompted a prominent charity to throw her off its board,
she would have a stronger case that the publication had caused her material
harm.57 If her lawyer was able to open that argumentative thread, could she
not dip back into the mainstream arguing that her consultative relationship
with the First Lady was itself a private fact worthy of protection?
V. CONCLUSION
What disturbs me, as a journalist, is the lack of clarity in the concept of
false light. It strikes me, both in the Sipple case and in the hypothetical case
of Joan Quigley's sexual tendencies, that the definitions of what is private
and what is offensive and damaging are totally subjective. If Time, with the
best of intentions, had erroneously printed a detail-any detail-about
Quigley in the same article that revealed her hypothetical homosexuality, the
magazine would, as I understand it, have left itself wide open to legal
assault. Let us say that the same blind source responsible for describing
Quigley as "a little wacky" had also reported that she was gay. Furthermore,
let us also say a corroborating source for that piece of information was
another astrologer who could be construed as a competitor. Could Quigley's
lawyer not argue that this was both false and malicious?
Fortunately for Time, none of this happened. Also, based on my
experience with the magazine, I doubt it would ever have transpired-even
stipulating the hypothetical details described above. At the very least, given
space constraints and the priority of other facts in the story, the editors
would not likely have included details of Joan Quigley's sexual preference
56. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
57. Generally, to maintain an action for defamation a plaintiff must show a
communication with four elements: 1) defamatory imputation; 2) malice or negligence; 3)
publication; and 4) damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §558 (1977). If
Quingley could show that she was shunned form her community or removed from a board
because of the defamation, then she is more likely to prevail on her claim for invasion of
privacy.
2002]
63
: Nova Law Review 27, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
on grounds that the facts would not sufficiently enhance a story that was
essentially about her influence on the affairs of state.
Indeed, what did transpire in the aftermath of the White House
astrology story solidified Joan Quigley's status as a public figure. She, too,
wrote a tell-all book exploiting her connections to the Reagans. It was
entitled What Does Joan Say?: My Seven Years as White House Astrologer
to Nancy and Ronald Reagan.58 In the book, Quigley recounts her first
encounter with Time:
The next morning, I took the Concorde to New York. After spend-
ing the night at an airport hotel, I was intercepted as I was about to
board a plane to San Francisco by a young reporter from Time
Magazine. He told me he had booked a seat on the plane at the last
moment for the purpose of interviewing me. I decided to grant him
the first interview.
59
If Joan Quigley was not a public figure before this voluntary exposure
in the press, she certainly was afterwards. It is also amply clear from her
book that she saw her newfound fame as a potential source of profit.
58. QUIGLEY, supra note 22, at 21.
59. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
American privacy law is surprisingly weak. If privacy law were a
stock, its performance over the last century would not be deemed impressive.
* Rod Smolla joined the law faculty at the University of Richmond, T.C. Williams
School of Law, in 1998 as the new George E. Allen Professor of Law. He formerly taught at
as the Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law. He graduated from Yale in 1975 and Duke Law School in 1978, where
he was first in his class. He then served as law clerk to Judge Charles Clark on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. After practicing law in Chicago, he entered
academic life, and taught at DePaul University, University of Illinois, and University of
Arkansas law schools before beginning at William and Mary. He is the author of several
books, including JERRY FALWELL v. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL (St.
Martin's Press 1988); three treatises: Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech (West
Group, 2 volumes 1996); Federal Civil Rights Acts (West Group, 2 volumes 1994); and Law
of Defamation (West Group 1986 & 2d edition 1999); and co-author of a casebook on
constitutional law: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM
(with Banks and Braveman, Lexis/Matthew Bender, 4th Edition 2000). His book, DELIBERATE
INTENT: A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUE STORY OF MURDER BY THE BOOK was published by Crown
Publishers in July 1999. His new law school textbook, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, REGULATION OF MASS MEDIA, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, is published by Carolina
Academic Press.
1. The phrase "privacy law" is admittedly amorphous, and might be understood to
refer to any number of discrete bodies of American law, including the constitutional "right to
privacy" reflected in such substantive due process decisions as those protecting personal
decisions of issues relating to reproduction and procreation. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing privacy right relating to procreation and use of
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It has been a consistently poor achiever, barely keeping up with inflation. I
speak here of privacy law in the tort sense, and the four torts that are
classically understood to comprise invasion of privacy: 1) false light; 2)
2publication of private facts; 3) intrusion; and 4) appropriation. Of these
four torts, only appropriation (or "the right of publicity") has been a ripping
success for plaintiffs, a genuine high-return stock, and a species of
intellectual property, even though appropriation is arguably not a true form
of invasion of privacy at all.
3
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis are frequently credited for having
launched modern privacy law in their article The Right to Privacy.4 Warren
and Brandeis have been critiqued by such estimable scholars as Diane
Zimmerman and Harry Kalven, Jr., who have played the requiem for the tort,
asking if Warren and Brandeis were wrong. I come not to bury privacy,
however, but to praise it, and lament its stunted growth. The ambition of this
article is to try to account for the generally anemic performance of privacy
law, and in the process to suggest a number of palliatives that might
modestly rejuvenate it.
II. ACCOUNTING FOR THE WEAKNESS OF THE FIRST
THREE PRIVACY TORTS
Consider these weaknesses in the first three privacy torts: 1) false light;
2) publication of private facts; and 3) intrusion. First, false light is not much
contraceptives); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming "core" of
abortion right recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but modifying that right
through imposition of "undue burden" standard). In this article, I use the term exclusively to
refer to tort law causes of action that purport to protect privacy.
2. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). This four-part
taxonomy of privacy law was originally ordained by the tort oracle William Prosser, who first
labored to bring structure to privacy law by creating these four categories.
3. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. Throughout this article, I
frequently engage in a kind of legal anthropomorphizing-that is, I treat the "law of privacy"
or the cause of action for "false light" or the "law of defamation" as if it were human, with
ambition for "success." Of course this is a fiction, and I employ it merely as an economical
and vivid narrative device.
4. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
5. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 351 (1983) (citing Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326,
331 (1966)).
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more than defamation warmed-over. Second, publication of private facts is a
powerful cause of action constantly trumped by a more powerful First
Amendment. Lastly, intrusion, while a reasonably strong cause of action for
plaintiffs when establishing liability, usually proves paltry when it comes to
awarding damages.
A. False Light
False light invasion of privacy, which consists of placing someone "in a
false light" in the public eye, has always occupied an inherently ambivalent
niche in privacy law, primarily because it is so difficult to distinguish the
false light tort from good old-fashioned defamation. Many of the elements
6of false light and defamation overlap. While defamation requires that the
defendant publish a "false statement of fact" about the plaintiff; false light
uses a somewhat mushier terminology. However, both causes of action
require that a palpable falsehood be published, something capable of proof
or disproof, and something more than mere epithet, hyperbole, or opinion.7
A plaintiffs lawyer is naturally drawn to the false light tort when the case
involves a "false" portrayal of a client that has an impressionistic character
to it-a portrayal in which it is difficult to nail down a hard explicit "false
8
statement of fact" upon which to rest a defamation claim. Yet the false light
tort is not properly understood as a reserve tank for defamation suits that
have run out of gas. The requirement of a false statement of fact in
defamation law is not merely part of the common law-it is now of
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS define this tort as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the
public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
Id.
7. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 10:10, at 10-15 (2d ed. 2002) [here-
inafter SMOLLA I]. See Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 448 A.2d 1317 (Conn.
1982).
8. This tactic is sometimes successful. See Moore v. Sun Publ'g Corp., 881 P.2d
735 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that false light claim could be maintained even though
statements at issue were not actionable in defamation because they were opinion). However,
for reasons stated in the text above, it is my opinion that viewed objectively, holdings, such as
the one in Moore, are unsound. Id.
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constitutional dimension.9 A change of terminology ought not result in a
change of constitutional principle. In addition, a plaintiff ought not be able
to recover for a statement that would be deemed non-actionable in a
defamation suit because it is merely opinion, hyperbole, or insult, by merely
re-casting the cause of action as false light invasion of privacy. This must be
the rule if the First Amendment doctrine requiring a falsehood is to have any
genuine meaning.' °
So too, the fault requirements now imposed on defamation law by First
Amendment holdings must be understood to apply with at least equivalent
vigor when the suit is cast as false light." Again, this is a forced move, for if
we do not calibrate fault rules for false light invasion of privacy with at least
the same rigor that we require for defamation, false light would become a
pleading loophole allowing the facile avoidance of constitutional impera-
tives.
Thus, if the false light tort requires fault and falsehood in the
defamation sense, what real good is it? How is it not entirely duplicative of
defamation law, and thus superfluous? From a plaintiff's perspective, there
are three potential strategic advantages to invoking the false light tort as an
alternative or add-on to a defamation claim. Admittedly, these advantages
may make the tort marginally more attractive than a defamation claim in
some instances, but none of them are enormously impressive.
First, returning to the problem of falsehood, an enterprising plaintiff's
lawyer may find the looser terminology of false light more attractive than
defamation's stern insistence on a "false statement of fact," even if the
9. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
10. See SMOLLA I, supra note 7, at 10-15.
11. The fault rules required for false light are at least as demanding as those
applicable to defamation. See Chic Magazine, Inc. v. Braun, 469 U.S. 883 (1984); Wood v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.
1984); Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1984); Cantrell v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. I11. 1981) [hereinafter Cantrell 1]; Crump v. Beckley
Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1983). See also, Michael P. Lehmann, Triangulat-
ing the Limits on the Tort of Invasion of Privacy: The Development of the Remedy in Light of
the Expansion of Constitutional Privilege, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543, 593 (1976); Jerry J.
Phillips, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy and the Constitutional Standard of Care, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 77, 99 (1975). There is also substantial authority for the proposition that fault
rules for false light claims exceed those for defamation, in that all false light claims must be
supported by proof of actual malice, whether or not the plaintiff is a public figure or public
official. See Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980); Dodrill v. Ark.
Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840 (Ark. 1979); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc.,
448 A.2d 1317 (Conn. 1982); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d
882 (Ky. 1981).
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formal doctrine for the two torts, and the jury instructions, are identical. It
just feels smoother to say that the defendant has placed my client in a "false
light in the public eye" than to say that the defendant has made "false factual
statements" about my client. Many modem defamation cases are grounded
not in the literal falsehood of some publication or broadcast, but in what is
implied, or communicated "between the lines." This is a vexing and difficult
problem that constantly appears in defamation cases, and plaintiffs
frequently fight desperately to attempt to convince a court to allow a case to
go to a jury based on alleged innuendo and implication. 2 This whole battle
simply has a more inviting patina when the language is "false light." At
best, however, this is but a small tactical advantage in some cases, more a
matter of nuance and atmosphere rather than real substance.
A second possible advantage to the false light tort is that the damages
available to a plaintiff are not tied to loss of reputation, the traditional
lodestar of defamation law, but rather to the internal emotional and mental
12. Commonly, defamatory statements are communicated not in the literal language
that is spoken or written, but implied or insinuated. When this happens, the legal question is
whether a suit may be maintained on the basis of what has been implied. The issues
surrounding defamation through implication have, for several years, been among the most
hotly contested in defamation litigation across the United States. Some jurisdictions have
shown substantial hostility to defamation by implication, while others have treated it as a
natural and legitimate way in which to construe what is actually communicated by a statement,
and are quite permissive in allowing plaintiffs to base cases on what statements imply. The
issue of defamation through implication is closely linked to another common-law concept, the
term "innuendo," which has both a highly technical meaning referring to common-law
pleading rules, and a more general common sense meaning referring to the insinuation or
implication carried by a literal statement. See Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc.,
576 F.2d 495, 499 n.7 (3d Cir. 1978),
The term "innuendo" has two possible meanings in the law of defamation, one of
which is technical and the other of which is not. The narrow, technical meaning of the
term is associated with the common law system of pleading, under which an "innu-
endo" was an explanation of the defamatory meaning of a communication in light of
extrinsic circumstances, the existence of which was averred to in a prefatory statement
called an "inducement." That is not the meaning of the word as employed in this
opinion. The second, and here the relevant, meaning of "innuendo" is that which it has
in common language, namely, the insinuation or implication which arises from the
literal language used in a statement or set of comments.
Id. (internal citation omitted). See also Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 448 A.2d 6,
15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (holding "[a] publisher is, of course, liable for the implications of
what he has said or written, not merely the specific, literal statements made."). The court
stated "we are free to adopt, and have concluded that we should adopt, the approach of sister
states, and hold that the literal accuracy of separate statements will not render a communica-
tion 'true' where, as here, the implication of the communication as a whole was false." Id.
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harm caused to the plaintiff by being placed in a false light.13 Whereas
defamation law is classically understood to compensate a plaintiff primarily
for a form of "external" injury, to an "asset" we call "reputation," privacy
law is classically understood to look inward, inside the person, making the
plaintiff whole for damage to the soul.'
4
Again, however, there is less here than meets the eye. Despite the
traditional understanding that defamation cases primarily exist to compen-
sate for external reputational injury, both the formal doctrines and the real
world practices in fact are quite porous and permissive in allowing
defamation plaintiffs to recover for what are largely internal emotional
injuries. Take first, the magnanimous First Amendment definition of "actual
harm," established in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.' 5 Take second, the holding
in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,'6 that there is no constitutional requirement that
reputation injury be an element of a claim for defamation; a holding that
effectively renders the First Amendment irrelevant on the "external" versus
"internal" damages question.' 7 Take third, that in practice, we have always
dealt largely in euphemism when proving the monetary harm that flows from
an injured reputation. "Special damages," a term-of-art in defamation law, is
construed extremely narrowly, requiring evidence of actual pecuniary loss in
certain specialized circumstances.' 8  The general practice in defamation
cases as to how a plaintiff establishes his or her "general damages" for injury
to reputation is that a plaintiff introduces evidence that his or her reputation
has been tarnished, and the jury is then left to deduce a sum of money that
will fairly compensate the plaintiff. 9 In short, the damages question is more
13. Themo v. New England Newspaper Publ'g Co., 27 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Mass.
1940).
14. See id. (holding "[tihe fundamental difference between a right to privacy and a
right to freedom from defamation is that the former directly concerns one's own peace of
mind, while the latter concerns primarily one's reputation .... )
15. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (stating "the more customary types of actual harm
inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the
community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.").
16. 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (hereinafter Time I].
17. Id. at 460 (noting that "Florida has obviously decided to permit recovery for other
injuries without regard to measuring the effect the falsehood may have had upon a plaintiff's
reputation," and holding that under the Constitution, states are free to predicate defamation
awards entirely on internal anguish or humiliation).
18. See, e.g., Tacket v. Delco Remy, 959 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd on the other
grounds by Tacket v. GMC, Delco Remy Div., 93 F.3d 332 (7th Cir. 1996).
19. This is not to say that an experienced plaintiffs lawyer will not rely on much
more than such self-serving evidence from family or friends. John Walsh, one of the nation's
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an academic point than a real one, and does nothing to particularly
distinguish false light.
The most important doctrinal difference between false light and
defamation is that the falsehood in false light need not be the kind of
falsehood that necessarily damages a plaintiff's reputation. This is related to
the damages issue, but different from it, in that it goes to the substance of
what is said about the plaintiff. In theory, a plaintiff may recover in a false
light case even when the false things said about the plaintiff make the
plaintiff look good, if the falsehood would nonetheless be highly offensive to
a reasonable person. 20 This, of course, corresponds to the orthodoxy that the
gravamen of the false light action is "internal" damage to the plaintiff rather
than "external" injury to the plaintiff's standing in the community. 21 A
plaintiff may thus be deeply offended and anguished by a falsehood that to
others, particularly those who do not know the plaintiff personally, seems
either positive or at worst, neutral. To the extent that this is the only genuine
"value-added" by the false light tort, however, it is not much, simply because
there does not appear to be that many cases with which what is said about a
plaintiff is positive or neutral in terms of reputation, and is still highly
22offensive. It can happen, but it does not happen often.
Indeed, it does not seem that this kind of recovery for a portrayal that is
"offensive" but not reputation-injuring is truly an "invasion of privacy" in
the ordinary sense of that term. It is more a form of infliction of emotional
premier plaintiff's lawyers, thus cautions against use of such informal anecdotal evidence. See
SMOLLA I, supra note 7, at 9-17.
20. Two false light cases that have reached the United States Supreme Court seem to
fit this paradigm. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Hill family had been held hostage for nineteen
hours by three escaped convicts. 385 U.S. 374, 378 (1967) [hereinafter Time, I1]. The abduc-
tors treated the Hills civilly. Id. A novel was written about the event, followed by a
Broadway play. Id. Life magazine did a pictorial article on the play, which it said was
inspired by the Hill family episode. Id. The article and the accompanying pictures (from the
play) portrayed the convicts as violent and abusive toward the Hills and the Hills as bravely
facing up to them. Id. at 374. There were fictionalizations and errors in the play, but it was
not a particularly negative portrayal of the Hills. Time, II, 385 U.S. at 374. In Cantrell v.
Forest City Publ'g Co., the plaintiffs husband had been killed in a bridge collapse disaster.
419 U.S. 245, 247 (1974) [hereinafter Cantrell Il]. A newspaper reporter had visited her
home, but had not actually seen her. Id. at 248. The reporter painted her as proudly and
stoically bearing her grief in the face of abject poverty. Id. By manufacturing the emotions
and conditions of her life the story placed her in a false light. Id. at 245.
21. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
22. Some courts have rejected the false light cause of action entirely, finding no
cogent policy reasons for adding a tort to the books that appears so largely to overlap
defamation. See Renwick v. News & Observer Publ'g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1984).
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distress2 3 False light does not involve an "invasive" action by a defendant,
nor does it reveal information or activity that our society commonly regards
as intimate, confidential, or personal. Instead, it is a tort that provides a
remedy for the anger, resentment, and outrage that a plaintiff may experience
for having been lied about, or "portrayed falsely;" whether the falsehood
lowered the esteem in which the plaintiff was held in the eyes of others.
Conceptually, the false light tort is a little more than a suit for infliction of
emotional distress plus the element of falsity. Seen this way, false light is
simply too close to the torts of defamation and infliction of emotional
distress to ever amount to much, and does very little to advance any strong
social interests in the protection of our core concepts of privacy. William
Prosser once expressed the fear that the false light tort was "capable of
swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public defamation. 24 In
effect, the reverse has occurred; false light has not done the swallowing, but
has itself been devoured.
B. Publication of Private Facts
In contrast to false light, the tort of publication of private facts is in
some respects the quintessential cause of action for invasion of privacy.
This tort truly deals with the core. Here the weakness comes not from the
tort itself, which is strong, but from the defenses that are arrayed against it,
which are stronger. The tort is classically designed to give a plaintiff a cause
of action for the public revelation of some fact about the2 laintiff that, in the
eyes of the community, is simply nobody else's business.
One might think that this tort would be a virtual gold mine for a
plaintiff and his or her lawyer, since a large part of our modem media seems
to exist primarily for the purpose of revealing private facts about people.
Yet, it is not so. The cases in which plaintiffs have succeeded with this tort
are not legion, but rare, and there are many notorious examples of courts
refusing to allow recovery for the revelation of facts that most reasonable
people would regard as private.
For plaintiffs there are two main barriers. First, one of the elements of
the tort is that the facts disclosed must be "private" and not "public. 26 There
23. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
24. Prosser, supra note 2, at 401.
25. See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1983) (sustaining
award of $250,000 for newspaper story revealing that the plaintiff, a female college student
body president, was a transsexual).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D (1977).
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can be a circularity here. In any publication of private facts scenario,
virtually by definition some ostensibly private fact has leaked into the
general culture. This usually means that someone other than the plaintiff
already knew about it. If enough other people already knew about the
putatively "private" fact, a court may treat the fact as no longer private but
public, and the cause of action is cut off at the knees. Perhaps the best
example of this is the case of Oliver Sipple, the off-duty police officer, "who
was in the crowd at Union Square, San Francisco" the day that "Sara Jane
Moore [tried] to assassinate President Gerald R. Ford" with a pistol.27 Sipple
spotted Moore drawing her gun, and heroically grabbed her arm, probably
28causing her to miss, and probably saving the President. In the media
coverage about Sipple's valiant act that followed, it was revealed that he was
29gay. Sipple lost his invasion of privacy suit, and one of the grounds
invoked by the appellate court was that too many people already knew
Sipple was gay.30 His modest visibility and activism in the gay community
was deemed sufficiently public to render his sexual orientation a fact about
him that could no longer be characterized as "private."'"
More formidably, however, the tort of public disclosure of private facts
is frustrated by the "newsworthiness" defense; a defense usually deemed to
be both incorporated in common-law doctrine and mandated by the First
Amendment, 3 and a defense that tends to present plaintiffs with colossal
difficulties. We seem to live in an increasingly tabloid culture, and much
of what is revealed in modem media about the private lives of people is
offensive to many in the community; offending our collective sense of
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind
that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate
concern to the public.
Id.
27. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (Ct. App. 1984).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989).
33. See Geoff Dendy, Note, The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure
Tort, 85 Ky. L.J. 147, 148 (1997). "But the general case is that many courts provide media
with the extraordinarily broad newsworthiness defense, leaving the public disclosure tort
effectively impotent." Id.
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decency. But this does not mean the revelation is not newsworthy.35 Thus,
one constantly encounters causes of action for publication of private facts
that might otherwise be deemed worthy ingloriously vanquished by the
newsworthiness defense.
36
It is intriguing to speculate on what drives the strength of the "news-
worthiness" defense, and the concomitant weakness of the publication of
private facts tort. Privacy law has suffered from a peculiarly frustrating
experience with the "newsworthiness" concept. The frustration is especially
fascinating when compared to the very different history of defamation law,
which also has a "newsworthiness" doctrine of sorts, though it goes by a
different name. 37  Defamation law has been strikingly successful in
developing its version of the "newsworthiness" doctrine, evolving relatively
objective and workable doctrinal contours through a rich body of case law.
Why has privacy law failed where defamation law has not? Why is it that in
defamation law, courts appear perfectly comfortable evolving standards for
defining such factors as what is or is not a "public controversy" and the role
the plaintiff has or has not played in the controversy, while courts appear
very reluctant to engage in a similar second-guessing of journalistic
judgment in privacy cases? Why is the "newsworthiness" pill easier for
courts to swallow in defamation cases than in privacy cases-that is, why are
courts willing to embark on "objective" definitions of "newsworthiness" that
may often second-guess journalistic judgment when it comes to defamation,
but not when it comes to privacy?
In defamation law, the "newsworthiness" notion is tied to fault and
falsity. In privacy law, it is not. These distinctions have made all the
difference. In defamation, the question of whether the case involves
"public" or "private" matters enters formal legal doctrine in at least three
34. See Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the
First Amendment: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?, 64 IOWA L. REV. 185
(1979).
35. See Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (stating that "[a]
factually accurate public disclosure is not tortuous when connected with a newsworthy event
even though offensive to ordinary sensibilities.").
36. See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993); Ross v.
Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1989); Gilbert v. Med. Econs. Co.,
665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981); Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980);
Pasadena Star-News v. Superior Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Ct. App. 1988); Sipple v.
Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Ct. App 1984); McNutt v. N. M. State Tribune Co.,
538 P.2d 804 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975); Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y. 1985);
Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Cos., 712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986).
37. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
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different places. At the threshold, defamation law generally requires that the
allegedly defamatory speech be on issues of "public concern" to qualify for
the speaker any heightened First Amendment protection at all. 38 Defamation
law then divides between public plaintiffs and private plaintiffs, requiring
that the "actual malice" standard of knowing or reckless falsity be satisfied
for public official and public figure plaintiffs, but permitting private
plaintiffs to recover on the lesser showing of mere negligence.39 In turn,
there are two types of public figures, the all-purpose public figure, deemed
so famous that he or she is treated as public for all purposes; and the far
more common "limited public figure," treated as "public" only for purposes
of speech germane to that plaintiffs participation in a "public contro-
versy. ''4° There is a substantial body of case law defining the term "public
38. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). In
Dunn & Bradstreet, the credit reporting agency, Dun & Bradstreet, issued an inaccurate credit
report about the plaintiff, Greenmoss Builders, a residential and commercial building
contractor. Id. at 751. The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice Powell, held that
the First Amendment damages rules applicable to defamation actions involving issues of
public concern did not apply when the defamation arose in the context of speech not on issues
of public concern. Id. at 762.
39. Id. at 766. Fault standards in modem defamation law are largely dictated by First
Amendment doctrines emanating from the Supreme Court's landmark 1964 decision, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter New York Times 1]. In the New
York Times I, the Court held that in defamation actions brought by public officials for
defamatory speech germane to the official's performance in or fitness for office, the public
official plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant published the defamation with "actual
malice," defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity. Id. at 279-
80. In a series of decisions following New York Times I decision the constitutional rules
evolved to include "public figures" as among the plaintiffs who must demonstrate actual
malice. The capstone of this evolution came in the 1974 decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The case involved a libel action brought by Elmer Gertz, a well-
known Chicago attorney and law professor, against Robert Welch, Inc., the publisher of the
monthly magazine, American Opinion, an organizer of the John Birch Society. Id. at 325.
The defendant claimed that Gertz was a public figure and that the magazine was thus entitled
to the protection of the New York Times actual malice standard. Id. The Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that Gertz was a private figure, and further holding that in private figure
cases, the actual malice standard was not required by the First Amendment. Id. The Court in
Gertz left it to state courts to develop for themselves the proper standard of liability in suits
brought by private plaintiffs, so long as they did not dip below the floor requirement of
negligence. Id.
40. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial promi-
nence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those
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controversy," and a substantial body of case law defining the relationship a
plaintiff must have to such a "public controversy" in order to be deemed a
"limited public figure" in a defamation suit.41 There are, of course, many
close cases, many fact patterns on the cusp, in which deciding whether there
is a "public controversy" at stake, or whether the plaintiff may be fairly said
42to have voluntarily entered that controversy, is an extremely close call. But
a close call is not the same as bad law. The fact that there may be frequent
cases close to a line does not mean that the existence of the line is illegiti-
mate. While I do not agree with every decision by the courts, I do believe
time has proven that the basic legal standards which have evolved are
coherent and functional.
A fundamental axiom of modem defamation law is that the media
cannot "bootstrap" itself into the higher level of First Amendment protection
granted in public figure cases by itself turning the plaintiff into a public
figure by focusing attention on the plaintiff.43 The plaintiff must already be
classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.
Id.
41. See generally SMOLLA I, supra note 7, at §§ 2:15-2:77.
42. This sometimes seems exasperating. See Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411
F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (stating that the demarcation between public and private
figures "is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.").
43. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 162-64 (1979). In Wolston, the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, Wolston, who had been brought before a grand jury
investigation in connection with an espionage inquiry, was a private figure. Id. at 161.
Wolston ignored a subpoena requiring him to appear before a grand jury in 1958, and
subsequently pled guilty to a charge of criminal contempt. Id. at 162-63. Wolston's episode
with the grand jury investigation and his subsequent conviction for criminal contempt resulted
in fifteen newspaper articles in New York and Washington, D.C. Id. at 163. Emphasizing
that Wolston had not invited controversy by entering into the public arena to influence a
public debate, the Supreme Court held Wolston to be a private figure. Id.; see also Outlet Co.
v. Int'l Sec. Group, Inc., 693 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Tex. App. 1985) (stating "[n]or can we agree
with the broadcaster's contention that Medlin was shown to be a public figure. There is no
evidence that he assumed any role of special prominence in society .... ) Similarly, in Time,
Inc. 1, the Supreme Court ruled that Mary Alice Firestone, wife of Russell Firestone, a
member of the wealthy Firestone family, was a private figure, despite being embroiled in bitter
and highly publicized divorce litigation. 424 U.S. at 453-57. The Court reasoned that she
had done nothing to invite public controversy other than to participate in the litigation, which
was not enough to bring her within the definition of a public figure. Id. at 453-54.
Firestone's prominence in what the Court depicted as "the sporting set" did not qualify her as
a person of "especial prominence in the affairs of society." Id. at 453, 487. Even though Mrs.
Firestone initiated litigation in a public court of law, the Court held that her action was not a
purposeful insertion into a matter of public controversy, since "state law compelled her to
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a public figure when the allegedly defamatory statement is made, a public
figure by virtue of voluntary entry into a pre-existing public controversy.44
This is solid law in defamation cases.45  Yet such bootstrapping often
appears to happen as a matter of course in privacy cases. In a genuine
resort to legal process in order to obtain lawful release from the bonds of matrimony." Id. at
454. Although the Court conceded that some participants in some litigation may be legitimate
public figures, either generally or for the limited purpose of press coverage concerning the
litigation, the majority would regard Mary Alice Firestone as "drawn into a public forum
largely against their will in order to attempt to obtain the only redress available to them or to
defend themselves against actions brought by the State or by others." Id. at 457.
44. Thus in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, the Supreme Court held that an academic who
had received substantial federal grants for research was a private figure for purposes of
criticism of those grants by a United States Senator, William Proxmire. 443 U.S. 111, 136
(1979). The plaintiff, Ronald Hutchinson, was the Director of Research at Kalamazoo State
Mental Hospital, in Michigan, who had received more than $500,000 in federal funds for
scientific research. Id. at 114. Despite his position and the substantial federal funding his
work received, he was deemed a private figure by the Supreme Court. Id. at 134. The
Supreme Court found that Hutchinson was not a public figure, squarely holding that Senator
Proxmire could not turn Hutchinson into a public figure by virtue of Proxmire's own
allegations, because that would permit a defendant to create a public figure defense through
the defendant's own conduct. Id. at 135-36. Echoing its holding in Wolston, the Court again
emphasized that Hutchinson did not thrust himself into the public eye "to influence others."
Id. at 135.
45. See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 136-37 (2d Cir.1984). The
Court in Lerman adopted a four-part limited public-figure test, requiring defendant to prove
plaintiff:
(1) successfully invited public attention to his views in an effort to influence others
prior to the incident that is the subject of litigation; (2) voluntarily injected himself into
a public controversy related to the subject of the litigation; (3) assumed a position of
prominence in the public controversy; and (4) maintained regular and continuing
access to the media.
Id.; see also, Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir.1982); Durham v.
Cannan Communications, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 845, 850 (Tex. App. 1982). The Court in
Fitzgerald adopted a five-part limited public figure test, requiring defendant to prove:
(1) the plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication; (2) the plaintiff
voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in a public controversy; (3) the
plaintiff sought to influence the resolution or outcome of the controversy; (4) the
controversy existed prior to the publication of the defamatory statements; and (5) the
plaintiff retained public figure status at the time of the alleged defamation.
Fitzgerald, 691 F.2d at 668.
The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that we should not consider post-defamation
press coverage in determining whether or not an individual is a public figure. We
think this logical. To do otherwise would be to permit the press to turn a person into a
public figure by publicizing the defamation itself. We, therefore, cannot consider this
story in determining whether or not appellant was a public figure.
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publication of private facts scenario, the fact that has been revealed about the
46plaintiff was by definition not previously revealed to the public. The
plaintiff cannot be said to have voluntarily encouraged the fact's release-to
the contrary, the plaintiff has by hypothesis guarded against its general
disclosure. Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff may not have sought
attention, and may not have invited media scrutiny, courts at times appear
willing to treat the fact as "newsworthy." Indeed, the mere fact that the
material has appeared in a media publication often seems to go a long way,
if not all the way, in establishing that the material is newsworthy.
4 8
The operative impact of the "newsworthiness" judgment in defamation
law (a judgment that goes under the formal doctrinal label of "public figure"
status) is more limited than in privacy law. In defamation cases, the decision
to characterize the plaintiff as "public" (and the subject of the defamation, in
that sense, "newsworthy") does not mean the plaintiff loses the case; it
merely means the defendant is saddled with the burden of establishing a
49higher level of fault. In privacy cases, in contrast, the judgment is all or
nothing. If the material is newsworthy, the plaintiff loses.
If privacy law were to "mature," if you will, on lines more akin to the
structure of defamation law, the newsworthiness judgment in privacy cases
might become more nuanced, and its impact on the cause of action less
draconian. In defamation law, we routinely draw a distinction between
"matters of public interest," and matters "the public is interested in."
Precisely the same judgment is appropriate in privacy law. That a fact that is
Durham, 645 S.W. 2d at 850, n.* (citation omitted).
46. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
47. Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social
Change: 1890-1990, 74 CAL. L. REV. 789 (1986); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN
OPEN SOCIETY 117-50 (1992).
48. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Ct. App. 1984). The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, comment f states,
[t]here are other individuals who have not sought publicity or consented to it, but
through their own conduct or otherwise have become a legitimate subject of public
interest. They have, in other words, becomes "news."... These persons are regarded
as properly subject to the public interest, and publishers are permitted to satisfy the
curiosity of the public as to its heroes, leaders, villains and victims, and those who are
closely associated with them. As in the case of the voluntary public figure, the author-
ized publicity is not limited to the event that itself arouses the public interest, and to
some reasonable extent includes publicity given to facts about the individual that
would otherwise be purely private.
§652D cmt.f.
49. New York Times , 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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revealed is "true" and that its publication might be "of interest" to the public
ought not mean that the fact is truly about a matter of "public interest" or
"public concern" in the First Amendment sense.50 The publication of private
facts tort cannot survive if this is to be the rule.
If the private facts tort is to survive, and certainly if it is to flourish, it
may thus be helpful to borrow from defamation concepts. Fault plays a role
in defamation. Fault, however, is harder to "plug in" to the privacy tort. The
reason is that fault in defamation is always tied to a "defect" in the
information-its falsity. Fault in this sense is coherent, as it is in a products
liability case. There is something wrong with what the defendant has
produced-it is factually incorrect-and we can thus talk intelligently about
the defendant's level of culpability in relation to that error: was it entirely
innocent, was it negligence, was it the result of reckless indifference to truth
or falsity, or was it knowingly false? These are intelligible gradations on a
rational spectrum.
In a privacy case, the information released is not "defective" in the
same sense. The information is accurate. The formal definition of the tort
tries nonetheless to capture some sense of "fault" in the requirement that
liability is predicated on a revelation that would be "highly offensive" to a
reasonable person. Fault calibrated in terms of offensiveness, however, is
inherently in greater tension with central First Amendment principles than
fault calibrated in terms of falsity. Offensiveness has an inherently
subjective quality. In most of First Amendment law, the mere fact that
speech is offensive to most people in the community does not justify its
abridgment.5" The one glaring exception is obscenity, in which the
50. See Barbouti v. Hearst Corp., 927 S.W.2d 37, 48 (Tex. App. 1996).
A public controversy is not simply a matter of interest to the public; it must be a real
dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some segment of it in an
appreciable way.... [E]ssentially private concerns or disagreements do not become
public controversies simply because they attract attention.
Einhorn v. LaChance, 823 S.W.2d 405, 411-12 (Tex. App. 1992).
51. The central principle animating the First Amendment is that the government may
not censor speech on the basis of viewpoint. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
Even expression as offensive and disturbing to most citizens as the burning of the American
flag is protected under the Constitution. Id. at 414. The Court stated, "[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."
Id.; see United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (same). The same principle applies to
such reprehensible expression as hate speech. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992) (striking down the conviction for cross-burning under the hate speech law); Black v.
Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001) (striking down the conviction of Ku Klux Klan
leader under the state anti-cross-burning law).
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requirement that the material be "patently offensive" to local community
52
standards is an element of the current First Amendment standard. Indeed,
it was the fact that the emotional distress tort was tied to such subjective
notions of "offensiveness" that led the Supreme Court in the Hustler case to
strike down its application in Jerry Falwell's claim against Larry Flynt and
Hustler Magazine.
There are numerous legal and cultural forces at work here. First, there
is the ingrained skepticism in our constitutional tradition for permitting the
imposition of any civil or criminal liability for the mere publication of
truthful facts that are lawfully obtained.54  Second, there is a reflexive
wariness in our constitutional tradition of any regime that permits govern-
ment actors to second-guess the editorial judgment of journalists or other
speakers as to what is or is not worthy of being said.55 Third, there is strong
cultural ambivalence about the revelation of private facts, and ambivalence
that works very powerfully to differentiate the private facts tort from the
52. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
53. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988); see also Paul A.
LeBel, Emotional Distress, the First Amendment, and "This Kind of Speech": A Heretical
Perspective on Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 315 (1989); Robert C. Post,
The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990); RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL (Illini Books
ed., 1990) (1988) [hereinafter SMOLLA II].
54. See, e.g., Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990) (refusing to enforce the
traditional veil of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings against a reporter who wished
to disclose the substance of his own testimony after the grand jury had terminated, holding the
restriction inconsistent with the First Amendment principle protecting disclosure of truthful
information); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding unconstitutional the
imposition of liability against a newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim in
contravention of a Florida statute prohibiting such publication in circumstances in which a
police department inadvertently released the victim's name); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co.,
443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979) (finding unconstitutional the indictment of two newspapers for
violating a state statute forbidding newspapers to publish, without written approval of the
juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender, where the newspapers
obtained the name of the alleged juvenile assailant from witnesses, the police, and a local
prosecutor, stating that "[t]he magnitude of the State's interest in this statute is not sufficient
to justify application of a criminal penalty .... ); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829 (1978) (overturning criminal sanctions against newspaper for publishing
information from confidential judicial disciplinary proceedings leaked to the paper); Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding unconstitutional a civil damages award
entered against a television station for broadcasting the name of a rape-murder victim obtained
from the courthouse records).
55. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
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56defamation tort. Defamation involves the publication of falsehoods. The
private facts tort involves the publication of truths. Everybody dislikes a
liar. The opprobrium that attaches to bearing false witness against one's
neighbor is of biblical stature, a moral proposition one is taught from
childhood.
The social opprobrium that attaches to spreading true information about
others, even if the information is maligned as "dirt," is far less intense than
the social opprobrium that attaches to spreading lies. This is because almost
everybody does gossip. Some gossip more, some gossip less, but only a few
exceptionally saintly or reclusive souls do not gossip at all. Gossip is the
junk food of knowledge, a guilty indulgence. Most of us practice it as much
as we condemn it. Indeed, trafficking in gossip is considered gainful
employment that may be honorably pursued as a profession. Most
newspapers publish gossip columnists. There are no newspapers that, to my
knowledge, publish libel columnists.
These factors have conspired to severely stunt the growth of the
publication of private facts tort. The Supreme Court's latest foray into
privacy, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,57 is a prime example. While Bartnicki dealt
with the revelation of conversations obtained by eavesdropping on a cellular
phone conversation in violation of electronic eavesdropping statutes,58 the
case applies well to common law invasion of privacy suits. The Court, in
Bartnicki, ruled that various state and federal laws making it illegal to
disclose material acquired through the illegal interception of cellular phone
messages are unconstitutional; at least when those laws are applied against
defendants who do not themselves engage in the acts of interception, who
receive the material from anonymous sources, and when the subject-matter
of the intercepted conversations are deemed to be "matter[s] of public
concern."
59
The case involved a statute passed by Congress in 1968, Title Ill of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.60 The statute made
illegal not only the interception of electronic communications, but also
subsequent disclosure or use of the contents of the communication by any
56. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 1007 (1989) (observing that the newsworthiness
test "bears an enormous social pressure, and it is not surprising to find that the common law is
deeply confused and ambivalent about its application").
57. 532 U.S. 514, 514 (2001).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 535.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.
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person knowing or having reason to know that the communication was
obtained illegally. 61  The law also created a civil action, essentially a
62
statutory tort claim, against any person who intentionally violated the Act.
More than forty states, including Pennsylvania64 (where Bartnicki arose),
61. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended
by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, provides in pertinent part that it is a
violation of law when any person:
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of
any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that
the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this subsection; [or]
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of
this subsection.
Id.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a). In such a suit the plaintiff may obtain equitable or
declaratory relief, damages (calculated as the greater of actual damages or specified statutory
damages), punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520(b), (c).
63. Depending on exactly what statutes one counts, as many as forty-four states
prohibited interception and disclosure of electronic communications in some circumstances, in
statutory provisions that were often patterned closely after Title III. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§
13A-11-31, -35 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 42.20.300-330 (Michie 2000); ARiz. REV. STAT.
§§13-3005, -3006(2001); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631, 632 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-
9-303 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-187, -188, -189, 54-41r (West 2001); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-62, -66.1 (1999); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 803-42 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-6702 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2001); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/14-2 (1993 & Supp. 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-4 (Michie 1998); IOWA CODE
§§ 808B.2, .8 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4002 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.020,
.060 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1303, :1312 (West 1992 & Supp. 2002); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 710, 711 (West 1964 & Supp. 2001); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(c) (West 1990); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.539c, .539e, .539h (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 626A.02, .13 (West 1998); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 542.402, .418 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §
45-8-10 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-702, -707.02 (1995); NEv. REV. STAT. 200.620, .630,
.650, .690 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-156A-3, -
24 (West 1985 & Supp.2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-12-11, -14 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 250.05, .25 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-287 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-15-02 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.52, .65 (Anderson 1999); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 176.2-176.5 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 165.540, .543 (2001); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5703, 5725 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-21 (2000); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-601-603 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 16.02, .05 (Vernon 1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-4, -11 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-62, -69 (Michie 2000);
W. VA. CODE §§ 62-1D-3, -12 (2000); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 968.31 (West 1998); WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7-3-602, -609 (Michie 2001). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120(a) (Michie
82
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had laws on the books similar to the federal provision. The dispute in
Bartnicki arose from an intercepted conversation between two persons
actively involved in a labor dispute, Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony Kane.65
Gloria Bartnicki was a principal labor negotiator for a teachers' union in
66Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania State Education Association. Anthony
Kane, a high school teacher at Wyoming Valley West High School, was
president of the union.6 7  In May of 1993, Bartnicki and Kane had a
telephone conversation concerning the ongoing labor negotiations with a
68 69local school board. 6  Kane was speaking from a land phone at his house.
Bartnicki was talking from her car, using her cellular phone.7° Strategies and
tactics were discussed, including the possibility of a teacher strike.7' The
talk was candid, and included some blunt, characterizations of their
72
opponents in the labor controversy, at times getting personal. One of the
school district's representatives was described as "too nice," another as a
"nitwit," and still others as "rabble rousers. 73 Among the opposition tactics
that raised the ire of Bartnicki and Kane was the proclivity, in their view, of
the school district to negotiate through the newspaper, attempting to pressure
the teachers' union by leaks to the press.74 The papers had reported that the
school district was not going to agree to anything more than a pay raise of
1997) (while not directly prohibiting subsequent disclosure, the statute does make it a crime to
"record or possess a recording of such communication"); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-542, -554
(2001).
64. See Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West 2000) et seq. (making it a felony when any person
"intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire,
electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to
know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral
communication" or "intentionally uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire, electronic
or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know,
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral
communication.").
65. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
66. Id. at 518.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Bartnicki v. Vopper, Brief of Petitioner, 2000 WL 1280378 at *4.
74. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518-19 (2001).
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three percent.75 As they discussed this position, Kane stated: "If they're not
gonna move for three percent, we're gonna have to go to their homes... [t]o
blow off their front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those
guys.
76
The direct wrongdoer-the actual "intruder," so to speak-is not
known, or at least was not identified in the record. 7' This anonymous person
intercepted the conversation, presumably using a scanner that picked up the
cellular phone transmissions, recording it on a cassette tape.78 An unknown
person (who may or may not have been the interceptor) then proceeded to
place the tape in the mailbox of the president of a local taxpayer's group that
was opposed to the teachers' union and its bargaining positions, a man
named Jack Yocum. 79 Yocum listened to the tape, recognized the voices of
Bartnicki and Kane, and took the tape to a local radio station talk show host,
80Frederick Vopper. Vopper received the tape in the Spring of 1993, but
waited until late September to broadcast it, which he did a number of
times. 8' At first Vopper broadcast a part of the tape that revealed Bartnicki's
82phone numbers. Other media outlets also received copies of the tape,
including a newspaper in Wilkes-Barre, but no other broadcaster or publisher
played the tape or disclosed its contents until Vopper initially broadcast the
material on the tape.83 Once Vopper broke the story, however, secondary
coverage of the events, including the contents of the tape, appeared in other
media outlets.84 Invoking a federal statute and a very similar Pennsylvania
law, Bartnicki and Kane sued Yocum, Vopper, and the radio stations that
carried Vopper's show, for having used and disclosed the tape of their
intercepted telephone conversation.85
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the prohibitions against intentional disclosure of illegally
intercepted communication, which the disclosing party knows or should
know was illegally obtained, were "content-neutral law[s] of general
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 514.
78. Id. at 519.
79. Bartnicki, 532 U.S at 519.
80. Id. The host of the show was named Frederick Vopper, though he appeared on
the air under the name "Fred Williams."
81. Id.
82. Bartnicki v. Vopper, Brief of Petitioner, 2000 WL 1280378 at *4.
83. Id. at *4-5.
84. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 514 (2001).
85. Id. at 520.
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applicability. ' 86 The court added that application of those provisions against
the defendants violated their free speech rights, since the taped conversations
87concerned matters that the Court deemed to be of public importance.
Critical to the Court's ruling was its assumption that the defendants had not
played a part in the illegal interception. 88 The Court in Bartnicki emphasized
that it was not answering the ultimate question of whether the media may
ever be held liable for publishing truthful information lawfully obtained, but
was rather addressing what it described as "a narrower version of that still-
open question,, 89 which it put as: "Where the punished publisher of
information has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in
itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the government
punish the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect in a
chain?" 90 The purpose of the law, the Court explained, was to protect the
privacy of wire, electronic, and oral communications, and it singles out such
communications by identification of the fact that they were illegally
intercepted by virtue of the source, rather than the subject matter.9' On the
other hand, the Court held, the prohibition against disclosures was still fairly
92characterized as a regulation of speech. The Court held that the first
interest identified by the Government in support of the law-removing an
incentive for parties to intercept private conversations-could not justify the
86. Id. at 526.
87. Id. at 534.
88. Id. at 530.
89. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528.
90. Id. (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(Sentelle, J., dissenting) rev'd by McDermott v. Boeher, 532 U.S. 1050 (2001)). The Court
observed that it's unwillingness to construe the question before it any more broadly was
consistent with the "Court's repeated refusal to answer categorically whether truthful
publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment." Id. at 529.
91. Id. at 526.
92. Id.
On the other hand, the naked prohibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as a
regulation of pure speech. Unlike the prohibition against the "use" of the contents of
an illegal interception in § 251 l(1)(d), subsection (c) is not a regulation of conduct. It
is true that the delivery of a tape recording might be regarded as conduct, but given
that the purpose of such a delivery is to provide the recipient with the text of recorded
statements, it is like the delivery of a handbill or a pamphlet, and as such, it is the kind
of "speech" that the First Amendment protects. As the majority below put it, [i]f the
acts of "disclosing" and "publishing" information do not constitute speech, it is hard to
imagine what does fall within that category, as distinct from the category of expressive
conduct.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-27 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
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statute.93 The normal method of deterring unlawful conduct, the Court
argued, is to punish the person engaging in it, and it would be remarkable,
the Court claimed, to hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of
information can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-
abiding third party. 94 The Government's second interest-minimizing the
harm to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted-was
in the view of the Court considerably stronger.95 Privacy of communication,
96the Court accepted, is an important interest. Nevertheless, the Court
reasoned, because the statements made by Bartnicki and Kane would have
been matters of "public concern" had they been made in a public arena, the9y
were also matters of public concern when made in private conversation.
Invoking the long line of precedents granting the media a First Amendment
right to print truthful information on matters of public concern that is
"obtained lawfully," 98 the Court held that the newsworthiness of the
information revealed trumped the privacy rights of the parties to the
conversation.99
The decision in Bartnicki was crucially influenced by the judgment that
the purloined conversations were, in effect, "newsworthy," because they
were on matters of public concern.' This was an extremely generous
understanding of speech of "public concern" from the defendants'
perspective, and seemed heavily influenced by the roughness of the
93. Id. at 529.
94. Id. at 530.
The normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punish-
ment on the person who engages in it. If the sanctions that presently attach to a viola-
tion of § 2511(1)(a) do not provide sufficient deterrence, perhaps those sanctions
should be made more severe. But it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a
law-abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a
non-law-abiding third party.
Id. at 529-30.
95. id. at 532.
96. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 532 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)).
97. Id. at 525.
98. Id.; see, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102, (1979) (stating
that "state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy
constitutional standards"); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
99. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
100. Id.
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conversation, and its ostensible reference to criminal violence. 01  This
influence was most visible in the concurring opinions of Justice Breyer and
Justice O'Connor. °2 Justices Breyer and O'Connor came down hard on the
fact that the conversation between Bartnicki and Kane appeared to
contemplate violent and illegal action.103  In the views of those two
concurring Justices, it was only this added element of illegality that provided
the special circumstances that warranted application of a newsworthiness
defense to the disclosure of the intercepted conversation.' 0 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented. 0 5 The laws at
issue, he argued, were content neutral because they sought to restrict only
the disclosure of information that was illegally obtained in the first instance,
placed no restrictions on republication of material already in the public
domain, did not single out the media for especially disfavorable treatment,
utilized a scienter requirement to avoid being sprung to trap the unwary, and
promoted both the privacy interests and the free speech interests of those
using devices such as cellular telephones.
10 6
The Bartnicki decision, however, while a major press victory in its
outcome, is not an entirely anti-privacy decision. Although on the facts of
the case the newsworthiness defense won again, there were signals from a
majority of the Justices that it would not win all the time.'0 Given the
narrower concurring views of Justices Breyer and O'Connor, a better
understanding of Bartnicki is to treat the expansive remarks of Justice
Stevens, writing for the nominal majority, as really expressing only the
views of a four-Justice plurality. The pivotal concurring opinion of Justice
Breyer made it clear that he was only applying "intermediate scrutiny" to the
statute, 108 and that in a future case, a case not implicating speech that posed
101. Id. at 535-36.
102. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J. concurring).
103. Id. at 539 (Breyer, J. concurring) (stating "the speakers had little or no legitimate
interest in maintaining the privacy of the particular conversation. That conversation involved
a suggestion about 'blow[ing] off.., front porches' and 'do[ing] some work on some of these
guys,' . . . thereby raising a significant concern for the safety of others.").
104. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J. concurring).
105. Id. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 525.
108. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
I would ask whether the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their speech-
restricting and speech-enhancing consequences. Or do they instead impose restrictions
on speech that are disproportionate when measured against their corresponding privacy
and speech-related benefits, taking into account the kind, the importance, and the
20021
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the specter of criminal violence, he would be willing to sustain the types of
disclosure limits imposed by eavesdropping laws.'
0 9
As discussed in the concluding section of the article,1 0 Bartnicki may
provide some valuable clues as to the types of doctrinal developments that
might well evolve to generally strengthen privacy torts.
C. Intrusion
From a plaintiff's perspective, the tort of intrusion has been more of a
success story than false light or publication of private facts, because the tort
of intrusion is largely inculated against any strong First Amendment defense.
Intrusion is typically defined as requiring an intentional intrusion into the
solitude or seclusion of another that "would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.""' The intrusion tort is complete before any material
obtained from the intrusion is ever disseminated-indeed, there is no
requirement that any material even be gathered or observed from the
intrusion, let alone published. In this sense, intrusion appears to involve
only "conduct," and not "speech" at all, and thus raises no serious First
Amendment issues.' 
1 2
This is a somewhat artificial understanding of intrusion, however,
because, in fact, most high-profile intrusion cases involve a media defendant
who has allegedly intruded in the course of gathering news. On the
extent of these benefits, as well as the need for the restrictions in order to secure those
benefits? What this Court has called 'strict scrutiny'-with its strong presumption
against constitutionality-is normally out of place where, as here, important competing
constitutional interests are implicated.
Id.
109. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 537-38 (Breyer, J., concurring).
As a general matter, despite the statutes' direct restrictions on speech, the Federal
Constitution must tolerate laws of this kind because of the importance of these privacy
and speech-related objectives. Rather than broadly forbid this kind of legislative
enactment, the Constitution demands legislative efforts to tailor the laws in order
reasonably to reconcile media freedom with personal, speech-related privacy.
Id. (Breyer, J, concurring) (internal citations omitted); see Warren & Brandeis, supra note 4,
at 196; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350-51 (1967) (stating "the protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right
to be let alone by other people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left
largely to the law of the individual States").
110. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
112. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 521 (4th Cir.
1999).
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hypothesis that the First Amendment ought to be understood as providing at
least some protection for the newsgathering process antecedent to the
dissemination of news, 1 3 there is arguably at least some role for the First
Amendment in fashioning the contours of the intrusion tort. The matter can
be pressed further. A major function of modern investigative journalism is
the revelation of corruption and malfeasance. Whether the journalist is
trying to uncover wrongdoing by the government, or wrongdoing by
individuals or corporations in the private sector, virtually by definition,
investigative journalists seek to reveal what others would rather keep
secret. 14 One strategy for doing this is to be sneaky. Some journalists, like
some cops, operate best undercover." 
5
Thus far the law has mediated these tensions through a series of
doctrinal devices, which create the surface impression that the intrusion tort
is a valuable legal device for protecting privacy, when in fact it renders the
tort relatively ineffectual and a meaningless remedy for privacy invasions.
The deceptive surface is the product of a time-honored strain of First
Amendment jurisprudence that defiantly and consistently avows that the
media is not the beneficiary of any special constitutional exemption from
laws of "general applicability."" 6 This doctrine was applied most famously
113. See Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
114. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998) (stating
"[information collecting techniques that may be highly offensive when done for socially
unprotected reasons-for purposes of harassment, blackmail or prurient curiosity, for
example-may not be offensive to a reasonable person when employed by journalists in
pursuit of a socially or politically important story.").
115. There is, of course, a critical moral and legal difference between cops and
journalists. Cops act formally on behalf of society, and are subject to the strictures of
constitutional limitations on their undercover activity, including the Fourth Amendment's
protection from unreasonable search and seizure. In our society we generally reserve the right
to use force to enter the private spaces of another for the purposes of policing wrongdoing
to--of course-the police. See Randall P. Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The
Tension Between Exemption and Independence in Newsgathering by the Press, 47 EMORY L.J.
895 (1998).
116. See, e.g., Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (sustaining
application of antitrust laws to the press); Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186 (1946) (sustaining application of Fair Labor Standards Act to the press); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) [hereinafter Associated Press /]; Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) [hereinafter Associated Press I1] (sustaining application of
National Labor Relations Act to the press); see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (sustaining generally applicable sales tax even as applied to
religious books and merchandise).
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in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 117 in which a newspaper was sued by a
source for breaking a promise to keep the source's name confidential, where
the newspaper revealed the source because it came to the judgment that the
source's name had become newsworthy. 1 8 The newsworthiness defense did
not help the defendant in Cohen, because the breach of promise was deemed
a breach of generally applicable law that occurred independent of any act of
publication.'19 The Court thus announced that "generally applicable laws do
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against
the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news.' 120  The surface power of this proposition, however, is depleted in
many intrusion cases through a combination of other common-law and First
Amendment doctrines. Intrusion claims require some invasion of a
plaintiff's "solitude" or "seclusion;" concepts that are consistently
interpreted to bar recovery for investigative efforts that involve surveillance
of a plaintiff in a public space, or surveillance of a plaintiff in a non-public
space where the plaintiff nonetheless did not have any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. 12  The mere fact that the defendant has used a hidden
camera or secret microphone, for example, will usually not render an act an
"intrusion" when the setting is deemed a non-private space.122 This has the
practical effect of largely limiting actionable "intrusions" to situations in
which other torts designed to protect "space" will do the trick just as well, if
not better. Many intrusions are just fancy forms of trespass.123
117. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
118. Id. at 665.
119. Id. at671-72.
120. Id. at 669; see also Citizen Publ'g, 394 U.S. at 131 (sustaining application of
antitrust laws to the press); Associated Press I, 326 U.S. at 1; Associated Press 11, 301 U.S. at
103 (sustaining application of National Labor Relations Act to the press); Oklahoma Press
Publ'g, 327 U.S. at 186 (sustaining application of Fair Labor Standards Act to the press).
121. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715-17 (1987) (finding a psychiatrist's
office was place at which a psychiatrist had reasonable expectation of privacy); Frankel v.
Warwick Hotel, 881 F. Supp. 183, 188 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding a father's meddling in son's
marriage was not an intrusion where there was no "physical or sensory penetration of a
person's zone of seclusion"); Green v. Chicago Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249, 255-56 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996); Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. 1942) (stating that
"[ciertainly if there is any right of privacy at all, it should include the right to obtain medical
treatment at home or in a hospital.., without personal publicity.").
122. See PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1280-81 (Nev. 1995)
(rejecting an intrusion claim by an animal trainer who allegedly engaged in abuse of monkeys
in a backstage preparation area).
123. See Simmons v. Miller, 970 F. Supp. 661, 668 n.2 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (noting an
intrusion "typically entails an 'intrusion upon the plaintiffs physical solitude or seclusion"').
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Damages rules play an even more significant role. Many courts appear
determined to draw a line between the damages that flow from the actual
intrusion itself, and the damages that flow from the subsequent publication
of the material obtained during the act of intrusion. Damages that come
from the dissemination of the material, courts reason, are subject to First
Amendment restraints, such as the newsworthiness defense.124  If the
undercover television news crew captures scenes of unsanitary food
preparation practices during a behind-the-scene expose of a restaurant in
which a journalist has fraudulently taken a job as a waiter; the restaurant
may recover, free of any First Amendment constraint, for the damage caused
to it by the employment of the confederate waiter and the waiter's secret
filming of the back kitchen. However, the restaurant may not recover free of
First Amendment restraint for the subsequent broadcast of that video
footage. To recover for what was disseminated, the restaurant must invoke
the law of defamation (or its privacy cousin, false light) or the privacy tort of
publication of private facts. Defamation and false light will not work as
causes of action if the material broadcast is substantially true. 12 5 While it is
not correct that "the camera does not lie"-for we know that sometimes the
camera does lie-it is correct that the camera does not lie often. As long as
the journalists do not edit the material or otherwise present it in a manner
that is false in some material sense, there can be no recovery. As to the
publication of private facts tort, if in fact the restaurant was engaged in
unhealthy food preparations, this will be deemed newsworthy, and under
application of that defense, the plaintiff will again lose.
124. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 521 (4th Cir.
1999).
125. Under First Amendment principles established by the United States Supreme
Court, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the allegedly defamatory statements made
are false. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). Minor, trivial,
technical falsehoods will not support a defamation action. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1990). Rather, the test is whether the "gist" or the "sting" of the
allegedly defamatory statements was different than publication of the literal truth would have
been. Id. The defendants are protected from liability for minor or trivial inaccuracies, but
may be held liable for statements that deviate in a material way from the truth. Id. at 516. The
concept is a simple one: a charge is not "substantially true" if the average reader thinks
differently of the plaintiff had the actual facts been presented correctly. As the Supreme Court
in Masson explained: "Put another way, the statement is not considered false unless it 'would
have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have
produced."' Id. at 517 (citing ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS
138 (1980)); see Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 721 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983);
SMOLLA II, supra note 7, at § 5.8.
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Once we disqualify all damages from the dissemination of the material,
the plaintiff is relegated to those damages that flow in some direct sense
from the intrusion itself. These damages are likely to be nominal, if they
exist at all.
126
It must be admitted that occasionally there are successful intrusion
claims. These usually involve an intrusion of unusually brazen insensitivity
into a scene of grief, violence, or injury in which society is outraged by the
distress caused to the victim or the victim's family. The plaintiff in such a
case is usually innocent of any wrongdoing, so that whatever newsworthi-
ness inures in the portrayal of the plaintiff, comes from the plaintiff's own
misfortune or victimization-as when a television news crew films a patient
in a hospital bed or in a rescue helicopter.1 27 There are also some recent
statutory elaborations on common-law intrusion, such as California's new
electronic trespass laws that modestly revitalize the tort. On balance,
however, one would be hard pressed to rate the tort at much higher than a
"C" average. This much can clearly be said: when one considered how
widespread and common hidden camera style reporting is in modem media,
what is most striking about intrusion is how rarely plaintiffs are able to use it
to get an "A."
III. WHEN PRIVACY AND PROPERTY CONVERGE
The one privacy tort that truly exceeds market expectations is
appropriation, or the right of publicity. This tort, in fact, is living beyond its
means. Courts have, with some frequency, applied it in ways that not only
stretch the credulities of sound public policy, but also in ways that seem
downright unconstitutional. Any number of examples might be cited, but I
will describe three holdings that strike me as symptomatic of the tendency of
some courts and legislatures, seemingly star struck, to extend lavish
protection to the personas of celebrities. The cases involve personalities
that, on the face of things, could not be more different: Vanna White,
Muhammad Ali, and the comic triumvirate of Larry, Curly, and Moe, known
collectively as "The Three Stooges."
Muhammad Ali (then named Cassius Clay), in his prime, was not only
the world's greatest heavyweight boxer; he was the world's greatest
celebrity. When he left boxing, his celebrity faded, and debilitated by the
effects of Parkinson's disease, he largely left the public eye. Ali's fame was
126. Id.; see Veilleux v. National Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 128 (1st Cir. 2000).
127. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998).
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rejuvenated when he was chosen to light the Olympic torch at the Centennial
Olympic Games in Atlanta. It was also rejuvenated through the portrayal of
his life in a well-regarded feature film in which he was played by Will
Smith. My children, all of whom were under the age of thirteen in 2002,
were not alive when Muhammad Ali defeated Sonny Liston for the
heavyweight crown; not alive when Ali changed his name from Cassius Clay
to Ali; not alive when he bantered with Howard Cosell once a month on
ABC's Wide World of Sports; not alive when he refused to report for the
draft in Vietnam; not alive when he was stripped of his heavyweight title;
and not alive when he regained it. Some of my children had been born by
the time Ali lit the Olympic Torch in 1996, though they only vaguely
remember that moment. At the time the torch was being lit, they had to ask
who Ali was, and why their dad had tears in his eyes, and why Ali had been
chosen to light the torch, and why Ali's hand shook so strongly with palsy.
But all my children know Will Smith. And because of the movie (whether
they saw it or not), they now know Ali. Indeed, more people know Ali, and
his legend, than know the name of the current heavyweight champion of the
world. There are probably people who still think of Ali as the champion.
In the late 1970s, when Ali was still at the apex of his fame, he sued
Playgirl Magazine. 28 Ali's dispute with Playgirl arose from a fictional
sexual fantasy and an accompanying sketch of a boxer run by the magazine
in its February 1978 issue. Ali's name was not used in the piece, nor was
any photograph of him taken. Rather, his image was conjured up through
fiction and an impressionistic sketch, as part of a sexual fantasy. 29 The
court ruled that Ali should prevail against the magazine for its violation of
his right of publicity. The court even imposed the harsh remedy of an
injunction against any further distribution of the issue. However, on closer
examination of this fight, it looks like Ali may have won it with a phantom
punch. The case is an insult in search of a cause of action. While
128. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
129. Id. In the words of the court:
Even a cursory inspection of the picture which is the subject of this action strongly
suggests that the facial characteristics of the black male portrayed are those of Mu-
hammad Ali. The cheekbones, broad nose and wideset brown eyes, together with the
distinctive smile and close cropped black hair are recognizable as the features of the
plaintiff, one of the most widely known athletes of our time. In addition, the figure
depicted is seated on a stool in the comer of a boxing ring with both hands taped and
outstretched resting on the ropes on either side. Although the picture is captioned
"Mystery Man," the identification of the individual as Ali is further implied by an
accompanying verse which refers to the figure as "the Greatest[.]"
Id. at 726-27.
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undoubtedly the sexual fantasy may have conjured up the image of
Muhammad Ali in the minds of readers, what was the nature of the "right"
held by Ali that this effort violated? There was no false statement of fact
expressed or implied, for no reasonable reader could have understood the
fictionalized sexual fantasy as an actual assertion that Ali had engaged in
sexual activity with the fantasizer. 3°
To the extent that the "offense" was the emotional distress suffered by
Ali for finding himself the object of such a fantasy, the subsequent decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,"'
would preclude recovery for that distress alone. 13 There was no "intrusion"
into Ali's solitude. It was the case, of course, that his identity was in a sense
appropriated by Playgirl. But this appropriation was not an appropriation of
Ali's "privacy" in any normal sense, for nothing he actually did was
described; nor can it be plausibly maintained that Ali's "property" in his
name or likeness (or more broadly, his "identity") was appropriated, in the
sense that our law ought to recognize appropriation. Ali's identity, as with
virtually all intellectual property, is, in part, owned by the property-owner,
and, in part, dedicated to the public domain: this is the place where
property, privacy, and public goods converge.
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,' 3 3 the Vanna White case,
demonstrates just where the convergence between property, privacy, and
publicized goods can lead. In this case, the Samsung electronics company
ran an impish and funny commercial featuring a robot dressed in a wig,
gown, and jewelry reminiscent of Vanna White's usual style on the popular
game show Wheel of Fortune.1 34 The robot was posed in front of a Wheel of
Fortune-like game board.1 35 White sued and won on a claim for violation of
her rights of publicity, as codified in the California statute.1 36 Judge Alex
Kozinski dissented from a denial of rehearing en banc, in an opinion that
was on the money:
130. See, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
131. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The Court held that "a public figure may hold a speaker
liable for the damage to reputation caused by publication of a defamatory falsehood, but only
if the statement was made 'with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."' Id. (quoting New York Times 1, 376 U.S. at 279-80).
132. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
133. 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
134. Id. at 1514.
135. Id.
136. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997).
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Private property, including intellectual property, is essential to our
way of life. It provides an incentive for investment and innovation;
it stimulates the flourishing of our culture; it protects the moral en-
titlements of people to the fruits of their labors. But reducing too
much to private property can be bad medicine. Private land, for in-
stance, is far more useful if separated from other private land by
public streets, roads and highways. Public parks, utility rights-of-
way and sewers reduce the amount of land in private hands, but
vastly enhance the value of the property that remains.
So too it is with intellectual property. Overprotecting intellectual
property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossi-
ble without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely nothing
since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and
technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the
works of those who came before. Overprotection stifles the very
creative forces it's supposed to nurture. 137
138
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., for example,
the Supreme Court of California applied California's statutory right of
publicity to prevent exploitation of The Three Stooges comedy act, even
though Moe Howard, Curly Howard, and Larry Fein, the stooges, were all139 • • .
dead. 1 The California statute defines "deceased personality" as a person
137. White, 989 F.2d at 1513.
138. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
139. The right of publicity in California is both a statutory and a common law right.
The statutory right originated in California Civil Code section 3344, enacted in 1971, which,
as originally enacted, authorized recovery of damages by any living person whose name,
photograph, or likeness has been used for commercial purposes without his or her consent. In
1979, the Supreme Court of California recognized a common law right of publicity, which it
described as a "complement" to the statutory cause of action. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,
603 P.2d 425, 428 n.6 (Cal. 1979). However, the court held that because the common law
right was derived from the law of privacy, the cause of action did hot survive the death of the
person whose identity was exploited and was not descendible to his or her heirs or assignees.
Id. at 428-30. In 1984, the California Legislature in effect overruled that aspect of Lugosi,
creating a second statutory right of publicity that was descendible to the heirs and assignees of
deceased persons. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West 1982 & Supp. 2002). In Comedy III
Productions (the Three Stooges case) the Supreme Court of California treated the 1984 statute
as modeled on the previous section 3344 and largely identical, but for the provisions
extending the right beyond death. Section 990 reads in pertinent part:
Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or
services, without prior consent ... shall be liable for any damages sustained by the
person or persons injured as a result....
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"whose name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial
value at the time of his or her death," whether or not the person actually used
any of those features for commercial purposes while alive.140 The statute
expressly states that the rights it creates are "property rights" that are
transferable before or after the personality dies, by contract, trust, or will.'
4
'
The right to require consent terminates if there is neither a transferee nor a
survivor, or fifty years after the personality dies. 42 The court held that
neither the California statute's fair-use-style exemptions, nor the First
Amendment, gave others the right to traffic in the personas of The Three
Stooges without authorization. 1
43
These kinds of decisions undoubtedly take some sustenance from the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.144  The case involved the "human cannonball," Hugo
Zacchini, and his act, which involved getting shot from a cannon and flying
two hundred feet through the air into a net. 45 Against his will, and without
his permission, a local television station filmed his performance at a county
fair, and broadcast his entire act, which lasted about fifteen seconds, for
viewers.146 The question before the Supreme Court was whether the First
Amendment required the recognition of a "newsworthiness" privilege broad
enough to immunize the television station for broadcasting Zacchini's
performance. 147 The Supreme Court held that no such First Amendment
privilege existed, specifically analogizing the state-created privacy/property
right to federal intellectual property law. 14 8 The court noted that protection
§ 990(a).
140. § 990(h).
141. § 990(b).
142. § 990(e), (g).
143. The law contains a number of exemptions similar to the "fair use" defense in
copyright, exempting use. For example, "in connection with any news, public affairs, or
sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign," § 990(j), as well as uses in "[a] play,
book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program,"§
990(n)(1), a work of "political or newsworthy value," § 990(n)(2), "single and original works
of fine art." § 990(n)(3).
144. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
145. Id. at 563.
146. Id. at 563-64.
147. Id. at 565.
148. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985) (stating "[i]n our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable
right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas."); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
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of the privacy/property right in such circumstances actually worked to foster
and enhance First Amendment values, in much the same way that federal
Copyright and Patent Law is said to advance the progress of the arts and• 149
sciences. Zacchini was probably correct on its facts. But too often courts
seem to have extrapolated too much from the holding, enforcing the right of
publicity to extend to the intellectual property holder's rights, which is far
more generous than necessary to encourage enterprise, and enormously
detrimental to the robust flow of satire, parody, critique, homage, and take-
off, that are the hallmarks of a free marketplace of ideas.
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME RESTORATIVE SUGGESTIONS
The first lesson that might be drawn from the assessment of the
generally sad-sack state of modem privacy law is that privacy torts are
generally weakest when the laws are purest and strongest and when the laws
are alloyed in some sense with property concepts. The more that privacy law
can be crafted in terms that borrow from property concepts, the stronger it
will be. The two privacy torts most strongly affiliated with property
concepts, intrusion (related to trespass) and appropriation (arguably a
species of intellectual property), have already outperformed other privacy
causes of action. To the extent that the weakest privacy tort, publication of
private facts, is able to evolve with adaptations that are borrowed from
property law, the strength and utility of the tort to plaintiffs will increase.
It is my guess that privacy law will strengthen in the future if there is an
increasing "convergence" between the intrusion and private facts torts. This
has already happened to some degree, and to the extent it continues, privacy
protection will gather increased momentum. The convergence I am
contemplating here is relatively simple: when an "intrusion" into a sphere of
life in which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy coincides
with the publication of material that is ostensibly a private fact, the
plaintiff's overall success in a privacy suit will be strengthened. As it stands
now, legal doctrines appear to invite defendants to employ a "divide and
(stating "[t]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate [the creation of useful
works] for the general public good."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (stating "[t]he
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights
is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts.').
149. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
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conquer" strategy, in which the intrusion side of the claim is entirely severed
from the private facts side of the claim.' 50 This renders the intrusion action
largely meaningless, since only the damages recoverable from the intrusion
itself are typically allowed, and it also renders the private facts cause of
action subject to the traditional difficulties attendant to the newsworthiness
defense.
15
'
However, neither the damages limitation nor the newsworthiness device
ought to interdict meaningful recovery by a plaintiff in tort when there is
both an intrusion and a publication of a private fact, unless the private fact
that is disclosed reveals criminal misconduct. This is the model recently
followed by California in its Electronic Trespass Law. 52 More significantly,
in my judgment, it is the model that will eventually evolve as lower courts,
and perhaps the United States Supreme Court itself, provide gloss and
amplification of the Bartnicki decision. 
53
In Bartnicki, it must be remembered that it was only the judgment of the
two concurring Justices, Breyer and O'Connor, that the conduct being
discussed in the intercepted conversation was "criminal," which influenced
them to treat the publication of the conversation as sufficiently newsworthy
to require First Amendment protection. 54 Bartnicki would otherwise have
been a true "convergence" case, in the sense that an intrusion like act-
interception of a private conversation with a scanner-gave rise to
publication of a private fact-a confidential conversation. The "pub-
lisher" of the private fact was not the "intruder," but surely knew that the
material was the result of an intrusion. In such instances no privilege to
traffic in the private fact ought to exist unless it reveals criminal conduct.
156
The day will eventually arrive when legal protection of privacy will
finally come into its own in America. For all the frustrations that privacy
law has endured in the last century, and for all the constant erosion of our
privacy we now endure, through the confluence of such factors as new
privacy-invading technology and new fears of terrorism, I believe that, in
this century, the general societal yearning for a retrieval of the "right to be
let alone" will grow steadily more intense. If, as Oliver Wendell Holmes
150. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
152. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2002).
153. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
154. Id. at 535.
155. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
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suggested, the law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life,"' we
can expect privacy law to gradually strengthen, as our moral life gradually
evolves to demand it.
157. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Jewell lived a relatively quiet life until an explosion in the
Olympic Park at the 1996 Atlanta Games culminated in the press magnifying
rumors, and ultimately trumpeting Jewell as "the prime suspect in the
bombing. His life became a nightmare, to the point where his attire, his
weight, and even his treatment of a pet dog became fodder for gossip
columns and talk shows."' Later cleared of any complicity in the bombing,
Jewell found, to his dismay, that the courts would refuse to entertain his libel
2
action against the media that had figuratively drawn and quartered him.
A young Florida woman, B.J.F., reported her rape to the local police
department. 3 A representative of the department placed the woman's name
in the police blotter.4 A reporter for the local paper, having seen the blotter,
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University.
A.B., Hamilton College; M.S.L.S., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., Duke
University. The author wishes to thank Professors Billie Jo Kaufman and Fran Tetunic for
their comments on the manuscript, and his research assistants, Olympia Duhart and Diana
Abril, for their attention to the footnotes. The author also wishes to acknowledge the
outstanding work of the reference staff of the Shepard Broad Law Center's Law Library.
1. ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 19 (2001).
2. Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). The
appellate decision was handed down after Professor O'Neil had completed his book.
3. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527 (1989).
4. Id.
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wrote a story on the rape and included the young woman's name.5 Despite
the paper's internal policy (and a state statute) 6 against publishing the names
of rape victims, the paper printed the name.7 The young woman, suffering
shame and humiliation from the disclosure of her ordeal, found little solace
in the judicial system when the system found the paper had not acted
improperly since it received its information from public record.8
William James Sidis, a child prodigy in mathematics, suffered a
nervous breakdown due to living in the public eye. Several years later, one
of the leading lights in American journalism found him living the life of a
recluse and wrote an article mercilessly exposing the former prodigy's
sheltered and unremarkable lifestyle. 9 Again, the courts offered no relief
when the media had taken a quiet, private person's life and turned it topsy-
turvy.' 0
All three of these people found themselves sacrificed on the altar of the
First Amendment, watching their emotional life's blood stream down its
sides. All three had no recourse and had to cope with the psychic and
economic consequences of righting their lives, with no assistance from those
who had wronged them. Professor Robert M. O'Neil, Director of the
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, sees little
problem with denying their claims. Adopting the role of High Priest to the
First Amendment, O'Neil dismisses Jewell briefly," relegates B.J.F. to an
endnote, 2 and does not mention Sidis at all. One would hypothesize that
Professor O'Neil regards the lives destroyed by media attention as little more
than the now infamous "collateral damage."' 3
5. Id.
6. "No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed,
published, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the name, address, or other
identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual offense ...... FLA. STAT. § 794.03
(2000).
7. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 527-28.
8. Id. at 538.
9. Later scholars disagree on whether James Thurber actually authored the article, or
simply revised it prior to publication. The name attached to the article was "Jared L. Manley,"
but this might have been a Thurber pseudonym. Whatever the case, Thurber's typewriter
figured significantly in producing the article. See Bent Twig, Time-Life Books, at
http://www.sidis.net/TimeLife.htm (last visited June 18, 2002); Good Will Sidis, HARVARD
MAG., at http://www.harvard-magazine.com/issues/ma98/pump.html (May 1998).
10. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
11. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 19-20.
12. Id. at 177.
13. Senator Bob Kerrey used the term "collateral damage" to describe children who
died at the hands of his American soldiers attacking a village in the Mekong Delta during the
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In his recent slim volume, Professor O'Neil points to what he views as
potential areas in which future civil litigation may chill freedom of the
press.14  Unfortunately, what could have proved an interesting and
significant call to action suffers from maladies that substantially undermine
his argument. He therefore does a significant disservice to those seeking to
protect the media, a group that undeniably has many proponents and
represents a vital position in an ongoing debate of substantial proportions.
Most significantly, O'Neil fails to produce adequate evidence to support his
sweeping thesis that "by the end of the decade [of the 1990s], there were few
places for the news or entertainment media to hide. The First Amendment
could no longer be invoked as a secure shield."' 5 Second, O'Neil distorts the
import and impact of recent cases. Finally, Professor O'Neil commits the
cardinal sin for a law professor of giving inadequate footnote references for
later authors to utilize his discussion.
II. INCOMPLETE STORIES: MEDIA ETHICS AND UNMENTIONED CASES
In what Professor O'Neil describes as "surely one of the darkest hours
of modem journalism, Arthur Ashe told a shocked world that he had
contracted AIDS."7 Ashe made the announcement under circumstances not
his own choosing.' 8 Shortly before the announcement, a sportswriter called
Ashe. The sportswriter had discovered Ashe's condition and would publish
it in national media in a matter of days. 19 Ashe, who made every effort to
maintain a private life off the tennis court, had little choice but to make a
public statement himself.2° O'Neil uses the Ashe incident to introduce his
concern that the continuing development of privacy law will jeopardize the
media's protection under the First Amendment.
21
Vietnam War. Timothy McVeigh was executed for destroying the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, causing the deaths of 168 people. "Timothy McVeigh
appropriated the term collateral damage to describe the nineteen children whom he murdered
in Oklahoma City." Lance Morrow, Bob Kerrey and Collateral Damage, at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,108054,00.html (Apr. 30, 2001).
14. In his preface, O'Neil speaks of "alarm bells" and "ominous portent[s]" which
have led to "uncertainty and media anxiety." O'NEIL, supra note 1, at x-xi.
15. Id. at xi.
16. Id. at 83.
17. Id. at 78.
18. Id.
19. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 78.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 83.
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[I]t is not too early to ask whether the news media should be con-
cerned about publicizing accurate and newsworthy information
on... [whether a person has contracted AIDS]. Or can they con-
tinue to rely comfortably on a First Amendment defense for telling
the truth, which would presumably provide a solid shield in any
other situation?
22
One would expect Professor O'Neil to mount a thorough argument
examining whether the established branch of privacy denominated public
disclosure of private facts now threatens to burst the floodgates.23 In this
context, O'Neil argues that an ethical media would not have revealed Ashe's
disease, and we should rely on media ethics for protection.24
Should the sportswriter have intruded on Ashe's personal life and
threatened to expose Ashe's disease? At the early stages, at least, AIDS
would not affect Ashe as a professional tennis player. O'Neil himself
acknowledges that: "A responsible student of the mass media would hope
that the editor or publisher in sole possession of this news would have found
some way not to release it-at least not until Mr. Ashe had time to do so in
his own way. 25 Now, these noble words might express a valiant hope, but
they have little to do with reality. Well before the days of Voltaire,
humanity realized that it did not live "in this best of all possible worlds."
26
For one thing, even if we could expect The New York Times to conceal the
story, we would hardly expect that The National Enquirer would follow suit.
But of greater significance, particularly in light of O'Neil's comment
that we would hope the media would exercise some restraint, members of the
media themselves have failed to give any indication that they would respect
privacy. Statements of ethics, whether from national organizations or from
the organs themselves, fail to reveal any significant concern for the privacy
27
rights of individuals. In short, not only could we expect the Ashe story to
22. Id.
23. The redoubtable William Prosser established four distinct areas of the privacy tort,
among them public disclosure of private facts. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OFTORTS §117, at 809 (4th ed. 1971).
24. See infra text accompanying note 27.
25. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 83.
26. FRANCOIS MARIE AROUET DE VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 4 (Easton Press ed., 1977,
Richard Aldington, trans.) (1759).
27. One of the great American papers does protect the privacy of those involved in the
news. The San Francisco Chronicle specifies: "We treat people with respect. This means
having a high regard for personal privacy. Ordinary citizens have a greater right to privacy
than public figures." SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, ETHICAL NEWS GATHERING, at
http://www.asne.org/ideas/codes/sanfranciscochronicle.htm (last updated Feb. 17,
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appear in the Enquirer, we could also fully expect the Times to accord it
significant coverage as well.
The American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), in its "Statement
of Principles," notes that "U]ournalists should respect the rights of people
involved in the news, observe the common standards of decency and stand
accountable to the public for the fairness and accuracy of their news
,,28
reports. Yet, such general phrases as "rights of people" and "common
standards of decency" hardly give sufficient guidance to editors and
reporters in deciding whether to run a story or in what manner to attempt to
gather facts. The New York Times has published guidelines which fall far
short of the ASNE statement, commenting only obliquely in a section
dealing with fictionalizing. "If compassion or the unavoidable conditions of
reporting require shielding an identity, the preferred solution is to omit the
name and explain the omission. 29  That small concession, used with the
guarded language of "compassion" and confined to concealing an identity,
can hardly rise to the level of giving subjects of journalistic inquiry any
confidence that their personal lives will not decorate the pages of the Times.
Similarly, The Washington Post offers little solace to the private person.
"As a disseminator of the news, the paper shall observe the decencies that
are obligatory upon a private gentleman.030 Again, and as the Post empha-
sized following this broad statement, what a private gentleman might do
varies with the time and social mores. 1 The media, both in reporting news
and in commentary, themselves create contemporary standards. 32 Thus, in
1999). Even the Chronicle, however, allows for variations from the general rule when
relative to the "relevance to the story." Id. On the other hand, the Chronicle does
acknowledge that even though it may explore the personal conduct of public figures, private
facts should appear in the paper with relation to "the degree to which private conduct bears on
the discharge of public responsibility." Id.
28. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, Art. VI,
at http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?id=888 (last updated Aug. 28, 2002).
29. THE NEW YORK TIMES, GUIDELINES ON OUR INTEGRITY, at
http://www.asne.org/ideas/codes/newyorktimesintegrity.htm (last updated Dec. 13, 2000).
30. THE WASHINGTON POST, STANDARDS AND ETHICS, at
http://www.asne.org/ideas/codes/washingtonpost.htm (last updated Feb. 17, 1999). The Post
also states that it "respects taste and decency, understanding that society's concepts of taste
and decency are constantly changing." Id. However, paragraph I relates to the use of
language in stories reported by the paper, and not to taste and decency in the manner in which
the editors and reporters conduct themselves.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 196 (1890).
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citing common standards and decencies, the Times and the Post theoretically
say little more than they will adhere to whatever norms they can convince
the public to adopt.
A full discussion by Professor O'Neil of the Ashe incident should have
at least called into question the possibility that responsible journalists would
have delayed running the story of Ashe's disease. Regrettably, little exists in
the media's own statements to justify O'Neil's conclusion that we can rely
on the media's ethical standards to protect private matters. Undeniably,
casting the media in a light other than benign hardly furthers O'Neil's
primary argument, for the reader will have less cause to protect media that
ride roughshod over individuals in quest of the almighty scoop. Yet, even a
first-year law student learns that the effective advocate must forthrightly put
forward conflicting arguments and cases, and must distinguish the negative
while asserting the positive.
Leaving aside the question of whether media ethics would cause at least
some editors to eschew reporting that Arthur Ashe had AIDS, there remains
the issue of whether contemporary privacy law threatens media indepen-
34dence. Consider first the evidence put forward by Professor O'Neil. He
points to cases granting equitable relief against paparazzi who hounded
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and later against others who equally tormented
35Arnold Schwarzenegger and Maria Shriver. These cases, he argues, pose
Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct
proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards and of moral-
ity .... When personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space
available for matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant
and thoughtless mistake its relative importance.
Id. What Warren and Brandeis wrote over one hundred years ago rings even more loudly
today, when the instruments of mass media reach the entire world and immediacy of reporting
is measured in fractions of seconds rather than in hours or days.
33. See, e.g., HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 279 (4th
ed., 1999).
In the Argument, you develop reasons why your client should prevail in order to
convince the court to accept your conclusions .... In addition, a successful argument
requires you to explain away the points against you .... To ignore the case against
you diminishes your credibility and the strength of your argument.
Id.
34. Suffice it to note that Professor Smolla's article elsewhere in this issue suggests
that the law of privacy not only has developed minimally, but offers little meaningful
opportunity for plaintiffs suing media defendants. Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the
Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 NOVA L. REV. 289 (2003).
35. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 88 (citing Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir.
1973)). O'Neil offers no citation to the Schwarzenegger case.
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needless civil remedies which unduly restrain the newsgathering process.
"The familiar existing sanctions against harassment, assault, stalking, and
the like should suffice where genuine physical or even emotional harm
results from invasive or trespassory image-gathering .... ,36 But again,
O'Neil fails to tell the full story. The sanctions to which he refers exist in
the sphere of criminal law, where procedural safeguards make successful
prosecution far less likely than the successful pursuit of civil remedies in
courts of equity.37 Further, we would hardly believe that Professor O'Neil
would champion criminal prosecution of over zealous reporters and
photographers. Thus, relying on existing criminal remedies would prove an
unlikely means of keeping an increasingly intrusive press from exceeding the
bounds of decency.
Professor O'Neil points to another case involving paparazzi, this time
hounding a more private target than the wife of a former president or two
actors. A married couple, senior executives of a corporation which had
come under media scrutiny, refused to give interviews to the media. 39
Reporters and photographers flocked around their home and even followed
them when they went on a vacation, renting a boat and using powerful
microphones to spy on the couple. 40  Calling the behavior of the media.. . ... ,,41
harassing, hounding, frightening and terrorizing, the court enjoined any
further intrusive activity. From these extreme facts, Professor O'Neil fears
a flood of cases based on media behavior which might descend as low as
mere petty annoyance. "The critical question, which courts have barely
begun to address, is where and to what extent reasonable expectations of
privacy beyond the home warrant some relief against unwelcome photo-
graphic invasions or intrusions. 43
Any number of cases have addressed the issue of intrusion on seclusion,
creating a solid, accepted body of law that establishes parameters for a
36. Id. at 88.
37. The entire nation saw the difference between criminal prosecution and civil tort
actions graphically and painfully displayed in the case of 0. J. Simpson. Acquitted of the
double murders of his ex-wife and her escort, Simpson suffered an economically crushing
defeat in a wrongful death action brought by their estates. What the state failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt, the plaintiffs could prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
38. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 75.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 76 (quoting Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
42. Id.
43. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 89.
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comfortable balance between reportage and seclusion." Consider, for
45
example, Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, where a woman, leaving a
carnival fun house, stepped on air jets that blew her skirt up over her waist.4 6
An enterprising reporter snapped her photo, which his equally enterprisin
editor ran without her permission in the next edition of the local paper.
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict for the woman, stating:
One who is a part of a public scene may be lawfully photographed
as an incidental part of that scene in his ordinary status. Where the
status he expects to occupy is changed without his volition to a
status embarrassing to an ordinary person of reasonable sensitivity,
then he should not be deemed to have forfeited his right to be pro-
tected from an indecent and vulgar intrusion of his right of privacy
• 48
merely because misfortune overtakes him in a public place.
The press will incur liability only for excesses that amount to indecency
and vulgarity, as stressed by Daily Times Democrat.49 Similarly, media will
escape liability for public disclosure of private facts when reporting a
newsworthy matter, unless the facts divulged offend the conscience. For
example, the president of the student body of a community college sued a
newspaper that accurately reported that she had undergone a sex change
operation years earlier.50 At trial, a jury found by special verdict that the
defendants had disclosed a private fact about the plaintiff which "was not
newsworthy; the fact was highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities; defendants disclosed the fact with knowledge that it was highly
offensive or with reckless disregard of whether it was highly offensive; and
44. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976).
45. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
46. Id. at 476.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 478.
49. Id. One should also note that where the media abandons its role in reporting the
news and instead engages in an exclusively profit-making enterprise, it might become liable
under the rubric of publicity. See., e.g., Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967, 968
(D.R.I. 1988). The famous "kissing sailor" photograph which signaled the end of the Second
World War undeniably retains its newsworthy status even today. Id. Yet, when a publisher
sought to sell limited edition copies of the photo at $1600 each, the publisher had to obtain a
written license from the sailor in order to publish, as the protection afforded by newsworthi-
ness no longer applied. Id.
50. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 766 (Ct. App. 1983).
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the disclosure proximately caused injury or damage to [the plaintiff].'.'
Again, liability hinged on the media reporting a fact not only private, but
which the community found offensive to its cultural standards.
As noted earlier, the press itself plays an integral role in shaping
contemporary attitudes and in expanding the standards by which the public
gauges morality.53 When the media creates the standards, it can hardly
complain when it violates its own creation. The law of privacy does little
more than allow the media to create the "breathing space" in which it can
publish truth.54 Who better to gauge the effect of its own articles than the
press?
III. DISTORTED IMPACT
In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc. ,5 the defendant published a book
56
entitled Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors. True
to its title, the book provided detailed instructions for any person desiring to
pursue a career as a professional assassin.57 It came as no surprise to the
publishers, then, that a reader of the book followed the instructions faithfully
and committed a treble murder for hire.58 In the aftermath of these brutal
51. Id. (emphasis in original, numbering omitted). Note particularly that Diaz shifted
the burden of proof on the newsworthiness issue from the defendant to the plaintiff. Id. at
769; see also Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). It is worth noting
that although Professor O'Neil criticizes Shulman for allowing the case to proceed, he
neglects to note that Shulman also put a substantial burden on plaintiffs seeking to sue under
its rubric. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 74-75, 77. And, let us not forget that plaintiffs suing
media defendants for defamatory utterances made in discussion of matters of public concern
must now prove falsity. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986).
Thus, plaintiffs must now prove the traditional elements of their causes of action, but must
also plead and prove the absence of two matters long considered affirmative defenses-
newsworthiness and truth. Id.
52. Of the four branches of privacy mentioned in the Restatement, only appropriation
of name or likeness does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the invasion of privacy is
"highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B
(intrusion on seclusion), 652D (publicity given to private life), 652E (false light) (1976).
53. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 196.
54. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
55. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
56. At http://faculty-web.at.nwu.edu/commstud/freespeech/cont/cases/hitman.html
(last updated Jan. 1, 2001).
57. Rice, 128 F.3d at 236-41.
58. Id. at 240-41.
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crimes, the personal representative of the decedents' estates sued the
publisher in federal court in a wrongful death action based on state law.59 At
the summary judgment stage, the publisher argued that the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution provided a blanket immunity from suit.
60
For the purposes of its motion, Paladin Enterprises made some remarkable
concessions: 1) that it marketed the book in such a way as to attract
criminals; 2) that it intended for and indeed knew that the book would be
used by assassins; and 3) that it assisted the assassin in this particular case in
committing the murders.6 1 Essentially, the defendant conceded that the court
should view its publication of the book in the same light as if Paladin had
written instructions to carry out the specific murders at the direct request of
the assassin.62
The appellate court found little trouble in reversing the district court's
63granting of the summary judgment motion. In so doing, however, it made
absolutely clear that its decision rested on the nature of the case as presented
to it by the stipulations of fact. 64 "These stipulations are more than sufficient
to foreclose an absolute First Amendment defense to plaintiffs' suit.
65
Indeed, the court so limited its decision that it felt obligated to criticize many
66
of the amici curiae for their expansive view of the nature of the case.
That the national media organizations would feel obliged to vigor-
ously defend Paladin's assertion of a constitutional right to inten-
tionally and knowingly assist murderers with technical information
which Paladin admits it intended and knew would be used immedi-
ately in the commission of murder and other crimes against society
is, to say the least, breathtaking.
67
Rice hardly serves as precedent for the traditional "copy cat" claim,
68
none of which had survived the preliminary stages of litigation. Where a
59. Id. at 241.
60. Id.
61. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241-42, n.2.
62. Id. at 241.
63. Id. at 267.
64. Id. at 253.
65. Id.
66. Rice, 128 F.3d at 265.
67. Id.
68. O'Neil himself grudgingly and secondarily acknowledges "the consistent pattern
of publisher and producer non-liability for imitative or 'copy cat' crimes." O'NEIL, supra note
1, at 179. The acknowledgment, however, only comes in what passes for endnotes.
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murderer saw a movie and acted similarly, or where a child heard a song
and committed suicide,7° courts readily rejected later causes of action either
because the nature of the second act meant it constituted a superceding,
intervening cause to the claim of negligence, or because the defendant owed
the particular plaintiff no duty. The trifold nature of the admissions in
Rice-marketing for the purpose of assassination, intent that assassins utilize
the book to commit crimes, and abetting the specific crime that caused the
demise of plaintiffs' decedents--makes the case virtually sui generis.
Soon after Rice, however, a Louisiana appellate court refused to dismiss
a complaint which alleged that the producer of the movie Natural Born
Killers intended for later copy cat crimes to result from the movie.71 No
other case has since surfaced with a ruling against the defendant at any stage,
nor have further developments arisen in the Louisiana case. Still, Professor
O'Neil elects to grossly misrepresent the impact of Rice. "Thus, within a
matter of months, the legal landscape had changed dramatically. The safe
harbor that publishers, producers, and distributors had taken for granted for
decades had suddenly vanished. '7 2  O'Neil seems to back away from this
stunning characterization later, when he acknowledges that the intent
element sets both Rice and Byers apart: "Thus, in both cases the defendants
were willing to assume that, even if such an intent could be proved (however
improbable that may have been), no legal liability could have been
imposed., 73 But his retrenchment is indeed short-lived, for on the next page
he again wrings his hands in anguish over the danger he perceives stemming
from these limited cases. "Moreover, once victims' groups and plaintiffs'
69. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 137-8.
70. Id. at 153-54 (discussing McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App.
1988)).
71. Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681, 691 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
72. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 141. Professor O'Neil does not seem to like very much
about Rice at all. He takes pains to point out that the judge who authored the opinion "was the
son of parents who had been brutally murdered two decades earlier under circumstances so
close to those of the Rice v. Paladin case he had seriously considered recusing himself but in
the end decided he could be objective." Id. at 140. He somewhat gently chides Rodney A.
Smolla for representing the plaintiffs in Rice. "[Smolla's] commitment to take on the
case... seemed a departure from his lifelong defense of expressive and creative interests. Yet
he became convinced that one who profited commercially from distributing material such as
the Hit Man Manual did not merit categorical First Amendment protection." Id. at 155-56.
73. Id. at 157.
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lawyers taste media blood, as now they clearly have, life will never be the
same."
74
Hit Man proceeded to summary judgment on a rarified issue, and then
only at the behest of the defendant. Byers survived dismissal of the
complaint, to be sure, but the plaintiff faces one of the most daunting proofs
in the tort panoply-that the ?5roducer knew or was substantially certain
others would mimic the crime. Indeed, to fit within the parameters of Hit
Man and thus survive summary judgment, the plaintiff would have to prove
the producers marketed Natural Born Killers to the criminal set, knew
assassins would learn their trade from the movie, and perhaps even that they
knew the specific assassin would use the movie to commit the crime. In any
calling, actors find themselves subject to tort suits. Almost 370 years ago,
John Donne wrote: "[L]awyers find out still/Litigious men, which quarrels
move."76 Things have not changed much, and the possibility of a civil action
74. Id. at 158. Somehow, depicting the media as the Christians and the victims of
their intrusiveness as the lions seems at best surreal.
75. "Proof of intent necessary for liability in cases such as the instant one will be
remote and even rare .... Byers, 712 So. 2d at 691. See also Rice, 128 F.3d at 265
("[T]here will almost never be evidence proffered from which a jury even could reasonably
conclude that the producer or publisher possessed the actual intent to assist criminal
activity."). The element of acting with knowledge which surfaced in Byers underscores the
United States Supreme Court's solicitousness of the media in another line of cases. Unless the
media actually participates in illegal activity in the newsgathering process, the courts will not
permit either criminal sanctions or civil liability. The Court made this plain in Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), where a radio station broadcast recordings of a cellular phone
conversation. The tapes of the conversation appeared, infant-like, on the station's doorstep
but plainly came from an illegal interception. The radio station "did not participate in the
interception, but they did know-or at least had reason to know--that the interception was
unlawful." Id. at 517-18. The Court refused to sanction either civil or criminal liability based
on title 18, section 2510-11 of the United States Code, making it illegal to intercept or publish
intercepted electronic communications. Without actually participating in the illegal acquiring
of information, the media will not incur liability. This answered the questions remaining after
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), which protected the newspaper that had published
the name of a rape victim obtained from official records open to the public. It also reaffirmed
those cases holding the media could not trespass on property in the newsgathering process.
See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). The ABC
reporters trespassed in that they gained access to areas of Food Lion stores closed to the
public, and did so by misrepresenting their credentials. Id. at 510. Thus, the apparent consent
of Food Lion to their presence in the meat department was vitiated by the misrepresentation.
Id. But see O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 98. Thus, so long as the media stops short of
participating in illegal activity, it may disseminate any material in its possession which is in
the public interest.
76. JOHN DONNE, THE CANONIZATION (1633), available at
http://eir.library.utoronto.ca/rpo/display/displaypoem.cfm?poemnum=648.
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exists as a cost of doing business. Only when suits progress beyond the
initial stages do they pose a real threat,77 and to date none of the small
number of copycat suits has made it beyond summary judgment.
IV. ENDNOTE PROBLEMS
[F]ootnotes have three basic functions: (1) they provide authority
for assertions, and in so doing, provide a bibliography for further
research; (2) they attribute borrowed materials to their sources; and
(3) they continue a discussion begun in the text, but along lines
somewhat peripheral to the logical development of the primary ar-
gument.
78
The problem with Professor O'Neil's failure to provide precise footnotes
should in no way suggest improper attribution; instead, Professor O'Neil has
violated the spirit of the first goal of footnotes, and the letter of the third.
While not devoid of bibliographic material, O'Neil's book rather includes a
scant eight pages of source references without pointing the reader to the
specific places in the text (other than a vague chapter-by-chapter listing) to
which the sources refer. The author justifies this sparse treatment by stating:
"Although detailed footnotes seem incompatible with a book of this sort,
familiar though they are to most legal scholars, some references are
appropriate and essential., 79 Readers thus must wonder exactly what "sort"
of book they hold in their hands, and unfortunately the pages of the volume
fail to reveal how, if at all, The First Amendment and Civil Liability differs
from any other text or treatise seeking to advance an argument on a point of
law. For example, Marshall Shapo's highly regarded The Duty to Act
8°
argued for a "fiduciary approach to governmental obligation' 8 1 and appealed
77. See Byers, 712 So. 2d at 691.
Because this case is before us on a peremptory exception pleading the objection of no
cause of action, we must accept this allegation [of intent] as true .... It is only by
accepting the allegations in Byers' petition as true that we conclude that the film falls
into the incitement to imminent lawless activity exception to the First Amendment.
Id.
78. ELIZABETH FAJANS & MARY R. FALK, SCHOLARLY WRITING FOR LAW STUDENTS:
SEMINAR PAPERS, LAW REVIEW NOTES, AND LAW REVIEW COMPETITION PAPERS 106 (2d ed.
2000).
79. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 173.
80. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, & PUBLIC POLICY
(1977).
81. Id. at 154.
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to a wide audience reaching well beyond the legal community, yet contained
thirty-five pages of meticulous notes."
The sketchy notes occasionally fail to identify sources precisely enough
for the reader to track them down without substantial additional work. For
the Jewell case noted above, Professor O'Neil gives us one sentence of
explanation with no specific citation to the actual material on which he relies
beyond a simple declaration that the material exists.83 While readers have
confidence in the accuracy of the statement, they will face a near impossible
task if they wish to pursue the matter further. Plainly, Professor O'Neil had
access to the order he mentions, for he gives us some details on the rationale
of the court. 84  Why not share the bibliographic data with his readers?
Similarly, citations to treatises in general will not serve the needs of readers
looking either for specific guidance or simple overviews. For example, legal
scholars regularly refer to both the Sanford and the Smolla treatises on
defamation," but would hardly hand either work to someone seeking basic
information without more precise direction. Unfortunately, Professor O'Neil
adopts this approach.86 Finally, occasionally the reader will need a precise
citation to pursue the concepts of other scholars. Professor O'Neil identifies
a fascinating quotation from a recent book by Stanley Fish," but gives
readers no ability to find the quote and its related material without massive
effort.88 The book from which O'Neil took the quotation, There's No Such
82. Id. at 155-90.
83. "The ruling that Atlanta park guard Richard Jewell was a public figure was that
of a Georgia state trial judge; though the decision was appealed, no further proceedings have
been reported." O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 174. Basic rules of citation, let alone fairness,
require something further. O'Neil tells us only that the ruling occurred sometime in late 1999.
Id. at 19. Even if the trial court's ruling went unreported, Rule 10.5(b) of The Bluebook: A
Uniform System of Citation requires an author to "[g]ive the exact date for all unreported
cases and for all cases cited to a looseleaf service, a slip opinion, an electronic database, or a
newspaper." THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.5(b), at 66 (Columbia
Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000).
84. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 19-20.
85. BRUCE W. SANFORD, SANFORD'S SYNOPSIS OF LIBEL AND PRIVACY (4th ed. 1991);
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION (1986).
86. "For a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the law of libel and slander,
one might consult [the Sanford or Smolla treatises] .... O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 174. One
might consult them for an overview, but one would quite likely feel overwhelmed by the
thoroughness of either work.
87. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING,
Too (1994).
88. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 9. At no point in the book does O'Neil indicate a page
for the quotation from Fish.
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Thing As Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too, contains 348 pages in the
paperback edition. 89 That haystack would daunt legal scholars, let alone
laypersons, searching for the quoted needle. Moreover, Professor O'Neil
eschews the opportunity to digress or expand on such tantalizing passages as
the Fish excerpt-a discussion that although relegated to a footnote would
bear great interest for his readers.
In short, while Professor O'Neil makes a stab at including the scholarly
apparatus one expects in a volume of legal thought, whether argumentative
or scholarly, he falls far short of what the profession finds acceptable. He
delineates the sources for his work, true, but fails to give his readers the
ability to move further on specific issues.90  His explanation for treating
sources in this cavalier manner (it is not that kind of a book) fails to provide
an acceptable reason for deviating as he has done from the minimum
standards of legal practice. 91 While some may regard these objections as
idle carping, Professor O'Neil's refusal to properly annotate his book at the
very least casts a questionable light on his effort to persuade others of the
force of his argument.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Robert O'Neil has written a seriously flawed book on a
subject that deserves a far more balanced and scholarly treatment. Not since
Anthony Lewis' excellent revisiting of the importance of New York Times v.
Sullivan92 have we seen a full discussion of the vital importance of freedom
of the press in a democratic society.93 Today's world of media, by its sheer
scope if nothing else, demands such a book. From the vanishing local daily
to the vastness of the Internet, we see media the New York Times court could
89. FISH, supra note 87.
90. Indeed, even the index (although entirely the responsibility of the editor and not
the author) occasionally erroneously refers the reader to pages where the topic is not
discussed. See, e.g., the index entry for Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) which
does not appear on the cited page 179, but which is found on page 177. O'NEIL, supra note 1,
at 177.
91. In the movie Michael, John Travolta plays the Archangel Michael, who when
importuned to perform miracles, responds: "I'm not that kind of angel." MICHAEL (New Line
Cinema 1996). Archangels, he quite correctly suggests, exist to perform battle in the name of
the Lord. Id. When O'Neil baldly asserts he has not written that kind of book, see supra text
accompanying note 79, we are left to wonder what kind of book he in fact has produced.
92. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
93. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (First Vintage Books ed. 1992) (1991).
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hardly have contemplated, let alone the framers of the First Amendment.
Journalism post-Watergate has adopted an aggressive, almost bullying,
prying methodology, and, aided by technological advances that make it
possible for the media to observe us even through the walls of our own
homes, now has the ability to take upon itself a non-governmental Orwellian
quality. The competition to control a market, whether by print or broadcast
media, leads to a greater quest for a scoop. And all of this takes place in a
society less concerned with appropriate conduct than ever, due in substantial
part to the media's own creation. The media must also acknowledge and
remedy its reluctance to adopt ethical standards of conduct that protect
average citizens from prying. Yet against all of these considerations, a
democracy can only survive if its members have access to the information
they need to make their decisions. The media must have the "breathing
space" 95 to inform the public. We still need a study that harmonizes our
need for a free press while avoiding the harm media can inflict.96 What a
pity, then, that Professor O'Neil failed to rise to the challenge. The First
Amendment and Civil Liability promised so much. It delivered so little.
94. O'Neil does throw barbs at the media itself. "To the extent that [news and
entertainment media] seek a more favorable reception in the courts of both law and public
opinion, they might do well to look more often at their own practices and ask whether pressing
free expression to its limits is always helpful." O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 170.
95. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
96. Fifty years ago, a prominent American commented:
I, of course, believe in freedom of the press. It might be well, however, to define
freedom of the press. I understand freedom of the press to mean freedom to print all of
the truth regardless of how pleasant or unpleasant it may be, and regardless of who may
be helped or hurt thereby.
JOE MCCARTHY, MCCARTHYISM: THE FIGHT FOR AMERICA 91 (Joseph Cellini ed., Ayer Co.
1988) (1952). One suspects that Professor O'Neil would agree with the sentiment, although
detest the speaker. These words came from Joseph McCarthy, long reviled as one of the
greatest opponents of freedom of speech in our country's history. That the ultimate Red-baiter
would so vehemently espouse freedom of the press suggests that we must avoid absolutism in
defending the media. McCarthy cared nothing for those he crushed in his fight against
Communism-including a substantial number of members of the media. Using the First
Amendment as an absolute shield when the media harms either the reputation or the
equanimity of persons, whether private or public, perversely recalls the absolutist sword of
McCarthyism.
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I. INTRODUCTION-THE "RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE" IS BORN IN AMERICA
As early as age four, children develop a sense of privacy-the
intermittent desire for others to leave them alone.' This almost primal desire
continues to grow throughout each person's life. Not surprisingly,
2Americans, as a whole, struggle for that same right in everything they do.
* The author is a May 2003 J.D. candidate at Nova Southeastern University in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. Prior to law school, he worked as a staff writer for fourteen years at daily
newspapers along Florida's East Coast, where he covered the courts, the police beat, and
general assignments that often involved the issues discussed in this article. He graduated from
the University of Central Florida with a B.A. in journalism. The author wishes to thank Tanya
Randolph for her love and understanding during the writing of this article, and Olympia
Duhart for her encouragement and guidance during the author's tenure as a law student.
1. Age 4, at http://www.kidsdirect.net/KD/ages/3-5(4).htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2002). By age four, the attributes of modesty and privacy begin to emerge, and by puberty
(age 9), they should have developed a significant desire for privacy. Age 9, at
http://www.kidsdirect.net/KD/ages/6-10(9).htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
2. Michael Kelly, 77 North Washington Street, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE, Mar. 2001, at
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/03/march77.htm (citing The Reinvention of Privacy
by Toby Lester, which contends that privacy "consistently ranks in the public-opinion surveys
as a primary worry."). Furthermore, privacy bulletin boards have sprung up on the Internet.
One, called Privacy, at http://motemind.topcities.com/law/privacy.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2002), debated how the media might be curbed from invading privacies when technology
makes it so easy. "[P]rotecting privacy in the information age is like changing the tires on a
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From work to financial matters to the mundane happenings of their everyday
lives, Americans want to exercise their right "to be let alone."' Unfortu-
nately, that same collective group also thirsts for the salacious, the shocking,
and the striking. The country's media strives to satiate that hunger with
accounts of anything from bizarre car crashes to the sexual miscues of
politicians to details of dastardly criminal dealings.4  When the media
attempts to cover these events for its reading public, the right of privacy and
the First Amendment clash.5  While First Amendment law leaves few
surprises when it comes to the coverage afforded general-purpose public
figures and public officials, the line begins to blur as the subjects of the story
move further and further from those regularly in the limelight. All too often,
common men, women, or children fall victim to a highly publicized event in
which they never intended to participate, as newspapers, magazines, and
television news magazines rush for readership and viewers.
This paper will consider how the right to privacy often collides with the
public's right to know. The carnage from that collision often ends in
lawsuits that allege emotional pain, suffering, and humiliation, with frequent
denials of recovery to the subjects of the stories once the media wields its
First Amendment shield. This paper discusses the emergence of privacy, its
current status, and its probable future. As this paper focuses on nonpublic
people cast involuntarily into a public light, it only tangentially considers
moving car," said one post by "FrayVader" in Oct. 1998. Id. Another post the same day, by
"Msivorytower," stated, "I fear we have become a nation addicted to voyeurism ." Id.
3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
4. See John J. Walsh et al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin: The
Constitutionality of Consequential Damages for Publication of Ill-gotten Information, 4 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1111, 1118 (1996); see also Wendy Kaminer, I Spy, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, at http://www.prospect.org/printlVll/18/kaminer-w.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2002).
5. Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 1114. Walsh is a New York attorney specializing in
First Amendment law who represented Food Lion, Inc. in its landmark RICO claim against
Capital Cities and ABC, after a 1992 segment of PrimeTime Live used hidden cameras and
deception to document hazardous food practices by the grocery chain. See Food Lion Inc. v.
Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
6. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. This amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, though many states have their own constitutional provisions to protect free
speech and the press. Walsh et al., supra note 4, at 1114 (citing Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 368 (1931)). In fact, California and New York boast constitutional clauses that
actually offer broader protections than the First Amendment. Id. (citing Immuno AG. v.
Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1278 (N.Y. 1991)).
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actions by public figures and officials who do battle with the media over
invasion of privacy issues, where the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
standard often applies. 7
This paper analyzes how courts decide when media entities go too far
when covering less-than-high profile people caught in news events through
no fault of their own. They are the average Americans snared in news
events: the crime victim, a motorist pinned in her car, the mistress of a
politician snared in a scandal, 8 the wife of a late-night talk show host,9 or a
regular Joe wrongly accused of a fatal bombing.10
The roots of privacy lie in common law, for nothing in the United States
Constitution promises a person privacy."1 This enviable right surfaced for
the first time when Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren penned their
famous 1890 Harvard Law Review article, "The Right to Privacy."' 2 Here,
the future Supreme Court justice and his law partner coined the oft-quoted
phrase, 13 "the right to be let alone,"'14 as they crafted an article in response to
7. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Generally, this standard imposes upon public
figures and public officials the need to show "actual malice" by the news outlet. Id. In other
words, the individual has to show the defendant acted with knowledge of the statement's
falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth. Id.
8. This, in no particular order, would include, most notably: Monica Lewinsky, the
figure at the heart of the Clinton scandal; Donna Rice, the woman linked with former
presidential candidate Gary Hart during his campaign; and Paula Jones, who claimed sexual
harassment by Clinton during his Arkansas governor days. This is not to suggest that any or
all of these women are or are not public figures, but merely the author's attempt to proffer
women involved in political sex scandals that drew ink from the press.
9. See generally Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
10. Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, The Legacy of Richard Jewell, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Mar./Apr. 1997), available at http://www.cjr.org/year/97/2/jewell.asp.
Jewell was accused of the Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta in 1996. Id. He was
cleared, but only after the media characterized him as a suspect in the bombing. Id.
11. In fact, privacy existed elsewhere in the world in the Middle Ages. Jewish juris-
prudence made it illegal to build a window through which you could peer into your neighbor's
courtyard. Paul M. Barrett, Private Matters, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (June 2000), available
at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/books/2000/0006.barrett.html (book review).
12. Maria Sguera, The Competing Doctrines of Privacy and Free Speech Take Center
Stage After Princess Diana's Death, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 205, 207 (1998).
13. Id. at 206. Brandeis took his seat on the country's high court in 1916. The two
were attorneys in the same Boston law firm when they wrote the article, specifically in
response to the publication of photographs of Warren's wife in newspapers without her
consent, which the two saw as the advent of what now is referred to as the paparazzi. Id.
14. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 193. The two first speak of the right to life,
the right to property, and "a recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his
intellect" before uttering the famous phrase. Id. The phrase, in fact, is mentioned often
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what at the time they considered the "'yellow journalism"' of tabloids." But
the sentence in which the phrase, "the right to be let alone," lies tells more of
the attorneys' thought processes, as they suggest "now the right to life has
come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let alone."'16
Warren and Brandeis further suggest newspapers and new technologies
"have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life."'17 They
called for courts to consider whether the law recognizes and protects
peoples' right to privacy, as "[t]he press is overstepping in every direction
the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency."' 8 Ultimately, they asked
whether the law existing at that time afforded a principle to protect the
privacy of the individual, and, if so, what the nature and extent of that
protection was. 19 They later likened the "right of the individual to be let
throughout the text of this seminal article on privacy rights. See id. at 193, 195, 205. The law
review article and other literature mentioning it actually suggest that the phrase first was
mentioned by Judge Cooley. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 195 (citing THOMAS M.
COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (1880)).
15. Sguera, supra note 12, at 206. The two attorneys also considered "new
technologies" troublesome to the right of privacy, as they allowed the media to more easily
and rapidly gather and disseminate information about people. For example, it had been
unlikely that someone could have his or her picture taken without actually "sitting" for it.
But, with technological advances, photographs could be "surreptitiously" taken. That, they
argued, left people no recourse for damages through contract and trust actions, and now
required the protection of tort law. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 211. On another
note, the yellow journalism at the time of the article likely differed from today's concept of
yellow journalism. Warren and Brandeis spoke of the encroachment of the media into private
lives. Id. at 196. Today's yellow journalism is generally considered to be tabloids, such as
The National Enquirer or The Star, and has a certain inherent, gossip-like nature.
16. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 193.
17. Id. at 195. All this, the authors suggest, "threaten[s] to make good the prediction
that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."' Id. See Jane
E. Kirtley, It's the Process, Stupid, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Sept./Oct. 2000), available at
http://www.cjr.org/year/00/3/kirtley.asp (suggesting that new and technologically advanced
video cameras and recording devices allow the press to become more intrusive). Kirtley, a
professor at the University of Minnesota's School of Journalism and Mass Communication,
was executive director of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press from 1985-
1999. Id.
18. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 196. Further, the authors contend "[t]o
satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the
daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which
can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle." Id. In fact, the authors offer a
forward-thinking suggestion that, with life growing more complex and intense, the need for
"solitude and privacy" are all the more essential to people and society. Id.
19. Id. at 197. The authors contrast the right to privacy with the law of defamation,
libel, and slander, which they said dealt only with damage to reputation and injury to a
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alone" with the "right[s] not to be assaulted or beaten.... imprisoned,
... maliciously prosecuted... [or] defamed,"20 and said courts could not
find the right to privacy based in private property doctrine.21
They concluded with suggested elements on which to base a new
22privacy law. The right to privacy, they theorized, allowed the publication
of any matter of "public or general interest., 23 However, it protected people
with whose affairs the community had no legitimate concern, "from being
,,24dragged into ... undesired publicity. Because this standard rests entirely
on the person being written about, Warren and Brandeis said it was
impossible to create a hard-and-fast rule banning "obnoxious publications"
and suggested any rule adopted must boast "elasticity. 25 Other elements
person's "external relations to the community." Id. These "wrongs and correlative rights,"
they said, "are in their nature material rather than spiritual," leaving nothing on which to base
a remedy for the "mere injury to the feelings." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 197.
20. Id. at 205. If this right holds true for "thoughts, emotions, and sensations,"
Warren and Brandeis said, these should receive protection, regardless of whether they are
expressed in written form, in conduct, in attitudes, or even in facial expression. Id. at 206.
They wanted to guard an individual against "ruthless publicity." Id. at 214. For example, if a
photographer could not, without consent, photograph a woman's face, "much less should be
tolerated the reproduction of her face, her form, and her actions, by graphic descriptions
colored to suit a gross and depraved imagination." Id. at 214.
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 213. This is why the two urged that courts
must not find this a new principle, but find it is a new application of an existing principle. To
find otherwise would be termed judicial legislation. Id. n. 1.
22. id. at 214.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 214-15. The authors note "[t]here are others who, in varying degrees, have
renounced the right to live their lives screened from public observation," such as a political
candidate. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 215. As an example, they suggest publicizing
that a nonpublic citizen suffers from a speech impediment or "that he cannot spell correctly, is
an unwarranted... infringement of his rights." Id. However, the press's reporting of the
same shortcomings of a would-be congressman could not be "regarded as beyond the pale of
propriety." Id. at 215.
25. Id. at 215. Oddly, Warren and Brandeis offer a general rule that seems to address
only those for public office or a public position and which prohibits publications concerning
their private lives, habits, acts, and relations when they have no legitimate connection to the
individual's fitness for that office or position. Id. at 216. But there is no standard by which
private acts are judged to be of "legitimate connection." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at
216. Warren and Brandeis, as a final statement for this first prong of a proposed new law,
claim, "[s]ome things all men alike are entitled to keep from popular curiosity, whether in
public life or not, while others are only private because the persons concerned have not
assumed a position which makes their doings legitimate matters of public investigation." Id.
Warren and Brandeis contend oral disclosure would not provide a remedy for invasion of
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proposed by the two men included a privacy right that ended once the person
disclosed the facts publicly or consented to publication, and neither the truth
of the matter nor absence of malice provided a defense.
26
II. PUBLIC V. PRIVATE-HOW THE COURTS DECIDE
Courts consider invasion of privacy a personal tort, one aimed at
protecting an individual's feelings. From this, the concept of four distinct
common-law invasion-of-privacy torts evolved: 1) intrusion upon one's
solitude or seclusion; 2) public disclosure of private facts; 3) publicity that
places someone in a false light; and 4) appropriation of one's likeness or
name for another's benefit. 28 A majority of states 29 and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts3° now recognize these torts, the first two of which are
discussed in this article. Intrusion on one's seclusion and publication of
private facts seem most applicable when discussing the media's coverage of
the common man in the Twenty-First Century.
While laws exist, application sometimes proves exceedingly difficult,
as invasion torts reach different levels for different people. Presidents,
governors, and even clerks of small townships all may consider themselves
to be public officials, and thus, find almost no assistance in invasion of
privacy laws. Entertainers, professional sports figures, and corporate
bigwigs fall into the public figure category and hold almost as limited a
privacy as any injury from an oral communication would "be so trifling that the law might
well, in the interest of free speech, disregard it altogether." Id. at 217.
26. Id. at 218. The lack of a defense for truthful disclosures or absence of malice
again goes to the heart of the right to privacy. The injury focused upon is not an individual's
character, but that person's privacy, the authors contended. Id.
27. THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
HANDBOOK, ch. 2 (1999), available at http://www.rcfp.org/handbook/viewpage.cgi?0201 (last
visited Mar. 21, 2002).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (1976). These all seem to stem from
the belief that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in many of the things they do
in everyday life. THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 27,
available at http://www.rcfp.org/handbook/viewpage.cgi?0201.
29. Sguera, supra note 12, at 210.
30. § 652A-E. This provides for injunctive and monetary relief, in some cases, for
press misconduct. Warren and Brandeis looked at remedies and found the key to be money.
Even in the absence of special damages, one who essentially injures another's privacy might
expect to pay a hefty sum or face the prospect, in rare cases, of an injunction. Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 3, at 217.
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claim to a right of privacy.' Murkier is the right of privacy for the
involuntary public figure, the man who the press, through no fault of the
individual, sometimes thrusts into the public eye.32 The message from courts
resounds clearly: what many define as an invasion of privacy often is
nothing more than the result of living in a free and open society, a privilege
that requires the relinquishment of at least some privacy so that "information
and opinion flow freely" and the people can maintain a free and democratic
society.33
Whenever involuntary or limited-purpose public figures attack the press
for invading privacy, the Fourth Estate (i.e., the press) often asserts a claim
of newsworthiness, supported by the public's right to know.34 And courts
generally seem to side with the press's constitutional First Amendment right
instead of John Q. Public, who holds no such constitutional privilege. That
generalization fails to curb a considerable amount of litigation over claims of
privacy invasion against the media. The issue, in many cases, focuses on a
person's status and whether the invasion went beyond the public's right to
know, thus making it an unwarranted intrusion. For example, publishing
intimate details of the president's sex exploits fails to cross the threshold of
privacy invasion because it is said the public has a right to know the moral,
ethical, and personal dealings of the person it elected to run the country.35
Publishing the same details of a nonpublic person's sexual relations steps
over that line. The comments in the Restatement (Second) of Torts offer
31. THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 27, available
at http://www.rcfp.org/handbook/viewpage.cgi?0201. People who fall into one of these
classes voluntarily expose themselves to scrutiny and essentially waive any right to privacy, at
least in matters linked to their ability to perform their public duties or perform in public. Id.
32. Id.
33. Sguera, supra note 12, at 214, 221. This has been true since, and probably prior
to, the adoption of the First Amendment in 1791. The amendment protects a journalist's right
to collect and disseminate, but does not give him complete civil or criminal.immunity. Id. at
222.
34. Id. (citing Ann Sjoerdsma, Journalism: Don't Shoot the Messenger, VIRGINIA-
PILOT, Sept. 2, 1997, at E4).
35. See Deborah Potter, The President, the Intern, and the Media: Journalism Ethics
Under Siege, at http://www.poynter.org/research/me/me-seige.htm (Feb. 16, 1998). However,
that right does not mean the profession advocates the publication, though it may make it more
likely due to increased competition, technological advances and changing ethics. Id.
36. See STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER, INVASION OF PRIVACY LAW, at
http://www.splc.org/legalresearch.asp?id=29 (last visited Mar. 11, 2002). Courts say a person
suing must show the information was sufficiently private or not already in the public domain,
sufficiently intimate, and highly offensive to the reasonable person. The news organization
defense then becomes one of newsworthiness. Id.
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some of the best examples of trying to carve out a definition for voluntary
and involuntary public figures.
Clearly, some individuals-voluntary public figures-place themselves
in the public eye by engaging in public activities, by assuming prominent
roles in society, public office, or institutions, or by submitting their work or
themselves for public judgment.38 These individuals hold little in the way of
recourse when the press records their appearances or activities in their
capacity as a voluntary public figure.
The difficulty of defining an involuntary public figure persists. For
example, those who commit crimes, even though they do not seek publicity
and actively try to avoid it, become "persons of public interest," entitling the
. ... 40 ...
media to inform the public of their deeds. Victims of crime, victims of
accidents and catastrophes, and those involved in other "events that attract
public attention" also fall into this category.4' Also ensnared in the net of
involuntary public figures might be an acquitted murder defendant, a twelve-
year-old girl who gives birth to a child, or a customer whose image is
televised after being caught in a store raided by police looking for criminal
activity.42 The key to all of these: newsworthiness.43
There are individuals who become involuntary public figures simply
because of the people with whom they associate, regardless of whether that
association is within their control. People linked with a public figure or
public official can expect their dealings, whether official or unofficial, to
often be fair game for the press. 44 For instance, Monica Lewinsky's affair
with then-President Bill Clinton created such a stir and so affected the
country's affairs that there was no question that it fell within the ambit of
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e, f (1976).
38. § 652D cmt. e. These individuals might include an actor, a prizefighter, or a
government official. Id. Some argue that once a person enters the spotlight, they are public
forever. Howard Kurtz, Questions of Privacy, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1992, at D1 (noting an
incident involving Ron Nessen, former President Gerald Ford's press secretary, whose twenty-
five-year-old love letters to his ex-wife were published by The Washingtonian after Nessen
left his position).
39. § 652D cmt. e.
40. § 652D cmt. f.
41. Id. In most cases, these people have not sought the public eye, but have been
involuntarily thrust into it, through no fault of their own.
42. Id. illus. 13-17.
43. § 652D cmt. g.
44. One news story suggested that some individuals are "dragged into the spotlight
through an accident of birth or circumstance. Would anyone care that a college student named
John Zaccaro Jr. was busted for cocaine if his mother wasn't [former presidential candidate
Walter Mondale's' running mate] Geraldine Ferraro?" Kurtz, supra note 38.
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newsworthiness.45  As Paul M. Barrett wrote three years ago in the
Washington Monthly, "[w]hile there is no law against repeatedly having
adulterous oral sex with the president of the United States, a woman who
does it in and around the Oval Office might reasonably be expected to
anticipate that word could get out, causing her some loss of privacy.,
46
Donna Rice also struggled with her newfound fame after the press
exposed her romantic liaison with Democratic presidential contender Gary
Hart.47 In interview after interview, she questioned the integrity of the press
in creating public figures out of private individuals. "I don't think that the
media has a right to make a private person a public person," she told Barbara
Walters during a 20/20 interview in 1987.48 The following year, the media
hammered Rice when she reneged on a promise to be a panelist at the 1988
• • • , • • 49
Society of Professional Journalists' National Convention. She reportedly
wanted to tell news types how the press rocked her life after the Hart affair. °
"You can't have an affair with a presidential candidate and not expect to be
made a public figure," Cincinnati Post reporter Sarah Sturmon said, after
Rice ditched the Right to Privacy panel at the last minute.5'
Clearly, Rice does not stand alone. Other women caught in the web of
political scandal have shot themselves in the foot when trying to stay out of
the public eye. They include Jessica Hahn, who invited reporters to her
45. Id. Ironically, in his Washington Post article, Kurtz suggests that news
organizations contend their reportage of politicians' extramarital affairs focused on whether
the affairs affected the politicians' public performances. That changed in 1987, when The
Miami Herald uncovered the Gary Hart-Donna Rice affair during his bid to become the
Democratic nominee for president. The justification for reporting on Hart turned on his dare
to reporters to tail him. Id.
46. Barrett, supra note 11. Barrett reports legal affairs for The Wall Street Journal.
Id. See also Andrea Lee Negroni, Privacy and the Prying Eyes of Cyberspace, MORTGAGE
BANKING, Apr. 1, 2000, at 76.
47. Robert Friedman, The Age of Exhibitionism, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), June
28, 1987, at 5D. Ironically, Rice went on ABC's 20/20 newsmagazine and told Barbara
Walters and 30 million viewers how the Gary Hart affair publicity had devastated her. Id. In
November 1988, Rice agreed to be a speaker on the Right to Privacy panel at the Society of
Professional Journalists' National Convention but ducked out and away from a throng of
reporters and photographers covering her appearance on the panel. William Swislow, If
You're Allergic to Animals, Don't Go to the Zoo: Reflections on the Donna Rice Affair,
Cincinnati Episode, THE QUILL, Jan. 1989, at 22.
48. Interview by Barbara Walters with Donna Rice, 20/20 (ABC television broadcast,
June 18, 1987).
49. Swislow, supra note 47, at 22.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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house to detail the trauma of her affair-gone-public with television evangelist
Jim Baker, and Fawn Hall, who testified before Iran-Contra investigators
about her secretarial duties with Oliver North.52
In some cases, just being the spouse of someone famous triggers the
involuntary public figure standard. 3 A United States court of appeals held,
more than twenty-five years ago, that the wife of entertainer Johnny Carson
fell into the public domain simply because she was married to Carson, a
public figure. "One can assume that the wife of a public figure such as
Carson more or less automatically becomes at least a part-time public figure
herself," the court said.55
A Restatement (Second) of Torts definition of "news" also provides
help. News, it states, falls "within the scope of legitimate public concern,"
and often is defined by publishers and broadcasters acting "in accordance
with the mores of the community. '56 "Authorized publicity" of an individual
includes accounts of those involved in homicides and other crimes, arrests,
police raids, suicides, marriages and divorces, natural disasters, and drug
deaths, as well as "many other similar matters of genuine, even if more or
less deplorable, popular appeal. 57 With definitions such as these, it is not
surprising that almost anyone who steps outside his or her house (and even
those who do not)58 may fall prey to the press's push to place people in the
52. Friedman, supra note 47.
53. Carolyn Condit, wife of Rep. Gary Condit (D-Cal.), has filed a $10 million libel
lawsuit against the National Enquirer over publicity she received after her husband's
relationship with Washington intern, Chandra Levy, surfaced after Levy's disappearance in
Spring 2001. Condit v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc. No. CIV F 02-5198, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16107 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2002). The case posed the question of whether Mrs. Condit was a
public figure because of her marriage to the congressman. She remained a California resident
while her husband lived in Washington, but she did appear in his campaign ads and posed
with him for a People magazine cover in 2001. Michael Doyle, Public-figure Question Key to
Case, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 22, 2002, at A15.
54. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 210 (7th Cir. 1976).
55. Id. Johnny Carson was a party to the suit, which was framed as a libel action
against National Insider, a tabloid periodical. Id. at 208. It was dismissed on summary
judgment in favor of Allied News. Co., the defendant. Joanna Holland joined her husband in
the suit. Id.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g (1976).
57. Id.
58. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 484 F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1973). The Cleveland
Plain Dealer, in a follow-up story about a bridge collapse, visited a family whose husband and
father had died in the 1967 tragedy. Id. at 152. A reporter and photographer came into the
family's house, when the mother was gone, and spoke with the children. Id. The court held
the item was newsworthy, appearing only nine months after the initial story. Id. at 154. "The
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public eye. Accident victims, 59 crime victims, 6° and even criminals61 stand
defensele -, against press decisions to publicize their plights.
There are times, however, when one, whether willingly or not, be-
comes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest.
When this takes place, he emerges from his seclusion... So where
a person.., by the particular character of his conduct or activities
has acquired, or has had thrust upon him, public notoriety, he re-
linquishes the right to live that segment of his life which has thus
engaged the public interest absolutely free from public scrutiny.
62
Here, courts show they are loathe to dispatch the First Amendment's
underpinnings.
I. BALANCING PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH
In the purest sense, the battle over privacy pits freedom of the press
against freedom from the press. 63 "We [are] dealing with that most fragile of
merchandise, the facts about another human being," People magazine
founding Managing Editor, Richard Stolley, told a writers' workshop in
1995. "[P]rivacy ... involves a collision between the First Amendment,
freedom of the press, and the Fourth and Fourteen[th] amendments[,] which
have been interpreted to mean freedom from the press." 64
Courts across the country strike differing measures for how far they will
allow the press to carry its First Amendment privilege. Privacy cases began
judgment of what is newsworthy must remain primarily a function of the publisher," the court
stated. Id. at 156.
59. Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
60. Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 584 P.2d 1310 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978). See
also Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 676, 687 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of privacy
claim against sheriff who released rape victim's intimate and "extremely humiliating" details
of her assault).
61. Smith v. NBC, 292 P.2d 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
62. Id. at 603 (citing Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 238 P.2d 670 (Cal. Ct. App.
1956)).
63. Richard Stolley, Speech at National Writers' Workshop, Hartford, Conn. (Apr. 1,
1995). Stolley, in 1974, became the founding editor for People magazine and is credited with
inventing the term "personality journalism." Id.
64. Id. Stolley suggests the turning point in publishing private facts is when the
"private facts become so newsworthy that their publication is justified." Id. For People
magazine's "personality journalism" that was a fine line. "In one sense, every story we did
was an invasion of somebody's privacy," Stolley told the workshop. Id.
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to find their way into the courts regularly in the 1960s, 1970s, and the 1980s,
although the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan65 and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell66 cases, for example, saw the courts support the First Amendment
and impose heavy burdens of proof on those who sued. 67  In fact, First
Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn, in response to the Sullivan
,,68decision, proclaimed it was a time for "dancing in the streets. Anthony
Lewis suggests that the First Amendment boasts tremendous power in the
privacy-publicity battle.69  "But despite all those legal trappings, those
grounds for recovery of damages, lawsuits for violation of the right to
privacy, have not often proved fruitful., 70 Lewis cites the case of Sidis v. F-
R Publishing Corp.7 as proof courts often side with the media in privacy-
72invasion cases.
But the media's collective belief that the First Amendment would shield
it from legal action for its newsgathering techniques began to fizzle in the
1980s and 1990s. 73 Cases marching into the courts forced those courts to
begin weighing the press's invasion against the public's right to know.74
Courts struggled with this delicate balance, giving ground to plaintiffs suing
the media. "[T]he virtually absolute status of the [First] Amendment
somehow doesn't seem to make as much sense to [the courts] in 1990 as it
65. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
66. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
67. See generally Kirtley, supra note 17, available at
http://www.cjr.org/year/00/3/kirtley.asp.
68. Libel? You'll Have to Prove It, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov./Dec. 2001),
available at http://www.cjr.org/year/01/6/1964.asp.
69. Anthony Lewis, Goodwin Seminar Speech, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova
Southeastern University, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Apr. 11, 2002). Lewis authored the book
Gideon's Trumpet.
70. Id.
71. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). Sidis was a child prodigy who, after having his
storied childhood chronicled by the press, dropped out of sight. Id. at 807. A story in the late
1930s detailed Sidis's current status as living alone in a run-down building in Boston. Id. He
sued for invasion of privacy and lost, as the Second Circuit refused to grant "all of the intimate
details of private life an absolute immunity from the prying of the press." Id. at 809.
72. Lewis, supra note 69.
73. Kirtley, supra note 17, available at http://www.cjr.org/year/00/3/kirtley.asp.
74. Noted media professor Rodney Smolla contended a decade ago that while the
"basic structure of New York Times v. Sullivan is solid," courts would begin to "cut back on
the [freedom of the press's] edges everywhere it can" in response to the media's overstepping
of its First Amendment privilege. W. John Moore, Press Clipping, 22 NAT'L J. 3086 (1990).
The article quotes several media lawyers speculating that First Amendment litigation would
spike in the 1990s.
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did in 1791," explained Jane Kirtley, executive director of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press.75
Time, Inc. v. Hill76 marked the first true case of privacy versus a free
press when the United States Supreme Court considered the privacy-invasion
claim of a family held hostage for nineteen hours by three prison escapees.77
The harrowing experience was turned into a play approximately two years
after the incident. Life magazine, in a feature on "The Desperate Hours,"
ran photos and a story of the incident, triggering a new round of severe
emotional trauma for the Hill family. 79 The Court, in a 5-4 decision, set
aside a $30,000 judgment James Hill had won in a lower court.8° Justice
Brennan's majority opinion found "[e]xposure of the self to others in varying
degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this
exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary
value on freedom of speech and of press." 8' A dissenting Justice Harlan
countered that the inherent dangers of a free press included "a severe risk of
irremediable harm to individuals involuntarily exposed to [publicity] and
powerless to protect themselves against it.",
82
These two Hill views boldly drew the battle lines for the free press-
versus-privacy debate that continues in this country today. The media acts
as a watchdog for a country looking for information on which to base
opinion, decision, and debate. 83 Too much control over publications, and the
danger clearly becomes exactly what the free speech clause seeks to
eliminate: a chilling effect on the press and a society that suffers from
75. Id.
76. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
77. Id. at 378.
78. Id. The Hill family sued under the New York privacy statute, N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS
LAW §§ 50-51. Id. n. 1. The statute requires first obtaining written consent of a person before
their name, portrait, or picture is used for commercial purposes. Id.
79. Time, 385 U.S. at 377.
80. Id. at 379, 398.
81. Id. at 388.
82. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. When the press oversteps its bounds and "roams into our cherished private-
sphere, it seems to turn dangerous and predatory. And then we Americans turn on the press."
Kevin P. Quinn, AMERICA, Apr. 20, 1996, at 28 (book review).
2002]
128
Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
stifled discourse on key issues in its communities.84 Too little, and we risk
the same result.85
Some scholars argue the media risks far more than litigation when
digging into people's past and present; they risk reputation. Again, the press
must balance its attempts to please both types of reader: those looking for
news and shocked at privacy invasions, and those thirsting for salacious,
down-and-dirty details that offer little news value. Often, those readers are
86
one and the same.
IV. THE CASE FOR INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE
Case law in privacy-invasion claims is a mixed bag, with courts using
different standards to reach a multitude of conclusions. Almost as varied as
the final rulings are the facts relied on in each case to reach the end result.
But before this article examines the cases involving privacy claims, two
instances, neither of which resulted in any type of litigation, stand for how
unwanted media publicity can wreak havoc with those involved in the story.
Robert O'Donnell leaped into the national spotlight in 1987, after he
slunk down a narrow well pipe in Texas to save an eighteen-month-old girl.
He garnered hero status, appeared in a parade, made numerous television
appearances, and collected a White House salute. 87  Then the limelight
waned, O'Donnell's marriage fell apart, and an addiction to prescription
drugs led to his dismissal from the fire department. 88 In April 1995, four
days after watching rescue workers try to save survivors from the bombed
84. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Justice Byron White's opinion stated:
"[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated." Id. at 681.
85. See Alexandra Varney McDonald, Hazy Future for Hidden Cameras, A.B.A. J.,
Oct. 1999, at 31. Los Angeles free speech attorney Neville L. Johnson is quoted within the
article as saying that with a lack of privacy "the ultimate victim will be the First Amendment
because people will be more circumspect and closed in discussion[] .... deter[ring] what the
First Amendment seeks to promote: the free and robust exchange of ideas." Id.
86. Kurtz, supra note 38. Kurtz quotes Todd Gitlin, a sociology professor at the
University of California, Berkeley: "Everyone is both a voyeur and a citizen .... The voyeur
is reading with eyeballs bugging out, while the citizen is saying 'These abominations are
sinking lower once more."' Id. Kurtz also notes in his story that a Boston radio show host,
"pissed off' at USA Today's story of tennis star Arthur Ashe's AIDS illness, offered a $1,000
reward to listeners who could supply "dirt" on the newspaper's top editors. Id.
87. David Andreatta, Coming Down From Hero High, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 21,
2002, available at 2002 WL 3089527.
88. Id. In fact, an O'Donnell book deal fell through and a cameo appearance in a
movie was cut from the final version. Id.
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Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, O'Donnell used a
shotgun to kill himself.89 Hero status imparted by press coverage can
devastate, experts say. "Becoming a hero is like living in a balloon that is
blown up and deflated," said Chuck Niedzialkowski, a counselor who
specializes in disaster-related mental health work.90 Firefighters involved in
the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center tragedy echo those sentiments.
"It was difficult getting used to the recognition," New York City firefighter
Don Dillon said. "We weren't ready for it. We didn't expect it.'
9
Thomas Baiter "died" in the World Trade Center attack but lived to tell
about it. Newspapers and the Internet listed Baiter, who was employed on
the ninety-sixth floor, as dead, and forced him to spend days informing
family and friends that he was not.92 The miscue by the media did not
devastate Baiter's life, but in his eyes, it constituted an "annoying" invasion
of privacy.93 So each intrusion differs, and each person, whether directly or
indirectly touched, is affected in a different way.
Looking at case law involving privacy paints a disjointed portrait of
where courts stand with media intrusion actions. Some things remain con-
stant. For instance, generally, no intrusion is actionable when a person is in
public and in plain view.94 Three young boys sued Playboy after a picture of
them taken with a Springfield, Ohio policewoman, helping them with their
bicycle, ran with a nude pictorial of the officer in May 1982.95 The boys
contended the innocent photograph destroyed their right of privacy and
96 97humiliated and disgraced them. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
the trial court said a person was subject to liability "only when he has
intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion. 98
The photograph, the trial court found, showed the children and the
policewoman on a public sidewalk "in plain view of the public eye," and
89. Id. He reportedly told his mother, "[w]hen those rescuers are through, they're
going to need lots of help... for years." Id.
90. Andreatta, supra note 87. This is the same fate that seemed to strike James Hill's
wife after Life magazine ran its piece on the play recounting their hostage experience. Mrs.
Hill suffered a nervous breakdown. Lewis, supra note 69.
91. Andreatta, supra note 87.
92. The Point (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 5, 2001).
93. Id.
94. But see Gallela v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Daily Times Democrat v.
Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
95. Jackson v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
96. Id. at 11.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652B cmt. c (1976).
98. Jackson, 574 F. Supp. at 13.
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plaintiffs could not show the activity was solely a matter of private
99
concern.
Richard Jewell, the security guard initially pegged as a hero in the 1996
Summer Olympics bombing at Centennial Park in Atlanta, sued several news
organizations after media reports prematurely dubbed him a suspect in the
bombing.'0°  Jewell, in a suit against the Atlanta Journal-Constitution,°m
asserted he was a private individual. The court, in affirming the trial court's
holding, found that Jewell was a "voluntary limited-purpose public
figure,"' 2 and cited the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 1 03 standard:
Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the
vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention, are
properly classed as public figures.... More commonly, those
classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and
comment. 1°4
Jewell argued he never assumed a role of special prominence in the
bombing issue and never thrust himself into the controversy. 10 5 The trial
court, which was affirmed on appeal, held that Jewell granted numerous
interviews and a photo shoot, and thus rendered himself a public figure for
this situation. 106
99. Id.
100. See generally Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Jewell v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 97 CIV 5617, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15765, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998). Jewell, prior to filing a claim against NBC, settled with the
network for more than $500,000. Report: Richard Jewell to Get More Than $500,000 from
NBC, at http://www.cnn.comIUS/9701/03/olympic.bombing/ (Jan 3, 1997).
101. Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). The
suit actually was a libel action, although it offers a working definition of limited-purpose
public figures. The appellate action combined three cases. Id. at 178. The one referred to
here is Case No. A01A1565, in which the lower court denied his partial motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 182.
102. Id. at 183.
103. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
104. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342,
345)
105. Id. at 183.
106. Id. at 185. The appellate court noted Jewell was "prominent enough" to hire a
media coordinator to field press inquiries and schedule appearances. Id. at 184.
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Thrusting oneself into the public eye, even unwittingly, places a person
within the press's reach. In Smith v. National Broadcasting Co.,'07 a Los
Angeles man's report of the escape of a black panther created fear and
turmoil in and around the city. Three months later, after the fervor died
down and Smith's life returned to normal, an NBC radio station broadcast a
reenactment of the black panther hunt based on Smith's report and his
subsequent arrest for filing a false police report.'0 8 Smith sued for invasion
of privacy, and a California appellate court held he had brought the invasion
on himself. "By his participation in what ultimately proved to be a baseless
report ... plaintiff became stamped with the imprint of public notoriety and
renounced his right of privacy. . . for '[t]here can be no privacy in that
which is already public."" 9
In Jacova v. Southern Radio and Television Co.,I 1o the plaintiff was not
a criminal, but claimed he appeared as one on television, after a videotape
taken during a police raid on a Miami Beach cigar shop aired on the evening
news."' Jacova entered the shop as a customer and, after the gambling raid,
ended up being filmed while talking with a law officer.'1 2 The footage ran
with a voice over that, Jacova claimed, made it appear that he was being
arrested." 3  The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that broadcasters had a
qualified privilege to use the name or picture of someone "who has become
an 'actor' in a newsworthy event."' 14 The court then tackled the question of
when a person becomes an actor in a public event and cited a New York
court's dicta:
One traveling upon the public highway may expect to be televised,
but only as an incidental part of the general scene. So, one attend-
ing a public event such as a professional football game may expect
to be televised in the status in which he attends. If a mere specta-
tor, he may be taken as part of the general audience, but may not be
picked out of a crowd alone, thrust upon the screen and unduly fea-
107. 292 P.2d 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
108. Id. at 602.
109. Id. at 603 (citing Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931)). But see
Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Ct. App. 1974) (stating "[it]
would be a crass legal fiction to assert that a matter once public never becomes private again."
(quoting Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 483 P.2d 34, 41 (Cal. 1971))).
110. 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
111. Id. at 35.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 37.
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tured for public view. Where, however, one is a public personage,
an actual participant in a public event, or where some newsworthy
incident affecting him is taking place, the right of privacy is not
absolute, but limited.'
15
The Florida high court then found the airing of the plaintiff's picture was not
an unreasonable or unwarranted invasion of privacy." 
6
Courts show little sympathy to crime victims, who carry almost no
protection from press publicity. After an assailant shot Susan Barker and
murdered her companion, and before the killer was caught, a newspaper
published her name and address. 1 7 Barker sued for invasion of privacy, but
the court sustained dismissal of the case, finding Barker had been thrust into
the public eye in an event that was of legitimate public concern and logically
connected with the publication of her name and address. 1 8 "The right of the
individual to privacy is limited by the public's right to have a free dissemina-
tion of news and information."' " 9 A similar case involved the publication of
a fourteen-year-old sexual assault victim's name after its release during a
court hearing. "° The plaintiff argued the publication was not newsworthy
and therefore not privileged. 12 1  The appellate court affirmed summary
judgment for the defendant newspaper, finding the incident was one of
public record, making it newsworthy and "privileged as a matter of law."'
' 22
The public records defense becomes a potent weapon for the press in
publication of private or embarrassing facts. In Wolf v. Regardie, 121 the
plaintiff tried to thwart a story on his development projects in a Washington,
D.C. business magazine. 124 The story dealt with details of Wolf's business
dealings that he wanted kept private. 125  An appellate court affirmed
summary judgment against Wolf, finding that public records such as the tax
115. Jacova, 83 So. 2d at 37 (emphasis added) (citing Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (N.Y. 1952) (holding that broadcast of the plaintiffs animal act at
halftime of pro football game was part of entire public sporting event and, thus, was not
invasion of privacy).
116. Id. at 40.
117. Barker v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 14 Va. Cir. 421 (Cir. Ct. 1973).
118. Id. at 425. The court found Barker was an involuntary public figure. Id. at 424.
119. Id. at 425.
120. Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 584 P.2d 1310, 1311 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1313.
123. 553 A.2d 1213 (D.C. 1989).
124. Id. at 1215.
125. Id.
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ledgers, court files, and government records research in gathering informa-
tion for the story provided a shield for the press.126
Likewise, six members of the University of Maryland basketball team
sued a local newspaper after it ran a story in November 1977 about the
youths either being placed on academic probation or recently being removed
from it. 127  The appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the
newspaper, holding the basketball program and its players' scholastic status
"was of significant public interest and concern,"' 128 and that since the players
had "sought and basked in the limelight .... [they] will not be heard to
complain when the light focuses on their potentially imminent withdrawal
from the team."'
129
While many courts seem stingy with invasion of privacy claims by
private individuals, other tribunals find room to reign in press actions.
Strapped to a backboard in a medical transport helicopter, Ruth Shulman
never thought her comment about wanting to die would be broadcast to the
nation. 30 Her words, captured by a microphone worn by a nurse aboard the
helicopter, along with footage captured by a camera operator on board the
helicopter, aired on the television show On Scene: Emergency Response.'
31
Shulman sued for invasion of privacy, and the defense argued the accident
happened on a public roadway and could be seen by anyone driving by.
132
The Supreme Court of California found that the First Amendment protected
the defendants in covering a news event within the public's view, even if the
facts broadcast about Shulman were private.' 33 But the court also concluded
a jury should be able to decide whether Shulman reasonably could have
expected her conversation with medical workers to be private. '34
Arguably, the last thing an injured accident victim should have to
worry about while being pried from her wrecked car is that a tele-
vision producer may be recording everything she says to medical
personnel for the possible edification and entertainment of casual
television viewers .... In short, the state may not intrude into the
126. Id. at 1221.
127. Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 406 A.2d 652, 654 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1979).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 660.
130. Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 476 (Cal. 1998).
131. Id. at 475.
132. Id. at477.
133. Id. at 497.
134. Id. at 491.
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proper sphere of the news media to dictate what they should pub-
lish and broadcast, but neither may the media play tyrant to the
people by unlawfully spying on them in the name of newsgather-
ing. 135
Here, this court seemed torn in trying to play the balancing act-not wanting
to disturb First Amendment privileges but still seeing a need to protect
people from an almost incomprehensible form of intrusion.
Another rude invasion came early one morning at the Maryland home
of Charles Wilson. Wilson and his wife were in bed when police entered
their home looking to serve a warrant on the couple's son. 136 A Washington
Post reporter and photographer were riding along with police and, though
the Wilson's son was not home, the photographer did snap a shot of Wilson
clad only in his underwear with an officer's gun pointed at his head. 137 The
United States Supreme Court found that media "ride-alongs," long a
publicity vehicle for police departments, violated privacy rights protected by
the Constitution's Fourth Amendment.138 Wilson's victory was moral not
monetary, as the high court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's dismissal of the
suit because the law was unclear, at the time of the raid, as to whether police
ride-alongs were violative of the Fourth Amendment.' 39
In another invasion case, felon Arnold Huskey sued NBC for invasion
of privacy after the network filmed him without his permission in the
exercise yard of the penitentiary in Marion, Illinois. 40 The network
contended that Huskey, as a prisoner, was a limited-purpose public figure
who lost all rights to privacy while incarcerated, and that he was in a
publicly visible area when recorded.' 4' The district court, in finding that
Huskey's conviction and imprisonment were matters of public interest, ruled
that his time in prison and the prison itself were not.
142
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving
of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a mor-
135. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 494, 497. Specifically, the court held that summary
judgment in favor of the defense on Shulman's intrusion claim was proper, and allowed her to
proceed on the publication of private facts claim. Id. at 497.
136. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 607 (1999).
137. Id. The photograph never ran in the newspaper. Id. at 608.
138. Id. at 614 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
139. Id. at 614-15.
140. Huskey v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (N.D. I11. 1986).
141. Id. at 1286.
142. Id. at 1292.
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bid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with
which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards,
would say that he had no concern.143
Here, the court appeared to merge a reasonable-man standard, along with the
mention of decency when finding for Huskey.'44
V. THE PRESS PRESSES ON INTO THE FUTURE
With lawsuits coming fast and furious, and costing exorbitant amounts
of money to defend, the press faces possibly its biggest challenge yet: trying
to curb civil actions against it while struggling to retain all of the privileges
the First Amendment affords. 145 The press may actually be fighting itself
when it comes to this. "We had a lot of debate inside the paper about this,"
Dick Rogers, the San Francisco Examiner's metro editor, was quoted as
saying four years ago. 146 "And I don't have a glib answer for when you do
and when you don't write a story about a person pushed into the public
eye." 147 The answer to the press's dilemma may be self-policing and self-
restraint, some press experts say. "There is a real primal aspect to
privacy," 48 Ellen Alderman, co-author of two privacy books, said. "And I
think the public expects the press to draw a line somewhere, even where the
law doesn' t.'
' 4 9
The question still exists: how far can the press go? Some say as far as
is necessary to inform the public. "What right do we have, in the purest
sense, not telling people something?" asked Kathy Pellegrino, recruitment
editor for the Sun-Sentinel in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. "It becomes a
balancing test. Not so much a legal question, but is it the right thing to
do?",
150
143. Id. at 1288. The court denied NBC's motion to dismiss for failing to state a
proper cause of action. Id. at 1296.
144. Huskey, 632 F. Supp. at 1288.
145. See generally Walsh et al., supra note 4; Sguera, supra note 12.
146. Kenneth Howe, A Delicate Balancing Act, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 15, 1999, at Al.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Kathy Pellegrino, Goodwin Seminar Speech, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova
Southeastern University, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Jan. 24, 2002).
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The solutions include self-censorship and industry ethics guidelines.15 1
The guidelines pose a problem, and some say they will backfire, leading to
litigation by individuals using the new policies against the press.1
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts increasingly walk a narrow line in refereeing the age-old battle
between freedom of the press and freedom from the press, as media outlets
push the envelope with new technology, new competition, and new topics on
which to report. The world is so different today than it was more than a
century ago when Warren and Brandeis penned their right to privacy article.
There is more news, more information, and more people who yearn, demand,
need, and require that news function in an open and free society. The press
plays a vital role in the free-flow of information and must continue to do so,
even when it damages the lives of private citizens. To be sure, there remain
some areas that must be off limits to publicity. For example, the details of
the life of a citizen not involved in a general news event, where no greater
good for society lies in publishing the information, ought to remain
protected. But this exclusionary category shrinks each day. Additionally,
this country's foundation of free speech and free press can never be
usurped-not even by the right to privacy.
As the press furrows out fresh news stories for its readers, the subjects
of those news accounts become increasingly more litigious. Courts
sometimes make matters worse with their broad interpretation of "newswor-
thiness" and shifting definitions of "limited" or "voluntary" public figures.
Ultimately, the burden of curbing privacy invasions must rest with the press
itself, as courts will be and should be unwilling to eviscerate the First
Amendment to save the thin skin of those who end up, through no fault of
their own, in newsworthy events. This creates a stalemate in the clash
between the right to privacy and the right to know.
We must leave the press to police itself-to do the right thing-to be,
as Warren and Brandeis said of the right to privacy, "elastic."'5 And when,
as they theorized in 1890, the press oversteps its bounds, we can rely on the
public, the very entity by which the press survives, to rebel and force the
press back in line.
151. Howe, supra note 146.
152. Id. (quoting Jane Kirtley, executive director of The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press).
153. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 215.
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It has been that way for more than 100 years and it will continue in that
vein for centuries to come. People choose to live in the "land of the free."
Inherent in that choice is the acceptance of a reduced level of privacy, one
needed for the greater good of society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
He never had a chance. William James Sidis was too shy, too
introverted, and far too withdrawn to ever survive the barrage of publicity
that surrounded him because of his preternatural mathematical skills.t The
brilliant scholar, who had lectured to mathematicians on the topic of four-
dimensional bodies at the age of eleven, and graduated Harvard at the age of
sixteen,2 could not cope with the media attention that tracked his academic
success. Within time, the bright light of media glitz proved too brilliant,
indeed. The one-time child prodigy-who suffered a nervous break-down
from the unwanted attention-abandoned his intellectual pursuits in favor of
* The author is a May 2003 J.D. candidate at Nova Southeastern University in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. She received her B.A. in English from the University of Miami. Prior to
law school, she taught American Literature and Creative Writing at Stoneman Douglas High
School in Parkland, Florida. She also worked as a staff writer for The Miami Herald. The
author would like to thank her family and friends for their support.
1. See Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
2. Id. at 807.
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a more private role in society and "cloaked himself in obscurity."' Quite
deliberately, Sidis receded from the public eye; he carefully carved out a
private place for himself free from the press and free of the public scrutiny.4
But the retreat would not last forever. More than twenty-five years
after Sidis sought the solace of quietude, he found himself again a subject of
inquiry.5  Although Sidis had lived quietly for some time, a visit from a
reporter transformed his life and highlighted an unusual time warp in the
field of media law--one that would persist for years.
The case, denied a writ of certorari by the United States Supreme Court
in 1940,6 set the stage for the "permanent public figure." Surprisingly, a
barrage of cases that deal with public figures in various contexts have done
little over the past sixty years to change the problems raised by retention of
public figure status. One who has achieved public figure status finds it near-
ly impossible to shed. More importantly, the retention of public figure status
presents incredible hurdles for defamation and privacy plaintiffs.7 This
article will present a test for restoring one-time public figures to private
status. Because of the need to restore the privacy rights of citizens and
provide them with a shield against defamation, courts should adopt a new
test to reinstate the private status of one-time public figures. Most impor-
tantly, courts should inject an element that allows for the passage of time
into the public figure abatement analysis.
Part two of this article will provide a background of public figure law; it
will discuss some of the legal hurdles presented by the New York Times v.
Sullivan standard and the added dimensions it presents for public figures
attempting to bring an invasion of privacy or a defamation suit. In Part
three, this article will examine some representative cases that depict the
problems faced by permanent public figures. Part four will propose a test for
3. Id. at 809. Sidis is not the only intellectual great to shun the public eye. "Many
great scientists and philosophers, among them Ren6 Descartes, Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Immanuel Kant, Thorstein Veblen, Isaac Newton, and Albert Einstein, have had ... solitary
personalities." SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND 15 (1998).
4. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809. In fact, the article in question discusses Sidis' attempt to
live a private life. The piece follows his attempts to conceal his identity as a clerk whose job
requires nothing extraordinary in the way of intellectual capabilities. Id. at 807.
5. The original celebrity surrounded Sidis' mathematical skills reached a peak in
1910. Id. On August 14, 1937, The New Yorker, a weekly magazine, portrayed Sidis in a
biographical sketch and cartoon. Id. The court referred to the 1937 article on Sidis as a
"ruthless exposure" of its subject. Id.
6. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
7. Carol Anne Been, Note, Public Status Over Time: A Single Approach to the
Retention Problem in Defamation and Privacy Law, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 951, 966 (1982).
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restoring the private status of public figures who seek to bring an action for
invasion of privacy or defamation. Finally, this article will conclude with a
discussion of why a test for restoring private status is needed today.
II. PUBLIC FIGURES AND THE LAW
A. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
The history of public figures and the law begins with an analysis of the
landmark case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.8 The case, a 1964 decision,
set the framework for the media law unique to public officials and,
subsequently, public figures. The New York Times case was sparked by a
newspaper advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," which called
attention to civil rights violations in the South.9 Although the plaintiff was
not named in the advertisement, he brought suit for defamation against the
New York Times.]0 L.B. Sullivan, who was one of three elected commission-
ers of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, claimed that the word "police"
referred to him as the Montgomery Commissioner who supervised the police
department." One of the paragraphs that served as a basis for Sullivan's
claim is as follows:
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's
peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have
bombed his home almost killing his wife and child. They have as-
saulted his person. They have arrested him seven times-for
'speeding,' 'loitering' and similar 'offenses.' And now they have
charged him with 'perjury'-a felony under which they could im-
12prison him for ten years ....
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. Id. at 256.
10. Id. The plaintiffs sought a total of $5,600,000. Kermit L. Hall, Justice Brennan
and Cultural History: New York Times v. Sullivan and Its Times, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 339,
351 n.67 (1991).
11. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 258. Sullivan was one of many state officials who
played a prominent role in breaking the strides of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. He
decided to disrupt the sit-in movement through force and intimidation. Hall, supra note 10, at
348. In one alarming example, state and city police stood by while "baseball wielding
Klansman waded into a group of some 800 black students from Alabama State University
supporting a sit-in at the restaurant in the state capitol." Id.
12. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 257-58.
2002]
141
: Nova Law Review 27, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
The Court noted from the onset that it was "uncontroverted that some of the
statements" were inaccurate.' 3  However, the Court was prompted by
weighty policy concerns in its landmark ruling. The Court acknowledged
the need for uninhibited debate that sometimes included "vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."' 4  Rather than strip journalists of their ability to criticize the
government anytime the ensuing reports contained false or defamatory
statements, the Court imposed a new standard by which to judge defamatory
statements aimed at public officials.
Prior to the milestone decision handed-down in New York Times,
"[l]ibel in America was recognized as a strict liability tort."'15 In New York
Times, however, the United States Supreme Court decided that the national
interest in promoting robust debate on public issues warranted extra
protection for journalists when their subjects were public officials.
Accordingly, the New York Times Court made significant strides in the effort
to protect free "speech critical of the government and government offi-
cials."' 16 Under New York Times, a public official would have to show with
"'convincing clarity' that the [newspaper] acted with 'actual malice' in
publishing [a] false, defamatory statement."'
' 7
The term "actual malice" was defined by the Court as: 1) knowledge by
the defendant that the statement was false; or 2) the defendant's reckless
disregard for the statement's falsity.' 8  Simple negligence in journal-
ism--even that which resulted in false statements--would not support a
defamation suit brought by a public official.' 9 With such a high burden, "the
Court made it extremely difficult if not impossible for such officials to
prevail in libel actions against media defendants."
20
13. Id. at 258. The inaccuracies, however, were limited to mistakes in the details of
the injustices King had suffered at the hands of Southern leaders. Id. For instance, one part of
the advertisement referred to a song black students sang on the state capitol steps during a
demonstration. Id. The advertisement identified the song as "My Country, 'Tis of Thee"
when the students actually sang the National Anthem. Id. at 258-59. In another error, the
advertisement referred to Dr. King's seven arrests at the hands of the southern police; in fact,
he had been arrested four times. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 259.
14. Id. at 270.
15. Elsa Ransom, The Ex-Public Figure: A Libel Plaintiff Without Class, 5 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 389, 391 (1995).
16. Id. at 391.
17. Id.
18. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.
19. Id. at 288.
20. Ransom, supra note 15, at 391.
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Other policy considerations propelling the New York Times decision
included the fear of self-censorship among media and the recognition of the
legitimate public interest in the dealings of public officials. Other
commentators have noted the political motives of the New York Times
decision:
Sullivan was a remarkable incident in modern American cultural
history, an understanding of which reveals how conflicting social
demands shaped and in turn were shaped by first amendment law.
Historians and legal scholars have regularly insisted that Sullivan
compels our attention because of its connection to the civil rights
movement of the 1960s. Sullivan, in this view, was a necessary
step in the legal confirmation of the civil rights movement, one that
shielded its leadership from exposure to the constraining effects of
state-administered common law rules of political libel. The white
public officials of the South that brought Sullivan and other libel
actions, according to this literature, were provincial racists, who
hypocritically complemented the force and violence they used
against the movement with a cynical invocation of the law's sweet
reason. From this perspective, Justice Brennan wisely collapsed
traditional lines of constitutional understanding in the face of mas-
sive, pent-up demands for racial equality.
2 1
Whatever the motivation behind its origins, the impact of the New York
Times v. Sullivan case immediately started a long-running debate on its need,
and, eventually, its efficacy. One set of scholars celebrated the decision,
calling it "an occasion for dancing in the streets. 22 Proponents of the New
York Times decision believed the Court's ruling evinced its commitment to
both the First Amendment and the principles of democracy that are central to
23America's promise. Others, however, asserted that the New York Times
test is so stringent that it actually invites journalistic misconduct, much to
the detriment of the society it aims to protect. The standard advanced in
New York Times "may so expose public officials to journalistic abuse that it
21. Hall, supra note 10, at 341-42 (citations omitted).
22. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (1964) (quoting Mr. Alexander
Meiklejohn).
23. Id. "The theory of the freedom of speech clause was put right side up for the first
time." Id. at 208.
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will drive capable persons away from government service, thus frustrating,
,,24
rather than furthering, the political process.
Still, others praised the spirit of New York Times but criticized its
limits. Any number of cases have shown how very far courts are willing to
go without finding "reckless disregard." Just four years after New York
Times, the United States Supreme Court found that failure to investigate or
seek any corroboration before publishing an allegation does not rise to the
level of reckless disregard for the truth.2 5  Another case, Masson v. New
26Yorker Magazine, Inc., examined the effect deliberate alteration of quotes
would have on libel action. Surprisingly, the Court ruled that the First
Amendment protects deliberate alteration of quotes unless the plaintiff can
prove that the change results in a "material" change of the speaker's
meaning.27
Also, in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,28 the
United States Supreme Court found that failure to comply with professional
standards in publication of a falsehood was insufficient to support a finding
,,29of "actual malice. Indeed, it seemed the "actual malice" standard would
create serious problems for a public official attempting a libel suit. In a
short time, however, the class would be expanded.
B. Expanding New York Times
Just three years after the decision announced in New York Times, the
United States Supreme Court examined two cases that involved the
application of the New York Times standard to public figures. Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts30 involved a controversy surrounding a head football
coach for a university. 31 Butts was not truly the kind of public figure or
24. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 139 (1999). See also Richard
Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong? 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782 (1986). "On
balance, the common law rules of defamation (sensibly controlled on the question of damages)
represent a better reconciliation of the dual claims of freedom of speech and the protection of
individual reputation than does New York Times rule that has replaced it." Id. at 817.
25. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1968).
26. 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
27. Id. at 497.
28. 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
29. Id.
30. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
31. Id.
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official contemplated by the Court in New York Times.32  Yet, he had
achieved national fame as a football coach. Butts filed a libel suit against
Curtis Publishing Company, publisher of the Saturday Evening Post, for an
article falsely accusing him of conspiring to "fix" a football game between
the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama. Butts sought
$5,000,000 compensatory and $5,000,000 punitive damages.35
The companion case to Curtis Publishing Co., Associated Press v.
Walker,36 concerned a libel claim brought by a man accused of inciting a riot
against federal marshals.37 The plaintiff, who was a national military figure
with his own following, the "Friends of Walker," was still not deemed a
public official at the time the false news dispatch was released about him. 38
According to the dispatch, Walker led opposition to federal efforts to
enforce court ordered desegregation at the University of Mississippi.
39
32. At the time the article about him was written, Butts was athletic director of the
University of Georgia, which is a state university. Id. at 135. However, he was employed by
the Georgia Athletic Association, a private corporation. Id. One case that had attempted to
define the "public figure" was Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). In Rosenbatt, the
United States Supreme Court held that the public figure status "applies at the very least to
those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to
have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Id. at
85.
33. Curtis Publ'g, 388 U.S. at 136.
34. Id. "The article was entitled 'The Story of a College Football Fix' and prefaced by
a note from the editors stating: 'Not since the Chicago White Sox threw the 1919 World Series
has there been a sports story as shocking as this one ... .' Id.
35. Id. at 137. "The jury returned a verdict for $60,000 in general damages and for
$3,000,000 in punitive damages." Id. at 138. "The trial court reduced the total to $460,000
by remittitur." Id.
36. 388 U.S. 130, 140 (1967). The United States Supreme Court combined the Curtis
and Associated Press cases and issued one opinion.
37. Id.
[The case] arose out of the distribution of a news dispatch giving an eyewitness ac-
count of events on the campus of the University of Mississippi on the night of Septem-
ber 30, 1962, when a massive riot erupted because of federal efforts to enforce a court
decree ordering the enrollment of a Negro, James Meredith, as a student in the Univer-
sity. The dispatch stated that respondent Walker, who was present on the campus, had
taken command of the violent crowd and had personally led a charge against federal
marshals sent there to effectuate the court's decree and to assist in preserving order. It
also described Walker as encouraging rioters to use violence and giving them technical
advice on combating the effects of tear gas.
Id. at 140.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Walker sued the Associated Press for libel, claiming the report was false.4 °
In its decisions, the United States Supreme Court expanded the New York
Times v. Sullivan standard for public officials to include public figures.
41
Chief Justice Warren noted in his concurring opinion that the distinctions
between governmental and private sectors are increasingly blurred.42
In many situations, policy determinations which traditionally were
channeled through formal political institutions are now originated
and implemented through a complex array of boards, committees,
commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely
connected with the Government. This blending of positions and
power has also occurred in the case of individuals so that many
who do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless inti-
mately involved in the resolution of important public questions or,
by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society
at large.
Viewed in this context, then, it is plain that although they are not
subject to the restraints of the political process, "public figures,"
like "public officials," often play an influential role in ordering so-
ciety. 43
To be sure, the announcements in the Curtis Publishing Co. and
Associated Press opinions would have far-reaching effects. They would
make significant legal distinctions. "A private person and a public figure
have different relationship in libel. The latitude for journalism is larger in
the latter category." 44 The decisions also opened the door for a host of
public figure classifications. Courts were no longer forced to confine the
higher "actual malice" standard to public officials; now, the standard
40. Id. at 140.
41. CurtisPubl'g, 388 U.S. at 155.
42. Warren reflected: "To me, differentiation between 'public figures' and 'public
officials' and adoption of separate standards of proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or
First Amendment policy." Id. at 163 (Warren, J., concurring). Even Warren was probably
unable to imagine how very blurred those lines would have become in 2002. Today, public
figures and public officials are nearly impossible to distinguish. With presidential candidates
routinely appearing on late-night entertainment shows, it seems there is almost no difference at
all between officials and celebrities.
43. Id. at 163-64.
44. JOHN MURRAY, THE MEDIA LAW DICTIONARY 83 (1978).
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45
extended to public figures as well. Still, the Court needed to address a
critical question: What made one a public figure?
46
C. Who is a Public Figure?
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to explore this issue in the case
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.4 7 The case involved a prominent Chicago
attorney, Elmer Gertz, who was hired to represent the family of a man shot
and killed by a policeman.48 Gertz's role in the civil suit against the police
officer prompted an article in the American Opinion, which "accused Gertz
of being the architect of a 'frame-up' of [policeman] Nuccio and stated that
Gertz had a criminal record and longstanding communist affiliation., 49 Gertz
sued for libel.5°
In examining the dispute, the United States Supreme Court was
afforded the opportunity to clarify the definition of "public figure." The
Court identified two attributes of public figure status. First, the Court noted
the public figure's access to the channels of communications. 51 According
to the majority opinion written by Justice Powell: "Public officials and
public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of
effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to
counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy."5
2
The second attribute of a public figure cited by the Gertz Court was the
fact that a public figure is one "who has assumed a role of special promi-
45. Curtis Publ'g, 388 U.S. at 164.
46. The question has generated conflicting opinions from courts and scores of critical
commentary from legal scholars. One commentator noted that "[tihe hard problem of line-
drawing is how to define and treat those who are more than private persons but less than
official: public figures. The question may well be unanswerable by any formula." Anthony
Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to the "Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 622 (1983).
47. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
48. Id. at 325. Gertz was one of the most popular attorneys in his day. For example,
one of his former clients was Jack Ruby. Ernest D. Giglio, Unwanted Publicity, the News
Media, and the Constitution: Where Privacy Rights Compete with the First Amendment, 12
AKRON L. REV. 229, 238 (1978).
49. Stone, supra note 24, at 143.
50. Id. After a jury trial, Gertz won a $50,000 judgment. The trial court, however,
entered a judgment n.o.v. based on its application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard
to anyone embroiled in a discussion of a public issue. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, but
the United States Supreme Court reversed. Id.
51. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
52. Id. at 345.
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nence in society and thus invites public scrutiny and the accompanying
risks."53 As Justice Powell expressed:
An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept
certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public af-
fairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might other-
wise be the case. And society's interest in the officers of govern-
ment is not strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties
.... Those classified as public figures stand in a similar position.54
Applying its newly announced test for a public figure to Gertz, the Court
held the prominent attorney to be ayrivate person for the purposes of the
New York Times v. Sullivan standard.
Subsequent cases attempted to inject other factors into the public figure
status determination: the controversy involved and the plaintiffs role in the
dispute. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone56 and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,57
respectively, the Supreme Court addressed these issues. In Time, the Court
rejected the public status of the plaintiff, applying the controversy
58
standard . The Court held that the dissolution of a marriage was not the
type of "public controversy" contemplated by the Gertz Court.59 The
plaintiff, therefore, would not be deemed a public figure because of her lack
of involvement in a public controversy. The Wolston case limited the public
figure status by the plaintiffs role in the controversy. The plaintiff in
53. Been, supra note 7, at 955.
54. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45.
55. Id. at 352. According to the Court's analysis, Gertz failed both prongs of the test.
He did not discuss the case with the media, and therefore lacked access to the press to rebut
claims. Been, supra note 7, at 955. Also, "because Gertz had merely represented a client, he
had not invited the risks associated with close public scrutiny." Id.
56. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
57. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
58. Time, 424 U.S. at 453.
59. Id. at 454. The Time case involved a divorce between a member of a socially
prominent family and Russell Firestone, a member of one of America's wealthiest families. Id.
at 450. "Time magazine erroneously reported that the divorce was granted on the grounds of
adultery." Stone, supra note 24, at 149. Mrs. Firestone sued the magazine for libel. Id. Part
of the final judgment alluded to the wild allegations that surfaced during the divorce:
"According to certain testimony in behalf of the defendant, extramarital escapades of the
plaintiff were bizarre and of an amatory nature which would have made Dr. Freud's hair curl."
Time, 424 U.S. at 450.
60. Been, supra note 7, at 957. Wolston involved a plaintiff who was convicted of
contempt in the late 1950s for his refusal to appear before a grand jury investigating Soviet
espionage. Stone, supra note 24, at 149. The case was highly publicized at the time.
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Wolston prevailed in his libel suit against the defendant because he had not
61
willingly engaged the attention of the public.
Commentators have advanced the same test. In a recent lecture,
Professor Rodney Smolla posed the question: "How do we know when we
are dealing with a public figure or a private person?" 62 His answer: "Have
they voluntarily injected themselves into a public controversy?"
63
Taken together, then, the factors considered by the United State
Supreme Court in conferring public figure status upon individuals include:
1) plaintiffs access to the media; 2) assumption of a special role in the
public eye; 3) the plaintiff's involvement in a "public controversy"; and 4)
the plaintiff's role in the controversy. While these guidelines may prove
helpful in determining who constitutes a public figure, they are not at all
useful under the abatement issue. Even if one meets the public figure status
-and summarily triggers the difficult hurdles presented by the New York
Times v. Sullivan standard-when can one retreat into a private legal status?
The answer to this question has proven elusive. Unfortunately, how-
64
ever, it is one that often emerges in both defamation and privacy cases.
"Sixteen years later, the defendant published a book erroneously identifying plaintiff as a
Soviet agent." Id.
61. See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 157. The Court's decision in Wolston was based on its
refusal to classify the plaintiff as a public figure. Therefore, it never had to reach the question
of whether the passage of time (sixteen years here) would make Wolston a private plaintiff. In
their concurring opinion, however, Justices Blackmun and Marshall argued that even if the
plaintiff gained public figure status at the time of the espionage charges, sixteen years of
anonymity would restore him to private status. Id. at 171 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Blackmun stated that the time lapse between Wolston's participation in the controversy and
the magazine's defamatory reference "was sufficient to erase whatever public-figure
attributes" Wolston once possessed. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
62. Rodney Smolla, Goodwin Seminar Speech, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova
Southeastern University in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Jan. 17, 2002). Smolla is a member of the
law faculty at the University of Richmond, and the author of numerous books on Free Speech
and First Amendment issues.
63. Id.
64. Although the New York Times case involved defamation, lower courts generally
defer to the Supreme Court's defamation test to "assess public figure status in privacy cases ."
Been, supra note 7, at 963. The law of privacy has had to rely heavily on judge-made law. In
fact, privacy law in this country originated in the seminal article written by Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). The American Law Institute did not officially recognize the tort of
public disclosure of private fact as one of the four types of invasion of privacy torts until
1976. Phillip E. DeLaTorre, Resurrecting A Sunken Ship: An Analysis of Current Judicial
Attitudes Toward Public Disclosure Claims, 38 Sw. L.J. 1151, 1151 (1985). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (2002).
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"While the [defamation and invasion of privacy] torts do address different
individual interests, the reputational and personal integrity concerns in both
causes of action are of equivalent value in the balance against free speech
guarantees. 65 Several cases highlight the need for a new test that factors in
the passage of time and allows public figures to retreat in time to privacy.
Moreover, the "Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question of
whether the passage of time can extinguish an individual's status as a public
figure. 66
III. REPRESENTATIVE CASES
A. Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co.
Many cases demonstrate the need for a new approach to the public
figure abatement problem. The case of Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co.
67
is one such case. In Brewer, plaintiff Anita Wood Brewer filed a defamation
suit based on a newspaper article that ran about her and Elvis Presley in the
68The Commercial Appeal, a Memphis newspaper. The article, which ran in
a People column on September 8, 1972, inferred that Brewer and Presley
were rekindling an old, romantic relationship. 69 The article read:
FLICKERING FLAME: Back in 1957 Anita Wood, who came
from Jackson, Tenn., to Memphis to sing on TV, was Elvis
Presley's "No. 1 girl." This week as Elvis closed his month-long
show at the Las Vegas Hilton, Miss Wood stopped by the hotel for
what appeared to be a "reunion" of two old friends. Elvis recently
filed for divorce from his wife of five years, Priscilla. Miss Wood
is divorced from former Ole Miss football star Johnny Brewer.7°
After John Brewer contacted the newspaper, the paper ran a correction
stating that Anita Brewer was not in Las Vegas on the date in question, nor
was she divorced from John Brewer. 7' The Brewers brought separate
65. Been, supra note 7, at 966.
66. Robert M. Dato, Comment, The Effect of Passage of Time on the Status of
Inactive Public Figures, 35 FED. COMM. L.J. 235, 242 (1983).
67. 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980).
68. Id. at 1240.
69. Id.
70. Id. Accompanying the article was a photograph of Wood. Id.
71. Id.
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defamation actions against Memphis Publishing Company, and the suits
were consolidated.72
By the time the case reached the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
initial issue was whether Anita Brewer or John Brewer were public figures.73
The court made the determination that both Anita and John Brewer were
public figures.74 It based its decision on the fact that Anita Brewer, in the
early to mid-1950s, won talent and beauty contests and worked as a disc
jockey with a radio station in Jackson, Tennessee. 75 The court also noted
that Anita Brewer had been awarded a motion picture contract, though she
76had never done a movie. In addition, she had appeared on national
television, once on the Jack Paar Tonight Show and about five times on the
Andy Williams Show, as a singer.77 More important to the content of the
article in question, Anita Brewer had dated Elvis Presley for about five or six
years, from 1955 to 1960 or 1961.78 The court also made note of the fact
that after Anita Brewer's marriage to John Brewer in 1964, she did not seek
media attention or continue as a professional entertainer.79
The court assessed John Brewer's status as a public figure through both
his football career and his marriage to Anita Brewer.80 "John Brewer was a
member of the Ole Miss football team the year it was ranked number one in
the nation." 8' He also played professional football from 1960 to 1970, first
82
with the Cleveland Browns, then with the New Orleans Saints. The court
also pointed out that John Brewer may have achieved public figure status
83through his marriage to Anita Brewer.
72. Brewer, 626 F.2d. at 1240-41. In 1974, a jury found for the Brewers and
awarded each $400,000. Id. The judge granted a new trial on damages alone and the second
jury awarded Anita Brewer $250,000 and John Brewer $150,000; they accepted a remittitur to
$100,000 and $50,000 respectively. Id.
73. Id. at 1241.
74. Id. at 1255.
75. Id. at 1248. Anita Brewer once did the "Antics of Anita" radio show. Id.
76. Brewer, 626 F.2d at 1248.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. There was possibly one exception of a television/newspaper interview shortly
after her marriage. Id.
80. See Brewer, 626 F.2d at 1255.
81. Id. at 1248.
82. Id. "In a published interview he was quoted as saying that his football career had
made his name well-known enough to open business opportunities for him the rest of his
life...." Id.
83. Id. at 1249 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
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The Brewers maintained that they were neither all-purpose public
84figures nor limited public figures. They asserted that neither one of them
had "'assume[d] special prominence in the resolution of public ques-
tions. ' ' '15  The Fifth Circuit rejected the argument and found that, under
86Gertz, the Brewers were public figures. Therefore, they could only win in
their defamation claim by proving the "actual malice" standards advanced in
New York Times.87 As for Anita Brewer's deliberate retreat from the media,
the court held that "even viewing Anita as one who had retreated several
years before this article, she would be required to prove malice in her suit
based on this article. 88
B. Friedan v. Friedan
The case of Friedan v. Friedan89 offers a unique view of the public
figure-status retention issue. In this case, the Southern District of New York
considered whether one can retroactively be deemed a public figure through
his or her connection to one who later emerged as a public figure.90 Friedan
involved a suit between plaintiff Carl Friedan and his former wife, Betty
Friedan, a well-known leader of the feminist movement. 91 The lawsuit was
the result of an article written by Betty Friedan, which ran in New York
magazine. The magazine issue featuring the Freidan article was part of a
special issue dedicated to "a twenty-five year throwback to the year 1949." 93
84. Id.
85. Brewer, 626 F.2d at 1249 (alteration in original ) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at
351).
86. Id. at 1255.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1257. The court seemed to hinge its decision on the fact that some of the
same issues that gave rise to Anita Brewer's classification as a public figure-her romantic
involvement with Elvis Presley-was the subject of the article. Id.
89. 414 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
90. Id.
91. Id. Betty Friedan is widely recognized as America's feminist leader. Her book
The Feminine Mystique (1963) challenged several long-established American attitudes. Betty
Friedan also founded the National Organization for Women in 1966. Betty Naomi Friedan, in
Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2002, at http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/
RefArticle.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2002).
92. Friedan, 414 F. Supp. at 78. In addition to suing his ex-wife, Carl Friedan also
sought recovery of damages from New York magazine and thee broadcasting companies for
using the magazine in spot commercials on their television channels promoting the article. Id.
93. Id. The magazine's retrospective was themed "The Year We Entered Modem
Times." Id.
[Vol. 27:365
152
Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss2/1
Duhart
The article aimed to present the contrasting lifestyles of Ms. Friedan, who
was a connubial housewife in the 1940s.94
The article was illustrated with a photograph of Betty Friedan, her then
husband, Carl, and their son in 1949. Carl Friedan brought suit under the
96Civil Rights Law of New York, the statute that protected privacy rights.
Carl Friedan argued that he had made "every effort" to disassociate himself
from his former wife's public status to preserve his identity as a private
individual.97  However, the Southern District of New York held that the
article-and the accompanying picture-describing Ms. Friedan's life
twenty-five years before her emergence as a feminist leader was held to be a
matter of public interest.98 First, the court noted from the onset that the
defendant, Betty Friedan, as a leader of the feminist movement, was a public
figure. 99 The court held: "All incidents of her life, including those which
contrast with her present status and views, are significant in terms of the
interest of the public in news."'°
The court then went an additional step and held that her life experiences
twenty-five years ago-before Betty Friedan herself achieved public-figure
status--was also a matter of public concern. 10 1 Finally, the court concluded
by citing Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.,' °2 and noted that Carl Friedan's
privacy would have to be subordinated to the public interest in his former
wife's life. The court noted, "'[e]veryone will agree that at some point the
public interest in obtaining information becomes dominant over the
individual's desire for privacy."'' 0 3 The court failed, however, to note a
major distinction between the Sidis case and the facts in Friedan. In Sidis,
the plaintiff was a public figure himself at one time. In Friedan, the plaintiff
94. Id. at 78-79. Betty Freidan has reflected many times on her slow entrance to the
feminist movement. She said recently in an interview: "Looking at my own experience...
when I was a graduate of Smith, the best women's college in America, I knew nothing of
feminism, I knew very little of the battle for women's rights that took place in the last century
and in the first half of this century." Kathleen Erickson, An Interview with Betty Friedan, THE
REGION, at http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/94-09/int949.cfm (Sept. 1994).
95. Friedan, 414 F. Supp. at 78.
96. Carl Friedan brought suit against Betty Friedan under sections 50 and 51 of the
Civil Rights Law of New York. Id. at 78.
97. Id. at 79.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 78.
100. Friedan, 414 F. Supp. at 78.
101. Id. at 79.
102. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
103. Friedan, 414 F. Supp. at 79 (quoting Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809)).
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Carl Friedan was not a public figure at the time the picture of him was taken
in 1949. Moreover, the court never did address the two decades that elapsed
since Carl Friedan was married to the now-famous Betty Friedan.' °  With
these failures, it is clear that the court's decision in Friedan is not based on
solid analysis.
C. Bernstein v. NBC
In Bernstein v. NBC, 1 5 the District of Columbia considered a suit
brought by a former death-row inmate who had been convicted of first-
degree murder in 1933.'°6 In 1933, plaintiff Charles S. Bernstein (under the
name Charles Harris) was tried and convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death by electrocution.107 Prompted by various people and
committees working to aid Bernstein, reporter Martha Strayer, who worked
for the Washington Daily News, worked to get the death sentence commuted
to life imprisonment.'0 8 In 1935, Bernstein's death sentence was indeed• • .109
commuted to life imprisonment. Five years later, Bernstein received a
conditional release from his life sentence.' Finally, in 1945, Bernstein re-
ceived a presidential pardon."'
After his release from prison, Bernstein joined the public and attempted
to live a normal life."' His efforts were destroyed in 1952, however, when
the defendant, NBC, telecast, live, a program entitled "The Big Story.""
3
The story was a fictionalized dramatization based on Bernstein's conviction
and pardon." 14 Bernstein sued for invasion of privacy."'
104. The impact the passage of time should have on public status abatement will be
discussed in further detail by the author. See infra pp. 13-15.
105. 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955).
106. Id. at 818.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 818-19.
109. ld. at 819.
110. Bernstein, 129 F. Supp. at 819.
111. Id.
112. Id. Bernstein operated a "resort lodge." Id.
113. Id. The story was telecast over thirty-nine stations in its network. Id.
114. Bernstein, 129 F. Supp. at 819. Although the story was based on Bernstein, the
names were changed. Id. at 820. Bernstein asserted, however, that the character playing him
had a strong resemblance to the way he had appeared years earlier, and that the portrayal of
him was "recognizable to him and to his friends and acquaintances" in the public. Id.
115. Bernstein sought $250,000 in actual damages for mental pain and personal injury
caused by the telecast. Id.
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Although the defendant network asserted that the docudrama did
change the name of the parties involved, Bernstein insisted that he was
readily identifiable through the show.' 16 More importantly, he stressed that
the passage of time between his release in 1940 and the show's airing in
1952 should restore his privacy rights.' 7 Was Bernstein still a public figure
despite his efforts to avoid the press, or had he become "stale news?""
8
As one commentator has noted, almost all individuals portrayed as
major characters in a docudrama fall within the public figure or public
official cate-gory." 9 "After all, if the individual was not at least a limited
public figure, why would the network produce the telefilm?"'120  Conse-
quently, a plaintiff in a docudrama is almost always faced with the New York
Times v. Sullivan standard.12  Certainly, the court in Bernstein agreed.
While the District of Columbia discussed at length society's need to "sustain
the unfortunate rather than tear him down,"' 122 the court still elected to find
that Bernstein was not removed from the realm of public interest.1
23
Therefore, the court held that any protection afforded by time "to a [former]
public figure is not against repetition of the facts which are already public
property." 124
D. A Closer Look at Sidis
The quintessential case for public figure abatement is Sidis. The case
vividly highlights the inherent problems in the so-called permanent public
116. Id.
117. Bernstein, 129 F. Supp. at 824.
118. See id. at 835.
119. Jacqui Gold Grunfeld, Docudramas: The Legality of Producing Fact-Based
Dramas-What Every Producer's Attorney Should Know, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
483, 494 (1991).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 494-95.
122. Bernstein, 129 F. Supp. at 827. The Bernstein court also discussed in detail the
"Red Kimono" case. Id. (construing Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931)). In
Melvin, a reformed prostitute was tried and acquitted on a murder charge. After her acquittal,
Gabrielle Darley "abandoned her life of shame," married, and "became entirely rehabilitated."
Melvin, 297 P. at 91. More than five years later, defendant made and released a movie
without Darley's consent. Id. "The Red Kimono" was based on Darley's past life. Id. Darley
sued for invasion of privacy. Id. The Melvin case was one of the few that got it right-the
court ruled that Darley's privacy had been invaded. Id. at 93-94.
123. Bernstein, 129 F. Supp. at 828.
124. Id.
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figure status retention. The life of William James Sidis 125 was defined early
by his father as a matter of public concern. The elder Sidis, an early
psychotherapist, believed that "geniuses are made the way twigs are bent"1
26
and worked hard to mold his child into a prodigy. He was also eager to show
off his success to the public.1
27
The effort was also aided by the natural genius of Sidis, who was said
to have had an IQ between 250 and 300. 12 Sidis qualified for admission to
Harvard University at age nine, but had to wait two years before he could
enter as a special student. 129  The young Sidis was also fluent in five
languages by age five, and could read Plato in the original Greek as a
child.
130
Such remarkable skills, coupled with his father's demands for attention,
generated enviable publicity for the young scholar. Sidis was featured in
front-page stories of the New York Times nineteen times. 131  In time,
however, the press that glorified the child prodigy turned cynical and waited
to be the first to predict his burnout. And in many ways, the burnout was
inevitable. For all of his brilliance, Sidis was a recluse. At his Harvard
graduation, he was said to have told reporters: "'I want to live the perfect
life.... The only way to live the perfect life is to live it in seclusion. I have
always hated crowds."
1 32
Sidis then made various career moves, and failed. 133  Eventually,
however, he found his place as a law clerk in a New York business firm,
where he worked for twenty-three dollars a week. 134 The job did not require
any of the extraordinary talents possessed by Sidis.135 He lived a quiet life,
125. Sidis was named for his godfather, the psychologist and philosopher Williams
James, who was a friend of Sidis' father. Good Will Sidis, HARVARD MAG., available at
http://www.harvard-magazine.com/issues/ma98/pump.html (last visited April 24, 2002).
126. Bent Twig, Time-Life Books, at http://www.sidis.net/TimeLife.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2002).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Good Will Sidis, supra note 125, available at http://www.harvard-
magazine.com/issues/ma98/pump.html (last visited April 24, 2002).
130. Bent Twig, supra note 126, at http://www.sidis.net/TimeLife.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2002).
131. Id.
132. Good Will Sidis, supra note 125, available at http://www.harvard-
magazine.com/issues/ma98/pump.html (last visited April 24, 2002).
133. Sidis tried a teaching stint at Rice University but failed. Id. He also entered
Harvard Law school, but dropped out in his last semester. Id.
134. Id.
135. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 807 (2d Cir. 1940).
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entertaining himself by collecting streetcar transfers and writing unpublished
books. 136  When the press turned its attention to him in 1937, it pierced
Sidis' veil of privacy with a vengeance. 37 The biographical sketch depicted
his lodgings ("'a hall bedroom of Boston's shabby south end"'), his laugh,
and his manner of speech. 138 All told, it was absolutely merciless. Sidis's
subsequent suit against the publisher was based on both invasion of privacy
and libel.' 39  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged Sidis's
constant disdain for the press; yet ruled that Sidis was not entitled to privacy
rights because he was still a public figure in 1937-when the one-time child
prodigy was thirty-nine years old. 1
40
[E]ven if Sidis had loathed public attention at that time, we think
his uncommon achievements and personality would have made the
attention permissible. Since then Sidis has cloaked himself in ob-
scurity, but his subsequent history, containing as it did the answer
to the question of whether or not he had fulfilled his early promise,
was still a matter of public concern.141
Sidis lost on the invasion of privacy claims, and in 1944 the magazine paid
him a reported $500 to settle a companion suit for malicious libel.141 Just
three months later, Sidis suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and died. 43 He was
forty-six years old. 144 If the public truly had a right to know whether Sidis
"fulfilled his [childhood] promise,"' 145 it satisfied its curiosity at a demanding
136. Good Will Sidis, supra note 125, available at http://www.harvard-
magazine.com/issues/ma98/pump.html (last visited April 24, 2002). Sidis wrote science
fiction and a two-volume history of America. Id. He also published a book, The Animate and
the Inanimate, advancing the theory of black holes fifteen years before astronomers advanced
it. Id.
137. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.
138. Id.
139. Id. The suit actually alleged three causes of action: 1) invasion of privacy under
the law in California, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, and Missouri; 2) infringements of the rights
afforded to him under the New York Civil Rights Law; and 3) malicious libel under the laws
of Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 809.
142. Good Will Sidis, supra note 125, available at http://www.harvard-
magazine.com/issues/ma98/pump.html (last visited April 24, 2002).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
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price. Again, the court improperly failed to allow for the abatement of the
plaintiff's public figure status.
IV. ONE MORE TEST
Using the principles asserted in cases that have led to the development
of media law, a new test for restoring pubic figures to private status should
be advanced. The test should rely on four factors, most of which have their
basis in the seminal cases of New York Times, Curtis Publishing/Associated
Press, and Gertz. The factors should include: 1) whether the plaintiff has
retreated from the media, or is still actively seeking media attention; 2)
whether the plaintiff is involved in a matter that is legitimately a matter of
public concern; 3) the plaintiff's access to the media; and 4) the passage of
time. By allowing courts to examine these factors, they can more properly
determine who is still a public figure. The current policy of "once a public
figure always a public figure" unfairly penalizes individuals and essentially
robs them of any protection under defamation and privacy laws. 146
"[F]ederal appellate courts generally have been inclined to reject the
argument for reversal of public figure status .... 147 Nonetheless, a few
courts have discussed, in a limited capacity, the effect time would have on
one's public figure status. Even in Brewer, for instance, the Fifth Circuit
offered this speculation:
It might be that during the "active" public figure period a wider
range of articles, including those only peripherally related to the
basis of the public figure's fame, are protected by the malice stan-
dard and that the passage of time or intentional retreat narrows the
range of articles so protected to those directly related to the basis
for fame. '48
Nevertheless, the Brewer court rejected the plaintiff's argument for public
status reversal. 149 Because courts do not properly factor the passage of time
into the public figure abatement cases, private individuals have been
wrongly held to the difficult standards presented by New York Times.
146. Ransom, supra note 15, at 411. Although a public figure may still bring an action
for defamation or invasion of privacy, the fact is that the "actual malice" standard required by
New York Times creates nearly insurmountable obstacles for plaintiffs. Id.
147. Id. at 401.
148. Brewer v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1257 (5th Cir. 1980).
149. Id. at 1247-48.
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One more media test is needed to aid courts in securing the legal rights
of so-called public figures. First, the title "public figure" has been extended
by courts to include a wide range of people who hardly meet the standards
established in Gertz. For instance, "[t]he range of public figures today spans
the socioeconomic spectrum"'' 50 and has been held to include everyone from
schoolteachers 151 to social workers.152  "Courts have applied the public
figure concept quite loosely, often encompassing plaintiffs whose lives
clearly were not public until the defendants' disclosures made them So., 153
While this concept has aided courts in their efforts to shield defendants from
liability, it has made success in privacy actions much more difficult to
achieve. 
154
As the cases in this article demonstrate, the passage of time usually has
little or no effect on public figure status. "With few exceptions, the cases
that have dealt with this question have held that once a person's activities
become a matter of public interest, the mere lapse or passage of time will not
in itself reinstate a person's prior right of privacy . . . ,,"55 Therefore, those
deemed worthy of public figure status might forever lose the legal protection
extended to individuals through libel and privacy laws. "Until they have
reverted to the lawful and unexciting life led by the great bulk of the
community, they are subject to the privileges which publishers have to
satisfy the curiosity of the public as to their leaders, heroes, villains, and
victims. '' 56 Is this a fair trade? As Warren and Brandeis wrote in their now-
famous article on privacy more than one hundred years ago: "The right to
privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or
general interest. ' '  The sound reasoning behind such limits, however,
should not prevent a once-public figure from ever restoring his or her
privacy rights. 158
150. Ransom, supra note 15, at 390.
151. Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978) (holding
that a grade school wrestling coach was a "public figure" within the New York Times v.
Sullivan standard).
152. Kahn v. Bower, 284 Cal. Rptr. 244 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a social worker
was a "public official").
153. DeLaTorre, supra note 64, at 1164.
154. Id.
155. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 203, at 821-22 (1990).
156. Id. at 822.
157. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 64, at 214.
158. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
A more complete test for restoring public figures to private status is
demanded by prevailing public policy concerns. First, the primary factors
that make one a public figure according to Gertz--the access to the media to
rebut false claims and the deliberate assumption of a role in the public
eye--are no longer present for those seeking to return to private status
through the passage of time. For instance, the plaintiffs in Brewer, Sidis,
and Friedan clearly demonstrated their efforts to invoke their rights to be
"let alone." The plaintiffs had not deliberately sought attention from the
media; rather, they each had effected a retreat.
Also, society's rehabilitative goals are not fostered by preventing
prisoners who find themselves in the public eye from ever returning to the
"privacy" of the general society. As the Supreme Court of California wrote
in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest,159 "[olne of the premises of the rehabilitative
process is that the rehabilitated offender can rejoin that great bulk of the
community from which he has been ostracized for his anti-social acts. In
return for becoming a 'new man,' he is allowed to melt into the shadows of
obscurity."' 16 When the prisoner is wrongly convicted and later released, as
in Bernstein, the reasons for allowing a prisoner to "melt" into the shadows
of obscurity are even more compelling.
Considering how difficult it is for public figures to win defamation and
privacy suits, courts should consider the issue of public figure abatement
seriously. "Both willing and unwilling public figures are the objects of
legitimate public interest during a period of time after their conduct or
misfortune has brought them to the public attention."'' 6  This result is
sometimes offensive to both justice and our human sensibilities. Therefore,
there is a need for one more test in the media law arena-one that would
factor in the passage of time. After all, no one can make time stand still.
159. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
160. Id. at 41. As the Supreme Court of California noted in Melvin v. Reid: "Even the
thief on the cross was permitted to repent during the hours of his final agony." 297 P. 91, 93
(Cal. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
161. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 203, at 822 (1990).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Bartnicki v. Vopper,' the Supreme Court faced a direct "conflict
between interests of the highest order:" the freedoms of expression secured
by the First Amendment and the right to privacy.2 Specifically, the Court
considered the question of whether the First Amendment shields the press
from liability under the federal Wiretapping Act' for disclosing an illegally
intercepted communication received from an outside source. A divided
Court held the Wiretapping Act unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the
case.5 Though termed "narrow," the Court's holding has broad implica-
tions.6 The headline could read "First In Write: Press Rights Prevail Over
Privacy Interests."
The Supreme Court presents two significant statements in Bartnicki.
First, confronted with a direct conflict between privacy and First Amend-
ment concerns, the Court once again declares the First Amendment interests
7first and foremost in importance. Second, because both sides argue core
purposes of the First Amendment, pitting the press freedom to inform the
public on matters of public concern against the individual freedom not to
8
speak, the Court's holding implicitly, if not explicitly, acknowledges a
hierarchy of interests within the First Amendment itself. Thus, in the
aftermath of the Bartnicki decision, freedom of the press triumphs over both
freedom of speech and the right to privacy.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the First Amendment
does not subject enforcement of a general law against the press to stricter
scrutiny than enforcement of the same law against other individuals or
entities.9 Yet the Court's decision in Bartnicki intimates otherwise. This
1. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
2. Id. at 518.
3. Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Oral Communications Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994).
4. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517.
5. Id. at 535.
6. Id. at 517.
7. See Id. at 535.
8. Id. at 519-20; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 559
(1985) (holding that the right not to speak serves the same functions as the First Amendment's
affirmative aspects) (citing Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250,255
(N.Y. 1968)).
9. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (asserting that the First
Amendment does not protect the press from breaking laws of general applicability). But see
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (distinguishing speech of
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article explores the Bartnicki holding and argues that the Court's decision
implicitly applies stricter scrutiny to the Wiretapping Act as regards the
press than as regards others. Part II examines the law prior to Bartnicki,
both in terms of the First Amendment and the federal wiretapping statute.
Part Il illuminates the Bartnicki decision. Part IV presents an analysis of
the Bartnicki opinion, focusing on the Court's reasoning and the implica-
tions of the holding. Part V demonstrates why the holding subjects Title III
to stricter scrutiny when the press is involved. Finally, Part VI concludes
that in the aftermath of Bartnicki, protection of privacy interests is
increasingly dependent upon journalistic ethics.
II. INTERESTS OF THE HIGHEST ORDER: THE LAW BEFORE BARTNICKI
In order to assess the significance of the Court's holding, we must
examine the law prior to Bartnicki. Since the Bartnicki Court concludes
that application of the federal Wiretapping Act to the facts of the case
violated the First Amendment, it is imperative to understand both the statute
(hereinafter Title III) and the relevant First Amendment law. This part
begins by addressing the First Amendment concerns raised in Bartnicki.
Then the focus shifts to the sphere of privacy and the protections afforded
under Title Ill. Finally, this part examines the legal interplay between these
two "interests of the highest order."' 0
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment mandates that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ."" Political speech is
afforded the broadest protection under the First Amendment because the
overriding concern at its inception was ensuring the "free discussion of
governmental affairs" essential to democracy.' 2 Curtailing this exchange of
ideas is thus an inappropriate "means for averting a relatively trivial harm to
media and non-media defendants in a defamation action); Curtis Publ'g v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 150 (1967) (holding that a newspaper publisher has no special immunity from laws of
general applicability to invade rights of others).
10. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518 (referring to freedom of the press and privacy
issues).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966)).
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society." 13 Accordingly, the courts have declared laws that abridge the
freedoms of speech or of the press unconstitutional unless they have
concluded that proper justification exists for their enactment. 14
Generally, where the courts have found laws content neutral with only
minimal effects on First Amendment freedoms, they have upheld the laws.
15
Content-neutral laws of general applicability "do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."' 6  The
government can justify incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms
by showing a sufficiently important interest exists to regulate a "nonspeech"
element. 17  The test, first enunciated in United States v. O'Brien,'8 is
satisfied as long as the law
is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial government interest; if the governmen-
tal interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.' 9
However, the courts have been reluctant to uphold laws directly
abridging First Amendment freedoms, especially when issues of public
concern are involved. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Supreme
Court reviewed recent decisions and declared, "state action to punish the
13. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
14. Id. Traditionally, courts have applied two levels of scrutiny in determining
whether proper justification exists for legislative action abridging these freedoms; intermediate
or strict. The standard of review chosen has generally been based on whether or not the law is
content based, preferring the tougher standard when content discrimination is present. Where
the courts have deemed laws content neutral, they have generally applied intermediate
scrutiny. Thus, two distinct lines of cases have emerged, both of which are implicated in
Bartnicki.
15. If a law discriminates based on content it is subject to strict scrutiny. See United
States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (holding that "a content-based
speech restriction ... can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny") (citing Sable Communica-
tions of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). Both Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co.,
443 U.S. 97 (1979), and Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), discussed in the
immediately following paragraphs, involved content-based restrictions.
16. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
17. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
18. Id. at 377.
19. Id.
20. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
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publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional
standards.' Ultimately, the Daily Mail Court held a state statute
prohibiting the publication of a juvenile offender's name unconstitutional as
applied by declaring the state's interest in protecting the child's anonymity
22insufficient when weighed against the First Amendment. The Court
concluded that when the press lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public significance, publication of such information is constitu-
tional "absent ... a state interest of the highest order. 23
The general rule of Daily Mail, commonly referred to as the "Daily
Mail principle, 24 is now a cornerstone of First Amendment law protecting
freedom of the press. In fact, the Court reiterated the principle in Florida
25Star. In Florida Star, the Court declared a Florida statute making it
unlawful to publish the name of a sexual assault victim unconstitutional as
26applied. The Court reasoned that the information was lawfully obtained
and the privacy and safety interests asserted by the state were outweighed by
the freedoms secured under the First Amendment. 27 Quoting directly from
Daily Mail, the Court cemented the principle: "'[I]f a newspaper lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.'''28 But, in
footnote eight of Florida Star, the Court specifically reserved the question as
to whether the press may publish the same information when acquired
29
unlawfully.
B. The Sphere of Privacy.: Title III's Role
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly establish an
individual right to privacy, the Bill of Rights implies that an individual
sphere of privacy exists that the government may not intrude upon.30  Both
the legislature and the judiciary have recognized this resulting right,
21. Id. at 102.
22. Id. at 104.
23. Id. at 103.
24. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 541.
27. Id. at 540-541.
28. Id. at 533 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co. 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
29. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535 n.8.
30. Eugene J. Yannon, Privacy Law, 34 MD. B.J. 24, 27 Dec. (2001).
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described by Warren and Brandeis as the "right to be let alone," 3 as an
important, if not fundamental, interest.32 The scope of this right, though, is
unclear, particularly in light of technological advances that make invasions
33of privacy easier.
Title III protects the individual's sphere of privacy by making it illegal
to intercept, use, or disclose the communications of any person except under
specified circumstances. Protecting privacy was an overriding congres-
sional concern in enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968. 3' The legislature made specific findings that techno-
logical advances in surveillance techniques increased the danger that private
communications "may be open to possible wrongful use and public
disclosure by ... unauthorized private parties." To ensure privacy in
communications, Congress deemed it imperative to "strik[e] at all aspects of
the problem .... Accordingly, Title ll provides a uniform basis for
protecting the privacy interest and broadly prohibits the interception, use,
and disclosure of private communications.
In pertinent part, Title I provides:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any
person who -
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral,
or electronic communication; [or]....
(c) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was ob-
tained through the interception of a wire, oral or electronic com-
munication in violation of this subsection; [or]
31. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
32. See generally Yannon, supra note 30, at 28-29.
33. Id. at 26.
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994).
35. S. REP. No. 1097 (1968); reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112.
36. S. REP. No. 99-541, at *3 (1986); reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557;
see also Brief for Petitioners Bartnicki and Kane, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)
(No. 99-1687, 99-1728); 2000 WL 1280378, at *17.
37. S. REP. No. 1097 (1968); reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2156;
Petitioner's Brief, Brief for the United States, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No.
99-1687, 99-1728); 2000 WL 1344079, at *9.
38. Petitioner's Brief, Brief for the United States, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001) (No. 99-1687, 99-1728); 2000 WL 1344079, at *5.
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(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire,
oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to
know that the information was obtained through the interception of
a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this sub-
section;... shall be punished .... 39
Title III imposes both civil and criminal penalties on any person in violation
of the statute. 40  Further, it establishes a private cause of action for any
person whose communication has been intercepted, used, or disclosed.4'
C. The Interface Between the First Amendment and Title III
Title III broadly protects the individual's "right to be let alone ' 42 from
interference in private communications. In doing so, it implicates the First
Amendment in two critical ways. First, by augmenting the freedom to speak
privately, Title III protects the First Amendment freedoms of speech and
expression. In this sense, the statute directly fosters First Amendment goals:
"privacy of communications is vital to our society" because it allows for the
"free interchange of ideas and information." 43 By prohibiting the intercep-
tion, use, and disclosure of private communications, Title HI reinforces the
First Amendment right not to speak, "which serves the same ultimate end as
freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect." 44
Second, and ironically, Title I1's use and disclosure provisions have a
potentially chilling effect on the freedoms of speech and the press because
they can function like a prior restraint. It is beyond dispute that prior
restraints pose the greatest threat to First Amendment freedoms. 45 Where
disclosures about issues of public importance are involved, the concern is
heightened since enforcement of Title 111 stands to directly conflict with the
39. § 2511(1)(a), (c), (d).
40. § 2511(4)-(5).
41. § 2520(a). The statute does not provide a private cause of action for "obtaining"
illegally intercepted communications. §§ 2510-2520.
42. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31.
43. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 856 (3d Cir. 1978).
44. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)
(citing Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)).
45. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding
publication of information of great public concern more important than preserving secrecy that
might affect national security in light of the basic rule against prior restraints).
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46First Amendment's mandate. Enforcement of these provisions against the
press thus inherently raises First Amendment concerns.
"It is beyond question that the First Amendment would not protect the
media [or other] defendants from liability ... [for violating] the interception
or procurement prongs of Title HI. '4 7 Title IlI's interception provision is
clearly constitutional. Both the press and non-media defendants, however,
have challenged the use and disclosure provisions on First Amendment
grounds.49 Where no significant First Amendment concerns have been
raised, the use and disclosure provisions have been uniformly upheld.50 But,
when the disclosures involved matters of public significance, the courts have
been inconsistent in their reasoning and conclusions."
Two circuit court cases illustrate the confusion. Both circuit courts
overturned the holding and rational of the district court below and both were
seeking certiorari from the Supreme Court at the time Bartnicki was decided.
In Peavey v. WFAA-TV, 52 the Fifth Circuit was presented with a "first
impression"53 conflict between the right to privacy arising under Title Ill and
46. See, e.g., id.
47. Peavy v. Harman, 37 F. Supp. 2d 495, 516 (N.D. Tex. 1999) aff'd in part, vacated
in part, rev'd in part by, Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
48. Congressional authority to regulate interstate communications stems from the
Commerce Clause and is generally subject to rational basis review; prohibiting interception of
private communications is a legitimate state end that is directly advanced by the statute.
Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated on other grounds by 532
U.S. 1050 (2001).
49. Case law is sparse in this area. Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation,
Construction and Application of Provision of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (18 U.S. C.A. § 2520) Authorizing Civil Cause of Action by Person Whose Wire, Oral, or
Electronic Communication is Intercepted, Disclosed, or Used in Violation of Act, 164 A.L.R.
Fed. 139 (2000) (providing an overview of the application of Title III's use and disclosure
history).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000). In an earlier case, Natoli v. Sullivan, a New York
court determined that a college newspaper could be held liable under Title III for disclosing
the transcript of a telephone conversation recorded in violation of the statute even if it had
played no role in the illegal interception and the information was of public concern. 606
N.Y.S.2d 504, 507 (Sup. Ct. 1993). The court noted however, that any republication of the
transcript by another media source would not violate the statute as the information was then in
the public realm and thus did not constitute disclosure. Id. at 509.
53. Peavy, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
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the "right of a free press to publish truthful and newsworthy information. 54
The question presented was whether the media defendants could be held
liable under Title III for using and disclosing information of public interest
that they had obtained from a known third party.55 Although the media
defendants knew or had reason to know that the information was initially
obtained in violation of Title Ill, they did not make the interceptions
themselves.56
After an extensive analysis of applicable law, the Fifth Circuit
determined that intermediate scrutiny was the proper standard of review and
found that Title IlI's use and disclosure provisions survived the constitu-
tional challenge. 57 The court reasoned that Title ImI is a content-neutral law
of general applicability designed to serve the important government interest
of privacy in communications and does not burden substantially more speech
58than necessary in furthering the government's ends. The case was
remanded, in part to determine issues of fact pertaining to the level of media
"participation" in the interceptions. 59
In Boehner v. McDermott, the District of Columbia Circuit also
confronted a direct clash between Title II's disclosure provision and the
First Amendment. In a highly publicized case involving the disclosure and
subsequent publication of Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich's illegally
54. Id. at 515. The trial court distinguished the statutory right to privacy arising under
Title HI from the "constitutional right... 'to be let alone' from government intrusion into
personal and intimate decisions and beliefs." Id. at 517. Applying strict scrutiny, the court
held Title I unconstitutional as applied to the media defendants who had published truthful
information that had been acquired by a third party in violation of the statute. Id. The court
reasoned "that the information provided to the media involved matters of public significance"
and the information was "lawfully obtained by the media." Id. Thus, the trial court found the
media's use and disclosure of the information protected under the First Amendment absent a
"state interest of the highest order." Peavy, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 517. The statutory privacy
interests violated here, the court explained, could be protected by imposing liability under
Title III to the known third party who disclosed the information to the press. Peavy v. Harman,
37 F. Supp. 2d 495, 526 (N.D. Tex. 1999). This is ultimately what the Supreme Court held in
Bartnicki. See discussion infra Part III.B.
55. Peavy, 221 F.3d at 180.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 193. The court overturned the lower court's determination that Title II was
unconstitutional as applied as well as its use of strict scrutiny as the standard of review. Id. at
194. The Bartnicki dissent essentially agreed with this court's reasoning. See discussion infra
Part III.D.
59. Peavy, 221 F.3d at 194.
60. 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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intercepted cellular phone conversation, the circuit court found that it was
the defendant's conduct that gave rise to liability under Title m. 61 Even
assuming some speech element was present, the court concluded that the less
exacting "O'Brien framework [was] the proper mode of ... analysis .' 62
Applying the O'Brien test, the court concluded Title 111 was constitutional as
applied to the non-media defendant who had not himself intercepted the
conversation but knew it was illegally obtained when he provided it to the
press. 63 The court, though, distinguished the non-media defendant from the
press, indicating that "[w]hether the statute would be constitutional as
applied to a newspaper who published excerpts from the tape-who, in other
words, engaged in speech-thus raises issues not before us."
64
When considering the clash between Title III's use and disclosure
provisions and the First Amendment, the courts were clearly struggling to
find the proper standard of review. Given the importance of these "interests
of the highest order," it is not surprising that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Bartnicki to resolve the conflict.65
Ell. BARTNICKI V. VOPPER
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court was presented with the issue
left unresolved in Florida Star, namely the scope of constitutional protection
afforded to speech that discloses truthful information of public importance
61. Id. at 467.
62. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the lower court's application of the
Daily Mail principle as well as the finding that the provision violated the First Amendment.
Id. at 476. The circuit court found the Daily Mail and Florida Star line of cases inapplicable
since the defendant was well aware of the illegality of the tapes when he took possession of
them. Id.
63. Boehner, 191 F.3d at 477-78.
64. Id. The court noted that the defendant did not "stand in the shoes of the
'newspaper' in Florida Star" and that the defendant's disclosure to the press was not the
equivalent of the newspaper's publication. Id. at 472. The dissent objected vehemently to this
distinction, explaining that "First Amendment protections.., extend to those who speak and
those who write, whether they be press barons, members of Congress, or other sources." Id. at
484 (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting). The media was not sued in this case. Karen N. Fredericksen,
The Supreme Court, the Press, and Illegally Recorded Cellular Telephone Calls, HUM. RTs.,
Fall 2001, at 17, 19 (2001).
65. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). The Supreme Court let the Peavy
decision stand in the aftermath of Bartnicki. Peavy, 221 F.3d at 158. At the same time it
rendered the Bartnicki decision, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Boehner
decision. Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, vacated, and
remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2190 (2001). See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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"unlawfully obtained. 66  The actual question the Court considered is a
narrower version of Florida Star's footnote eight:67 "Where the punished
publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a
manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully,
may the government punish the ensuing publication of that information
based on the defect in a chain? ' 68 A divided Supreme Court answered
"no !"6 9
A. The Facts
The facts giving rise to this issue of first impression occurred in the
contentious context of local union negotiations.70 Petitioner Bartnicki, the
chief negotiator for the local school board, called petitioner Kane, president
of the local union, from her cellular telephone. 71 They engaged in a lengthy
• • 72
conversation about a proposed strike. The call was intercepted and
recorded by an unidentified person who then anonymously placed the tape in
the mailbox of Jack Yocum, head of a local taxpayers organization.73
Yocum recognized the voices on the tape and knowing or having reason to
know it was illegally obtained, played the tape for the school board.74 He
also delivered it to res pondent Vopper, a radio commentator known for his
criticism of the union.
The unknown source initially made and disclosed the recording in
violation of Title III. 7 6 The recording contained unsettling remarks made by
Kane concerning the school board's intransigence: "If they're not gonna
move for three percent, we're gonna have to go to their, their homes ... To
blow off their front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those
66. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529. The question was also reserved in Landmark
Communincations, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978).
67. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (construing the issue narrowly "consistent with [the]
Court's repeated refusal to answer categorically whether truthful publication may ever be
punished consistent with the First Amendment.").
68. Id. at 528 (quoting Justice Sentelle's dissent in Boehner, 191 F.3d at 484-85).
69. Id. at 535.
70. Id. at518.
71. Id.
72. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
73. Id. at518-19.
74. Id. at 519.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 523.
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guys."' 77 Though Vopper knew or had reason to know that the conversation
had been illegally intercepted, he played excerpts from the tape on his
78public affairs show. Subsequently, Vopper and other media sources
79repeatedly rebroadcast the contents of the tapes.
Bartnicki and Kane filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania against Yocum, Vopper, and the radio
stations, alleging violations of Title Il's use and disclosure provisions and a
similar state statute.80 The District Court denied cross-motions for summary
judgment and then certified two questions for interlocutory appeal to the
Third Circuit. 81 First, whether imposing liability on the media defendants
for using and disclosing the contents of the illegally intercepted tape violates
the First Amendment, and second, whether imposing liability on Yocum for
disclosing the tape to the media violates the First Amendment. 82
When the Third Circuit Court of Appeals granted review the United
States intervened to defend Title 111 pursuant to statutory right. 8' The Third
Circuit upheld the lower court's denial of summary judgment in the Yocum
case, but reversed the denial as to the media defendants. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that the wiretapping statutes were content neutral
and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. But the court determined that
both the state and federal statutes "fail the test of intermediate scrutiny and
may not constitutionally be applied to penalize the use or disclosure of
illegally intercepted information where there is no allegation that the
defendants participated in or encouraged that interception., 86 The court
remanded the case with instructions to grant the media's motion for
87summary judgment. The Third Circuit denied the petitioners' ensuing
motions for rehearing and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 88
77. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518-19.
78. Id. at 519.
79. Id.; see discussion infra note 52.
80. Id. at 514, 519; see discussion infra note 52.
81. The questions were certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Bartnicki, 532 U.S.
at 521.
82. Id.
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2000) (allowing the government to intervene in any
action "wherein the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is
drawn in question.").
84. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 129 (3d Cir. 1999).
85. Id. at 123.
86. Id. at 129.
87. Id.
88. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 522 (2001).
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B. The Opinion89
At the outset, the Court acknowledges this case presents a "conflict
between interests of the highest order-on the one hand, the interest in the
full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues-and on
the other hand, the interest in individual privacy, and more specifically, in
fostering private speech." 90 Carefully considering the interests at stake, the
Court is "firmly convinced" that the First Amendment affords protection to
the respondents' disclosures.9I Thus, the question before the Court is
whether holding the respondents liable under Title III violates the First
Amendment.
92
Before addressing this constitutional question, the Court makes three
critical assumptions.9* First, the respondents played no role in the
interception itself and had no knowledge that it was being made.94 Second,
though the interception was made in violation of Title III, the respondents
lawfully received the information.95 Third, the intercepted conversation
involved "a matter of public concern" and the disclosed statements were
"newsworthy." 96
Turning to the constitutional issue, the Court deems Title III a content-
neutral statute.97 Though characterizing the use provision as a regulation of
conduct, the Court finds the disclosure provision a "regulation of pure
speech," analogizing it to the delivery of a pamphlet or a handbill.98 Citing
the Daily Mail principle as well as the primacy of the basic rule against prior
89. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined in the opinion,
written by Justice Stevens. Id. at 516. Justice Breyer authored the concurring opinion, joined
by Justice O'Connor. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist drafted the dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id.
90. Id. at 518.
91. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
92. Id. at 525. The Court draws "no distinction between the media respondents and
Yocum" in this regard. Id. at n.8.
93. Id. at 525.
94. Id.
95. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.
96. Id.
97. The Court reasoned that the communications are singled out because they are
intercepted; the statute thus distinguishes them "by virtue of the source, rather than the subject
matter." Id. at 526.
98. Id. at 526.
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restraints on publication, the Court concludes that strict scrutiny must be
applied. 99
The Court identifies two government interests supporting Title I: the
interest in deterring interceptions and "the interest in minimizing the harm to
persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted."' 00 The Court
assumes that these interests justify the disclosure provision when applied to
an "interceptor's own use" or disclosure of information.'0 ' But, the Court
asserts it does not follow that "punishing disclosures of lawfully obtained
information of public interest by one not involved in the initial illegality is
an acceptable means of serving" the same ends.1
0 2
The Court quickly dismisses the government's deterrence interest as
"plainly insufficient" to prohibit the disclosure of "public information" since
the government can better serve this interest by increasing the penalties on
interception itself. °3  It finds the second interest, minimizing harm,
considerably stronger since the disclosure of illegally intercepted private
communications could serve to inhibit private speech that is essential to the
functioning of a democratic society.' °4 The Court acknowledges that the
disclosure can be more invasive of privacy than the initial interception itself,
yet concludes that where sanctions on the publication of truthful information
of public concern are involved, privacy must "give way."' 0 5
The Court cites its opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan, reaffirming
the "general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is
secured by the First Amendment."'' 0 6 Recognizing that "neither factual error
nor defamatory content, nor a combination of the two, sufficed to remove the
First Amendment shield from criticism of official conduct,"' 7 the Court uses
"parallel reasoning" and holds Title III unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of the case. IN
99. Id. at 527-28 (referring to New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971), where the Court deemed the public's right to know superior to privacy interests).
100. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 532.
104. Id. at 532-33.
105. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534.
106. Id. (citing 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
107. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273
(1941)).
108. Id.
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C. The Concurring Opinion
Asserting that the decision does not afford "a significantly broader
constitutional immunity for the media," the concurring Justices stress the
narrowness of the Court's holding.' 9  Where competing constitutional
interests are at stake, the concurring Justices find the standard of strict
scrutiny inapplicable, preferring a balancing approach." 0 Balancing the
competing right to privacy with the First Amendment, given the specific
facts of this case, the concurring Justices nevertheless find Title lfl
unconstitutional as applied."'
The concurring Justices stress that Title IlI's direct restriction on speech
is necessary." 2  Since the threat of widespread dissemination creates a
powerful disincentive to speak, the government has a substantial interest in
broadly prohibiting the interception of private communications." 
3
Nevertheless, the concurrence concludes that Title III's disclosure provision
disproportionately burdens freedom of the press under the specific facts of
the case.' 14
Wary of creating a public interest exception to the statute,'15 the
concurring Justices emphasize that the petitioners "had little or no legitimate
interest in maintaining the privacy of the particular conversation."" 6 The
petitioners were contemplating a wrongful act that might have threatened the
safety of others. 1 7  Moreover, having voluntarily engaged in a public
controversy, the petitioners were "limited public figures. ' 18 The concur-
rence stresses that they thus had a more limited interest in privacy than
persons discussing purely personal matters "and the public interest in
defeating those expectations is unusually high."''9
109. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
110. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring).
113. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer fears a broad reading of the case
will inhibit legislatures from flexibly responding to advancing technology that threatens
privacy. Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring). He also urges legislatures to encourage privacy-
protecting technology. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring).
117. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
118. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
119. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 540 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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D. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting Justices fear that the Court's opinion diminishes the
purposes of the First Amendment by inhibiting the speech of millions of
Americans, particularly in light of advancing technology.12 0 Finding "scant
support, either in precedent or reason" to apply strict scrutiny, the dissent
would apply the O'Brien test to Title Ill since it is a content-neutral law of
general applicability that serves to foster both the right to privacy and
freedom of speech. The dissent distinguishes the Daily Mail line of cases
because the laws they implicated regulated the content or subject matter of
speech.122 Moreover, the dissent argues that unlike the laws under scrutiny
in the Daily Mail line, Title ll's disclosure provision does not inhibit
publication of information already in the public domain. 123  The dissent
focuses heavily on the statute's scienter requirement and argues that Title 111
does not operate as a prior restraint.124
Deeming the disclosure provision critical to achieving the government's
goals, the dissent thus finds Title I1 not only content-neutral, but narrowly
• 125
tailored to prohibit the disclosure of illegally intercepted conversations.
Stressing that the First Amendment also protects the right not to speak, the
dissent contends that "[tihe Constitution should not protect the involuntary
broadcast of personal conversations" even when the conversants are public
figures discussing public matters.116 The dissent affords a sphere of privacy
to public persons which encompasses the "right to have a private conversa-
tion without fear of it being intentionally intercepted and knowingly
disclosed."'' 27 Finding it unfortunate that the Court subordinates this right to
120. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 546-47 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent distinguishes Daily Mail
from the case at bar on three grounds: first, the information there was lawfully obtained from
the government itself whereas here, the private conversations have been intentionally kept out
of the public domain; second, the information in those cases was available to the public before
the media disclosed it; and third, the fear of resulting self-censorship was greater in the Daily
Mail line because Title III provides a scienter requirement and no duty is imposed on the
media to inquire into the source so there is no liability for negligent disclosures. Bartnicki,
532 U.S. at 546-47 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 547 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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privacy to the freedom of the press, the dissent would hold the statute
constitutional as applied to the facts of the case.128
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BARTNICKI DECISION
The rule of Bartnicki is seemingly clear: absent an "interest of the
highest order," the First Amendment affords the press the right to publish a
public figure's illegally intercepted "speech" on matters of public concern as
• . . 129
long as it did not participate in the initial interception. Prior to Bartnicki,
the Daily Mail principle required courts to make two determinations when
publishing truthful information.' 30  "[F]irst, whether the information was
lawfully acquired, and second, whether [the publication] addressed a matter
of public concern."''3 Bartnicki shifts the focus exclusively to the second
question. 32 It now appears that the only factor limiting the press's ability to
publish truthful information is whether it addresses a matter of public133
concern. This section begins by considering the Court's reasoning. It
then addresses the ambiguities and likely impact of the decision, finding that
the rule of Bartnicki is not as clear as it seems.
A. The Court's Content-Based Decision
Ironically, in holding a content neutral law of general applicability
unconstitutional as applied, the Court focuses on the content of the
disclosure itself. The Bartnicki decision clearly elevates speech on matters
of public concern above other forms of speech protected under the First
Amendment. 134 Ultimately, it also signals the triumph of press freedom over
privacy interests. 35  Yet, a majority of the Court affords greater weight to
the right to privacy and freedom of speech than the holding suggests. 36 Five
128. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 555 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
129. Karen N. Frederiksen, The Supreme Court, the Press, and Illegally Recorded
Cellular Telephone Calls, HUM. RTS., Fall 2001, at 17, 18.
130. Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306, 413 (2001).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id
134. Id.
135. Paul M. Smith & Nory Miller, When Can the Courts Penalize the Press Based on
Newsgathering Misconduct?, COMM. LAW., Summer 2001, at 1.
136. Id. at 28 (noting that five Justices seem willing to hold the press liable for
disclosing the contents of a third party's "illegal interception if the circumstances are
sufficiently different from those presented in this case").
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Justices assert that strict scrutiny is an improper standard of review where
privacy interests conflict with the First Amendment.13 1 Clearly, the two
concurring and three dissenting Justices are troubled by the Court's
reasoning. They have reason to be. The Court's analysis is logically
unsound, but will impact the legal interplay between the right to privacy,
freedom of speech, and freedom of the press in an era where technological
advances increasingly threaten privacy in communications.
1. Pure Speech?
The Court's application of the Daily Mail principle is predicated on its
assertion that Title 111's disclosure provision regulates "pure speech" rather
than expressive conduct. 38  Since the "speech" disclosed by the media
involves a matter of public importance, the Court applies the Daily Mail
principle and renders Title III unconstitutional as applied.' 39 But, it is not
clear at the outset that disclosure of an illegally intercepted communication
is "pure speech" at all within the meaning of the First Amendment.
The Court determines that a Title 1H1 disclosure involves "pure speech"
by analogizing the disclosure to the delivery of a pamphlet or a handbill.' 4°
But the analogy itself is flawed. 14 1 The delivery of a pamphlet or handbill
involves the intentional disclosure of its contents by the author or agents of
the author. 142 Though the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications
likewise provides the recipient the text of the statements, the statements
being disclosed are not initially intended for publication. 43 On the contrary,
these communications occur in private and are meant to remain confiden-
tial. 144
Simply put, it is illogical to term the media disclosure "pure speech."
The broadcast of these communications clearly implicates both the
deliberately private speech of the conversant and the intentional conduct of
137. Id.
138. Bartnicki, 532 U.S at 527.
139. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001).
140. Id. at 527.
141. Id. at 540 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 541; Brief Amicus Curiae Cellular Tel. Indus. Ass'n at *17, Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687), available at 2000 WL 1280461 (providing an in
depth analysis of this issue).
144. Even if the petitioners' expectations of privacy were diminished as the
concurrence asserts, they never intended the contents of their conversation to be divulged.
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
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the press in disclosing it.1 45  Disclosing the contents of an illegally
intercepted communication is simply not "pure speech" as the Court holds.
Nevertheless, the Court finds this "pure speech" concerns a matter of public
concern and applies the Daily Mail principle. The Court's foundation for
applying strict scrutiny is tenuous.
2. Compelling Speech
As the dissent points out, the First Amendment promotes the voluntary
freedoms of expression. 146 The First Amendment was not ratified to coerce
Americans to divulge their private conversations. 14  The Supreme Court of
the United States recognized this critical distinction in Harper & Row when
it noted that the right not to speak is not only protected under the First
Amendment, but serves the same ultimate purposes as the freedom to
speak. 48  Democracy requires that citizens are afforded privacy to think
creatively and constructively without fear of exposure. 49 Yet, the Bartnicki
Court holds that if the press receives information on a matter of public
concern from an outside source that broke the law to obtain it, then the press
cannot constitutionally be punished for publishing it.' 50 Bartnicki compels
the speech of the victim of the illegal interception.
At the crux of the First Amendment "lies the principle that each person
should decide for himself or herself the ideas or beliefs deserving of
expression."' 5  The Court's analysis ignores a core purpose of the First
Amendment by holding that public persons have abandoned their right to
converse privately when discussing matters of public concern. 15 Over a
century ago, Justices Warren and Brandeis surmised that as life becomes
more complex and civilization advances, privacy becomes more essential to
145. Amicus Brief at *17, Bartnicki (No. 99-1687).
146. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 553.
147. Id. at 540.
148. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985).
149. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
150. The Court has upheld press freedom to publish material unlawfully divulged by a
source, but in Bartnicki, the disclosed information was never in the public domain in the first
place, nor was it leaked by a source that rightfully had access to it. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (distinguishing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) and New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) on the basis of the government's
ultimate authority over the divulged information and the prior restraint imposed).
151. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
152. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539.
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the individual. 5 3 Could they ever have imagined the modern threats to
privacy in communications? The Court's decision compels speech,
diminishes the right to speak privately, and thus undermines an essential
element of democratic society that the First Amendment was designed to
promote.
3. Ignoring the Facts
The Bartnicki Court acknowledges that disclosing "the contents of a
private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the
interception itself."154 Yet the Court holds that although the media can be
held liable under Title III for illegally intercepting a communication, it
cannot constitutionally be punished for disclosing that same information
unless it was involved in the initial illegality.' 55 The Court reaches this
conclusion in part by finding that Title III's disclosure provision has no
significant deterrent effect on the initial interception.' 56 Instead, the Court
argues that punishment of the offender is the usual method of deterring
unlawful conduct. 57 The Court suggests that the government further its
interest in privacy of communications by imposing stiffer sanctions on
violations of the procurement prong. 58
While the Court limits the holding to the facts of the case, the Court's
outright rejection of the deterrence rationale 59 ignores the facts of the ver
case it is deciding. In Bartnicki, the initial offender is unknown.
Imposing stiffer sanctions on the initial offender is meaningless. The
government cannot further its objectives by punishing the source. As the
dissent argues, preventing the offender "from enjoying the fruits of the
crime" is a "time-tested" solution to deterring illegal acts that are difficult to
detect. 
161
153. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31, at 196.
154. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
155. Leading Case, supra note 132, at 406, 413.
156. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 530.
160. Id. at 518.
161. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 550 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(citing both the knowing possession of stolen goods and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule as examples).
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The Court justifies its own dismissal of the facts simply by stating
"surely this is [an] exceptional case., 162 Bartnicki may indeed present an
unusual set of facts, but this does not excuse the Court from addressing the
facts before it. Privacy interests suffer as a result; 163 permitting the press to
disclose the contents of an illegally intercepted communication increases the
demand for illegal interceptions. This is especially true on matters of public
concern where the interceptor's primary objective is likely disclosure of the
information itself. Failing to address the facts of the case at bar, the Court
seriously undermines Title lil's mandate of maintaining privacy in
communications.
4. A Tale of Two Evils
The Court's consideration of the use and disclosure provisions is
equally troublesome. While deeming disclosure "pure speech," the Court
expressly states that the use of illegally intercepted communications
constitutes conduct. '64 Since laws regulating conduct are generally subject
to the less exacting O'Brien test,165 imposing liability on the media for using
an illegally intercepted communication is more likely constitutionally
permissible than punishing disclosure of the same information. Arguably,
the speaker's sphere of privacy is more directly invaded by a verbatim
broadcast of private communications than by the media's use of the
information to investigate a story.
The result is illogical because the Court effectively permits the press to
commit the greater of two evils. If Vopper had used the intercepted
information as an investigative lead and never disclosed the actual contents
on the air, the Court's reasoning implies that the press could be held liable
for violating Title llt's use provision without offending the First Amend-
ment.166 Yet, the Court holds that punishing Vopper's verbatim broadcast of
the same information violates the First Amendment and is therefore
unconstitutional.167 The Court's reasoning permits the press to disclose the
162. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 531.
163. Conflict is created when a "general principle of law is applied to a case, although
not applicable to the particular facts of that case." Sacks v. Sacks, 267 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla.
1972).
164. "Unlike the prohibition against the 'use' of the contents of an illegal intercep-
tion... [disclosure] is not a regulation of conduct." Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526-27.
165. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
166. See Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (labeling Title III's
disclosure provision as conduct and finding it withstands the O'Brien test).
167. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 532.
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conversation, while prohibiting it from engaging in the lesser evil of use. In
the aftermath of Bartnicki, it appears that the media is safer directly invading
a public figure's privacy than searching for a less intrusive means of
presenting the same story. Surely, the Court could not have intended this
illogical result.
The Court's reasoning is illogical and inconsistent. The underlying
premise of the Court's opinion, that this disclosure is in fact "pure speech,"
is not justified. The Court not only fails to acknowledge that the First
Amendment is designed to promote the voluntary freedoms of expression,
but ignores the facts of the case at bar as well as the contradictory implica-
tions of its reasoning. Based on this defective foundation, the Court builds a
hierarchy of First Amendment interests, elevating the freedom of the press
above the freedom of speech and the right not to speak. By focusing so
heavily on the freedom of the press to publish truthful information of public
concern, the Court undervalues both the right to privacy and the First
Amendment freedom of speech.
B. Implications of Bartnicki v. Vopper
The Court's reasoning, flawed as it is, will affect the outcome of future
conflicts involving privacy rights and First Amendment freedoms; Bartnicki
is the law. Bartnicki clearly signals a triumph for press freedom to publish
truthful information on matters of public concern, but the extent the Court
has extended this freedom is unclear.168 Since the Court leaves important
issues unresolved, the effect of the decision is dependent upon judicial
interpretation. Although the decision is termed narrow, in an era of
advancing technology privacy interests will increasingly collide with
freedom of the press and Bartnicki's impact is potentially far-reaching.
1. Unresolved Issues
Bartnicki leaves important questions unanswered. The Court makes
three critical assertions that render the full significance of the decision
unclear; the speakers are public figures, the media had no involvement in
and no knowledge of the initial interception, and the information broadcast is
of public concern. It is unlikely that future cases will present such pure
factual scenarios. The legal interplay between privacy interests and freedom
168. The concurring Justices claim "the Court's holding does not imply a significantly
broader constitutional immunity for the media." Id. at 536.
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of the press is thus dependent upon how the judiciary interprets these factors,
_ ./ • • 169
including the weight afforded to the concurring opinion.
First, the Bartnicki holding is predicated on a finding that the speech
disclosed was made by public figures. The concurring Justices in Bartnicki
emphasize that because Bartnicki and Kane are public figures, their privacy
expectations are diminished. If the courts give weight to the concurring
opinion, the press may be afforded even greater constitutional protection
where public officials are involved. 70  Unfortunately, the Court does not
address whether the holding governs disclosures of private individual's
communications.' But by the same reasoning, the courts may afford the
press less constitutional protection when the speech of private figures is at
issue.
Second, the Court assumes that the media had no involvement in or
knowledge of the initial interception. Clearly, if the press actively partici-
pates in the interception, it can be held liable under Title mI's procurement
and disclosure prongs. But, the Court does not determine the threshold level
of press involvement necessary to trigger liability for disclosure. Can the
press be held liable under the disclosure prong while indirectly participating
in the initial interception? 172 Is mere knowledge that the interception is
taking place sufficient to trigger liability? 173 Bartnicki leaves these questions
unanswered. The scope of protection Bartnicki affords the press will remain
unclear until these issues are litigated.
1 74
Finally, and perhaps most critically, the Court assumes that the
intercepted conversation involves a "matter of public concern."' 175 Yet as the
dissent points out, "'public concern' is an amorphous concept that the Court
does not even attempt to define."' 176 The opinion indicates that the speaker's
interest in maintaining privacy does not determine whether a matter of public
concern exists, but fails to clarify what makes a matter newsworthy.1
77
How publicly important must the disclosure be to place the press under
the protective umbrella of the decision? The Court notes that domestic
169. Smith & Miller, supra note 135, at 29.
170. Frederiksen, supra note 129, at 19.
171. See id.
172. See discussion infra Part IH.B.2.
173. Frederiksen, supra note 129, at 19. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999), suggests knowledge is not enough to trigger press liability for
publication. Smith & Miller, supra note 136, at 30.
174. See discussion infra Part HII.B.2.
175. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
176. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
177. Smith & Miller, supra note 135, at 30.
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gossip does not fall within the ambit of the decision, but what if this gossip
is about a public official? 78 The Court distinguishes trade secrets from
matters of public importance, yet what if the secrets involve illegality?
179
Was the disclosure in Bartnicki of simple public importance or, as the
concurring Justices argue, of unusual public significance? Bartnicki
provides no guidance, leaving the line between issues of private and public
concern as ambiguous as ever.'80
The Court elevates matters of public concern above other forms of
protected speech without presenting coherent guidelines for determining
when the holding actually applies to a media disclosure. "[G]iven the
malleability of the public concern standard and the ease of ex post
explanations" the Court might have effectively answered the one question it
• 181
repeatedly refuses to answer categorically; whether truthful publication
may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment."' Bartnicki
intimates that the press cannot be constitutionally prevented from publishing
truthful information, regardless of the source. 183  But if the concurring'
rationale is followed, press freedom and privacy interests may be afforded
variable protection based on the status of the speaker and the public
significance of the disclosed speech. 84
2. Resolution in the Aftermath? Peavy and Boehner
Shortly after rendering the Bartnicki decision, the Court denied
certiorari in Peavy and granted review in Boehner. 85 In the long term,
litigation of these and other cases will help resolve the ambiguities of the
Bartnicki decision.186 For now, analyzing the Court's certiorari decisions
provides insight into the scope of Bartnicki.187  The Court's certiorari
178. Id. at 28-29.
179. Id.
180. Leading Cases, supra note 132, at 415.
181. Id. at 416.
182. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527.
183. Leading Cases, supra note 132, at 416.
184. Concurring opinions can be significant. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
185. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
1051 (2001); Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, vacated,
and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2190 (2001).
186. Frederiksen, supra note 129, at 18.
187. Having analyzed Pravda for many years, this author takes a Kremlinological
approach.
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decisions suggest three things. First, the threshold question is whether
matters of public concern are disclosed. The more newsworthy the matter,
the higher the government's interest must be to justify regulation. Second,
and related, when the speech disclosed is that of a prominent public official,
stricter scrutiny is required. Third, any indication of press entanglement may
remove the press from Bartnicki's protective umbrella.
The United States Supreme Court allowed the Peavy decision to stand
despite the fact that the lower court applied intermediate, rather than strict
scrutiny. 188 This seemingly inconsistent denial can perhaps be explained by
189the possibility that more than "pure speech" is at issue in Peavy. Unlike
Bartnicki, this case implicates the concept of press involvement, requiring a
factual analysis of whether the media "obtained" the interceptors. 190 The
United States Supreme Court's denial of review may indicate that when the
press is involved in the illegal interception, Bartnicki does not govern the
outcome at all. Perhaps when the media even indirectly "participates" in the
initial interception, intermediate scrutiny is sufficient.
After granting certiorari in Boehner, the United States Supreme Court
vacated the decision below and remanded it for consideration consistent with
Bartnicki.'9' The vacated opinion applied the O'Brien test and concluded
that Congressman McDermott, a non-media defendant, could be held liable
for disclosing an illegally intercepted communication made by a third party
to the media.' 92 Perhaps the enormous public significance of the disclosure
triggered the United States Supreme Court's remand. 93 Or perhaps it was
because the speech disclosed was that of Newt Gingrich, a prominent public
official. In either case, the remand in Boehner suggests that when matters
are of national significance, the O'Brien test is an improper mode of
analysis. Whether disclosed by the press or by a non-media defendant,
speech, not conduct, is at issue.
The remand of Boehner may be most significant in that the United
States Supreme Court did not reverse the decision below, thereby holding
the non-media defendant to the same standard of review as the media
defendant in Bartnicki. Although the remand indicates that a higher level of
scrutiny is required, it does not demand that the First Amendment must
188. Peavy, 221 F.3d at 181.
189. Frederiksen, supra note 129, at 19.
190. Id.
191. Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, vacated
and remanded, 532 U.S. 1050 (2001).
192. The media was not sued. Fredericksen, supra note 129, at 19.
193. Id.
2002]
185
: Nova Law Review 27, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
triumph when the media is not involved. It remains to be seen whether
McDermott, a non-media defendant, is immune from liability under Title Inl
like the press, or should be held liable for disclosure under a different
rationale.
V. A STANDARD OF ITS OWN?
The Court claims adherence to the general rule that the First Amend-
ment does not subject enforcement of a general law against the press to
stricter scrutiny than would be applied to others.194 In fact, in a one-sentence
footnote, the Court asserts that it "draw[s] no distinction between the media
respondents and Yocum.' ' 195 Thus, the Court does not explicitly hold the
press to a different standard of review. Yet, if the footnote is read literally, it
implies that the disclosure provision is unconstitutional in every instance
when the initial interception is made by an outside party without press
involvement, the disclosure involves a matter of public significance, and the
"speech" disclosed is that of a public figure. The Court's reasoning does not
support such a broad reading.
Logic dictates that the Court's rationale cannot be applied to a non-
media defendant's disclosure. The holding is not only rooted in freedom of
the press, but freedom of the press permeates every aspect of the Court's
analysis. The Court tellingly frames the question presented narrowly in
order to be consistent with its "repeated refusal to answer categorically
whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First
Amendment."' 196 Publication is defined as "[lthe act or process of publish-
ing" printed material. 97 Publish means "[t]o prepare and issue (printed
material) for public distribution or sale."' 98 When the media institution is
not the disclosing party, there is no publication, rendering the Daily Mail
principle inapplicable to the analysis.
Clearly Yocum's disclosure of the illegally intercepted communication
is substantively identical to the media's, but the form of his disclosure is
distinguishable. Although Yocum is exercising his freedom of speech by
disclosing information to the media, he is not publishing it. His disclosure
does not directly implicate the First Amendment freedom of the press.
194. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
195. Id. at 525, n.8.
196. Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
197. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 628 (Williams Morris ed. 2001). This
paper uses the term broadly to include all media disclosures.
198. Id.
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Yocum's disclosure to the non-media party does not even indirectly
implicate press freedom. Though Bartnicki does not address the issue of
whether the non-media defendant's liability is dependent upon the endpoint
of his disclosure, applying the Daily Mail principle is clearly inappropriate
when there is no publication.199
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the United States Supreme Court held
that a newspaper publisher has no special immunity from general laws to
invade the rights of others. 2°° Title ImI is a content-neutral law of general
applicability. In Bartnicki, the media respondents invaded the petitioners'
privacy by disclosing their confidential conversations initially intercepted in
violation of Title III. The Bartnicki decision subjects Title III to stricter
scrutiny when applied to the press than as applied to others because the
Daily Mail principle is inapplicable when a non-media defendant makes the
same disclosure. Implicitly, the decision holds the press to a lesser standard
of liability when violating a content-neutral law of general applicability than
it does others. The Court has effectively offended its own rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bartnicki clearly signals the triumph of freedom of the press over the
right to privacy and other freedoms of expression protected by the First
Amendment. But Bartnicki also demonstrates the importance of the distinc-
tion between legality and morality. Though it is now legally permissible for
the media to publish a public person's illegally seized speech on a matter of
public concern, it is not necessarily morally justifiable to do so. Despite the
201law, not all journalists would compel speech under the facts of Bartnicki.
Fortunately, morality and legality are not one in the same.
Certainly, journalists balanced the public right to know against the
individual right to privacy before Bartnicki. But as advancing technology
increasingly threatens privacy in communications, Bartnicki creates an
additional ethical dilemma for the media. Currently, many codes of ethics
199. If Bartnicki and Kane had sued only Yocum without suing the media, it is difficult
to imagine that the Supreme Court would have granted certiorari. Unlike Boehner, this case
does not involve matters of national significance or the speech of high-level public officials.
Although acknowledging that Yocum and McDermott technically stand in the same shoes, the
Third Circuit distinguished McDermott's disclosure based on his political motivations and his
potential involvement in the initial interception. Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129.
200. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
201. Interview with A. Barrett Seaman, Editor Emeritus, Time Magazine, in Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla. (Feb. 14, 2002).
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neglect to even address privacy interests. 202 Competition among journalists
can transform a little irresponsibility into a colossal peril for the individual
right to privacy. Bartnicki proclaims press freedom is first and foremost in
importance. Prominence ought to be accompanied by responsibility. Our
right to privacy depends on it.
202. Bob Steele, Codes of Ethics and Beyond, available at
http://www.poynter.org/research/me/coethics.htm (Apr. 1999).
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